

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE

MORAL CLASS BOOK,

OR THE

LAW OF MORALS;

DERIVED FROM THE

CREATED UNIVERSE,

AND FROM

REVEALED RELIGION.

INTENDED FOR SCHOOLS.

'Nil enim prodest, quod lædere non possit idem.'

'The statutes of the Lord, are right; rejoicing the heart:
The commandment of the Lord is pure; enlightening the eyes.'
PSALM xix. 8.

BY WILLIAM SULLIVAN,
COUNSELLOR AT LAW.

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WAITT & DOW'S POWER PRESS.

TO THE CHILDREN OF THE UNITED STATES.

You are *now*, an interesting portion of the Inhabitants of this Country. *In a short time*, you will be an important part of the many millions, who are engaged in the serious business of life. You will be held to perform all the duties incident to life, and to society; and you MAY *be* entitled to all the happiness, which rational beings are capable of knowing. If any one could inform you in what manner these duties may be performed, and by what means you may secure that happiness, should you think the information worth having? This volume is intended to impart such information. Whether it be adapted to the intended purpose, remains to be known. One thing is certain; it will never do you any injury; for, it will never be put into your hands, until persons, more competent to judge than you, or I, can be, shall have decided, that it is a proper volume for your use.

If you should be required to study this volume, you will find, that you have been soberly thought of by one who believes, that the preservation of civil and religious liberty, and of the means of individual and national happiness, DEPENDS ON YOU, *if you are properly instructed.*

WM. SULLIVAN.

Boston, (Mass.) August 1, 1831.

PREFACE.

It may be asked why a member of a *lay* profession, should 'break and enter the close' of the professed teachers of religion, and morality? There are many reasons, and among them, that this volume is one proof of the efficacy of their teaching; and that whatsoever may be found in it, worthy of notice, may be referred, directly or indirectly, to that origin. It is probable, that if the writer had never heard a *sermon*, he would never have attempted to make a book; most certainly, not such a one as this. He has heard from public teachers, that it is every one's duty to inquire, and to satisfy himself, that those things which are presented to him as truths, are such. He has tried to perform that duty; and having arrived at conclusions satisfactory to himself, he has ventured to suppose that he should not offend in presenting them, and the course taken to obtain them, to other minds.

There are other reasons. The writer has had opportunities, which professed teachers cannot have, to apply sober truths, to human life, as it actually oc-

curs. Those who are engaged, for many years in places where public justice is administered, must see all the varieties of human character; they must know the causes of immorality, and depravity, which operate on society; they are seen by public teachers rather by inference, and results ; they are seen by members of the legal profession, in their reality; in their beginning, process, and end.

A public teacher of religion and morality, cannot be expected to prepare a school book on such subjects, in the familiar, practical, and unpretending form, in which a layman may do it. Such a teacher, must, in such a labor, do justice to himself, to his profession, and to society. His work must partake of the dignity of his calling, and he must sustain the rank which he is known to hold when teaching from the sacred desk. A layman is under no like responsibilities. He is one of the multitude of the people. If his book be worth notice, it will be noticed. If it proves to be of no value, no one is injured ; no one is humbled, but himself.

It is due to any, and to all, into whose hands this volume may chance to come, to go a little further. There appears to be an honorable zeal, in this country, to promote common and scientific education. Within the present century, the means to this end, have been greatly extended, reformed, and improved. This zeal is founded on the truth of the maxim, that civil liberty reposes on intelligence, and virtue; and virtue, it

is said, reposes on intelligence. If all this were clearly so, perhaps not much more is necessary, than thorough instruction in languages, in the measuring of quantities, in the qualities of matter, in the action of matter upon matter, and in the faculties of the human mind, and in the use of them. It is not certain that intelligent persons, will always be virtuous ones. Mere learning, may be a facility in doing wrong. To produce the effect intended, and desired, the course of instruction should comprise religion, and morality. Are not all young persons, in this country, who receive an education, instructed in these important matters? We think they are not. We venture to assume, that religious truths, and the principles of morality, should be taught, as the sciences are taught. It is supposed that they are so taught in colleges, in the higher classes, and as a polish to a classical education. In our humble judgment, they should be taught in schools; and almost as soon as anything is taught. Dry precepts, and axioms, will not make a religious, and moral heart; the principles of action, and of thought, by which one is to live, and die, and which are to give a character to all one knows, and does, are not to be learned at a mother's knee; by occasional readings; periodical acts of devotion; nor by angry commentaries, upon follies and errors. If it be desired to impart a knowledge of grammar, for example, a boy is not told in the beginning, that the object in view is, to make of him a grammarian. He is told to get and recite, lesson after lesson, until he has gone through his book. When this work is done, he *is* a grammarian. In like manner, a boy should be

taught the principles of religion, and morality. If he be so taught, it is believed that these principles will arise, and be applied, in after life, like the principles of the common sciences. In short, we think, there is no other way of learning any thing, unless it be mere muscular movements, which depend on imitation.

If we are well founded in these opinions, it is quite another matter, whether this book be, or be not, properly adapted to give effect to them ; if not so adapted, and this theory of teaching, is, nevertheless, right, some more fortunate laborer will carry it into practical use.

The plan of this volume is to search out the original principles of morality. They are supposed to have been found in the laws of the created universe. We have endeavored to prove, that this universe must have proceeded from Supreme Intelligence, Almighty power, and unbounded goodness ; that it is one connected, and dependent system of being ; that physical, intellectual, moral, and religious man, is necessarily a part of it ; that his relation to the universe, can be discerned and understood by the light of reason ; that what he thus learns, is confirmed, and sanctioned, by Divine revelation. Beyond this we do not go ; and beyond this we need not go, since it is thus disclosed, and made certain, *that the law of morals, is the will of* God.

It may be supposed, that such an inquiry would necessarily lead to peculiar, and even to sectarian opinions, in religion. This consequence does not follow. If it did, there is no call to introduce it into this vol-

ume ; nor is it introduced. We know, and respect, the differences which exist, in religious opinions, in this free land. With these, on this occasion, we have no concern. The sole purpose is to illustrate the principles of that morality, which all denominations of Christians respect.

It seems to be a principle, seen every where, that every thing which has existence, shall have beginning, and progression, *to some purpose*, and a termination ; that the ending of one thing, is a preparation for some other thing to begin, go on, and end. In the natural world, this principle is seen to operate with admirable wisdom, and benevolence. But, where intellectual and moral beings appear, and where, consequently, an act, may or may not be done ; or where one thing may be done, and not another, there may be wisdom or folly, virtue or vice, happiness or misery. The purpose of this book is to apply this principle to man, as a physical, intellectual, and moral agent ; and as the only being (known to him) who is capable of the sentiment of religion.

Persons who are familiar with books, will see, if they read this, very little that is *new* to them. Like other writers, on similar subjects, we have attempted to lift heavy bodies, and to arrange them anew. Almost any one who will attempt this, will find that he has strength enough to do it, to some effect; but whether the new order will be better or worse than former ones, must depend on other opinions, than those of the laborers.

Though this is intended for a school book, it has not the usual *questions*. No opinion is meant to be expressed, by this omission, whether questions in school books, are profitable, or not. If this book should prove to be of any use, it will not be by requiring recitations from it, *by heart*, and in the very words therein used. The pupil should read ; and when he comprehends the thoughts intended to be communicated, he should close his book, and express what he understands *in his own words ;* THERE CAN BE NONE SO GOOD FOR HIS USE.

THE

MORAL CLASS BOOK.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

Every thoughtful person finds that inquiries arise in his mind of this nature, What am I? Whence am I? For what purposes do I exist? What is this which is called life? What is the power of thinking? Will the consciousness of being cease when this life ends? If not, will that consciousness relate to the acts done in this life? If so, in what manner, and with what consequences? If I doubt what answers I must give to these questions, why do I doubt? Is it beyond my power to remove my doubts? If I believe nothing of a future state of being as a consequence of the present being, have I done what I ought to do, to inform myself whether this be so or not? If I have a sentiment of being liable to account in a future life for my conduct in this, is it a mere sentiment, or is it founded in reason, and binding on me as a conviction, which I cannot free myself from?

Inquiries also arise in many minds of this nature: If there be a Supreme Being who created and who governs the universe, and who is supremely good and wise, why are the good and wise on earth sometimes subjected to suffering and to sorrow? Why is there, to such persons, so much of pain in body and in mind? Why do disappointments and afflictions fall on those who strive to perform their duty in all things? Why

do not the punishments of divine justice fall on those who violate the laws of the Supreme Being? Why is it, that worldly prosperity, respect, and honor, are often bestowed on those who violate all the laws which the righteous Judge of all the earth must have prescribed?

Why is it that man is so commonly the bitter and relentless enemy of man? Why is it that he hazards the destruction of his own property, his own liberty, and even his own life, to destroy property, liberty, and life in others? Why is it that we take pleasure in depreciating the good qualities of others, and in presenting their faults, follies, and errors to the notice of those who were before ignorant of them? Why do we feel emotions of dissatisfaction when others prosper, and regard the welfare of others as though it were a wrong done to ourselves? Why do we mourn over that which is past and which cannot be recalled; and tremble at that which has not come, and which may never come? Why is it that kind acts done to others are frequently forgotten by them; and sometimes regarded by them as a grievous burthen; and sometimes repaid by acts of unkindness, and reproach, and even of injury? Why is it that so much of human life is spent in vain and profitless pursuits? Why is it that when disabled and suffering, in body or mind, that we can so rarely console ourselves with the fact, that we did not cause our own distress? Why is it that family connexion (seemingly ordained as a necessary condition of human life) is so often a cause of irritation and vexation? Why are children sometimes inclined to regard parents rather as tyrannical and heartless rulers, than as affectionate and worthy governors; and why are parents sometimes led to regret that they have given birth to offspring, who are fastened on them by ties which cannot be broken? Why is it that unceasing parental care, and the wisest precaution in rearing children, are repaid by that bitter disappointment which must be hidden within the heart, and wept over unseen by any human eye? Why is it that when parental care

has been successfully applied, and when we see the coming forth of fruits, intellectual and moral, that in one little moment the blast of destruction passes over, and the remaining act is, to close the sepulchre on the remnant of lost hopes and joys?

What is that principle of our nature that compels us to some sort of action; and which will drive us into such as is hurtful to ourselves and to others, if we are not directed to those of an opposite character? Whence comes that sense of disappointment when success has crowned our pursuits? Why is it that one, in the enjoyment of bodily ease, and of worldly wealth, and apparently in command of abundance in those things which the world calls good, and for which mortals submit to unceasing toil, is, sometimes, the most disgusted of all men with life; finding no pleasure in the smiling earth, in the busy haunts, nor any good under the sun? Why is it that men need forcible and irresistible powers of government among themselves? Why do those who know that power is difficult to hold, and more difficult to use aright, earnestly desire it? Why is it that those who have power, either do not, or cannot, use it honorably to themselves and beneficially for others? Why are so many of the human race subjected to the most miserable poverty; so many wretched from the misuse, and abuse of bodily and mental power; so many deprived of personal liberty; and so many hung up between the heavens and the earth by order of their fellow men, in the presence of curious thousands, who laugh at the exhibition of death; admire the firmness, or despise the weakness of one who, in full possession of all his faculties, knows, that within a few moments he shall be dead by violence?—How does it happen that good and virtuous men, in reflecting on the change which is soon to come, and when the places that have known them will know them no more forever, do feel a sense of doubt, and even of despondency, as to their future destiny; and would gladly be assured that all they have habitually thought to be true, is unquestionably so?

Inquiries of this nature may be indefinitely multiplied. It is of little use to make them, if there be no answers to them. They have been answered, in general, among the learned; and in a learned manner. Can they be answered to the comprehension of the many, and especially of the young? Let us suppose that no small part of all that we see of folly, error and crime, and consequent suffering and misery, arises, not from the laws of the Creator, but from ignorance of these laws, or wilful disobedience of them; then it would follow, that the remedy lies, in making these laws known. When and how is this to be done? Not by leaving to each individual to find out the meaning and force of these laws through painful experience, and when the consequences of ignorance and disobedience are already fastened on him; but to make them known, before the responsible action of adult life begins. If there be rules for human life, which come from a Law-giver who cannot err; if these rules are laid down for subjects who are entrusted with the liberty of obeying or disobeying, it is inadmissible to suppose, that these rules cannot be found out, and made known to all who are to be affected by them.

To disclose these rules and make them operative, is a duty to ourselves, and to each other. The mode of doing it may be differently thought of by different persons. That which seems most likely to be effective is to address human reason, in a simple and intelligible manner, and in such manner that the opening mind may comprehend the truths which are taught. Such is the purpose of this work. No mysteries will be resorted to; no display of learning attempted. As these pages are intended for the use of children we shall address only their own good sense. They will be called on to judge by the light of reason wherewith their Creator has blessed them. If the intention with which this work is undertaken be proper and practicable, those who will bestow the time and attention necessary to that end, may, it is humbly hoped, be enabled to answer many of the inquiries before suggested,

so far as the enlightened minds which have left a record of their thoughts can assist and guide us in the search after truth.

The design of this volume is to prove that there is a Supreme Being; that he is the Creator and Governor of the Universe; that he created man as we see him to exist, in his earthly frame, in his intellectual powers, and with an immortal spirit; that there is placed within his reach the knowledge of the laws intended for government here; and that life here is connected with an existence, which is to be attained through the House appointed for all that have lived, that do live, and that are to live.

CHAPTER II.

Proofs of the Existence of the Supreme Being.

The propositions which must be established as the foundation of religious duty and of moral conduct in this life, and of hope in another and better life, are in substance, these.

Sect. 1. There is a Supreme Being who is the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things and of all beings; he intended human life to be a benefit to those to whom it is given;—and it may be a benefit, or not, according to the use which is made of it; the means of making it a benefit are placed within the comprehension of all to whom life and reason are given. Mankind are permitted to choose whether they will obey, or disobey; and subjected in this life, and in a future one, to the consequences of their acts and omissions.

2. In the first proposition, that there is a Supreme Being, we place revelation at present, out of the inquiry, and ask how can it be known that there is such

a Being?—and that he has prescribed rules for the conduct of the human race? How can we certainly know that man does not perish, and return to the earth, as we believe, that the vegetable kingdom and the whole race of animals inferior to man certainly do?

3. We propose to address the proofs which we have to offer to those minds, which admit, that man whencesoever he came, and whithersoever he is to go, and whether he returns to the earth, or ascends to heaven, is capable in his own nature, of comprehending facts and truths; and that he may, and commonly does, govern himself in his most serious and interesting acts of life, by ascertaining what is true when he can; and by inferences from known or supposed truths, when he can approach no nearer to certainty. It is believed that in the common exercise of the human faculties, there can be no other rule of government. If there be any persons who claim to be governed or guided by any other rules, we do not attempt to deal with them. It may be said that all knowledge is founded on experience; and that nothing is to be admitted to be true of which we have no experience. This saying is true, as to the common operation of the laws of nature in the material world. It cannot be true in relation to those things of which we have not had any experience. Thus knowledge is founded in experience as to the properties, and action of the elements. We know some of the properties of these from repeated experiments, which give always the same results. We do not know, in like manner, that there is a future state of being; but we know certain truths, from which the inference that there is such a state is to be drawn.

4. We do not know, as we do know experimentally certain truths concerning the material world, that there is a Supreme Being, since he is not known to us by the means which we have of knowing such truths. No one has seen the Deity: nor is his personal existence known to us through the senses, as we know of other existence: but his existence, power, and government, may be known to us, by neces-

sary and certain inference, from fact and truths, which are as undeniable as our own existence.

5. Does any one doubt that there is an existing material universe? Does any one doubt that he is a part of that universe? Did any human being form himself? Could any one of those from whom he sprung, form himself? If intellectual, spiritual man could not be originally the Creator of himself, could the material world, which is without intellect or spirit, create itself, and subject itself to the laws which we know, from experience, do govern it? Certainly all things, and all beings, were created. To this assertion it may possibly be replied, No. The supposition of creation is not proved.

6. It may be asserted that all things may have existed from eternity, just as we see them. What intelligible thought does this assertion communicate to a reasonable mind?—What is eternity? Can the human mind form any conception of eternity? Add thousands to thousands, and millions to millions, till the power of computation is exhausted, and it comes to no more than a succession of years. We are incapable of judging of duration but by a succession of some measure of time. Let us ascend to the highest possible duration of which we can conceive, we shall find a material universe existing there; the question would be the same then, as it is now. How came it into being? Did it create itself? The answer to such inquiries has always been, in every age of that world, by the most exalted minds, that the universe could not be its own author; it must have had some author; when, and in what manner it was created, may not be intended for us to know. It is enough for us to know, that it had a Creator. What, then, can we learn of HIM, of his majesty and power, his beneficence and laws, from the contemplation of his works? Every step which we take in exploring the works of the Most High forces upon us, more and more strongly, the conviction that all which we are made capable of understanding, proceeds from infinite wisdom, and from awful authority. We have only to trust in this examination to our

own senses, and to the inferences which we draw from what they disclose to us, to be assured of the existence, of the presence, and of the government of such a Being.

7. There are few who have had the benefit of instruction, probably few who are sensible of existence, who have not raised their eyes, in a cloudless night, to the starry firmament, and who have not felt some emotion, however undefined, that all which they see there, was the work of some incomprehensible Being, and that it continues to exist in pursuance of his laws. Familiar as this continually recurring spectacle may be, it is ever magnificent, and ever new, and ever fills the mind with astonishment and awe. Examined by the light of science and contemplated in its systematic regularity, the feeling of reverence and awe sinks deeper and deeper;—and well has it been said,

'An undevout astronomer is mad!'

8. How wonderful is it that such a comparatively insignificant being as he who moves on the surface of this little globe, and whose mortal frame is tied down to it by the irresistible power of attraction, should be able to foretell, with unerring certainty, the very moment when the light of the sun will be shut out from the earth by the intervening of its satellite: Nay, the precise moment when a comet was visible from our little globe at a time long past, when he was not in being himself; and when it will be again visible, when he must be gone, and perhaps unremembered on the earth.

9. Omitting always the light derived from revelation, in the present view of the subject, we know in these days the Author of the Universe, only by approaching towards him in the contemplation of his works. In doing this it will be demonstrated to all rational minds that every where the proofs of an infinitely wise and powerful Deity are clearly disclosed.

CHAPTER III.

Proof drawn from the Firmament.

10. The usual course of instruction in our schools makes known only that part of the firmament which is called the solar system, and of which our own planet is a part. This system it will be remembered, comprises the sun, the eleven planets, the two rings and seven moons of one of them (Saturn); the four moons of another (Jupiter); and the moon of our own planet. All these planets have the sun for the centre of their system, and seem to us to be dependant on him for light and heat, and are well known to move around him with the most exact regularity, while the moons of such of these planets as have them, move with the like regularity around them. Each of these planets, and each of their satellites, revolve in measured time as they move. What must that power be which appointed to the unconsumed and undiminished sun, his place, and to the planets which move around him their unchangeable orbits? The sun is 520 times larger than all the planetary globes which revolve around him, and one million 300 thousand times larger than our own globe. Such is the power of this luminary that the planet Herschel is held in its orbit, lighted and warmed by his brilliancy at the distance of 1800 millions of miles from his surface. Who upholds these orbs in their paths, and prevents them from rushing into one common ruin? If it be answered, it is the law of their being; who, then, ordained that law?

11. Besides the sun, and the planets which revolve around him, there belong to the same system, comets, the design and purpose of which is, to us, utterly inconceivable. Their magnitude and rapidity of motion are equally so. They, too, are nevertheless known to insignifiicant mortals to move with the same exact precision which is every where of divine authority. One of them is, by such agency, known to be 11,200

millions of miles from the sun at its greatest distance, and to move at the rate of 880,000 miles in one hour, when nearest to him. The tail of the comet which appeared in 1680, was computed by Sir Isac Newton to be 80 millions of miles in length!

12. Magnificent and glorious as the solar system may be; what is it in magnitude and distance, when compared with all the numberless worlds and systems beyond it! In every clear night the naked eye may discover nearly a thousand fixed stars, which are supposed to be such luminaries as the sun.—If all these luminaries are suns, and have their attendant planets as we know our sun to have, it would comprise a mass of matter equal to 1320 millions of globes of the size of our earth. The assistance which the human eye has obtained in extending its view into the works of the Almighty by artificial means, discloses to us the certainty, that orbs exist at such a distance from us, that a cannon ball moving at the rate of 480 miles an hour would require nine millions of years to pass from some of them to the earth. The sun is computed to be 95 millions of miles from the earth; yet in eight minutes and a quarter, the light reaches the earth from that luminary. What must be the magnitude of luminous bodies, which are seen with the help of glasses at such a distance, that it would require some years for light to come from them to the earth?

13. It is said by some modern astronomers, that stars are seen at such distance, that light must have left them four hundred years before it strikes on our earth. Beyond all that is now known to us to exist, there may be still other systems, and all of them in motion according to the laws assigned to them; all of them preserved and governed by one awful incomprehensible Power. All of them may be, and probably are, the abodes of intelligent beings, capable of comprehending and adoring the Universal God. Where shall the imagination fix the boundaries of creation? From whatever point on the surface of our sphere, the eye is directed towards the firmament, worlds on worlds,

systems on systems, are disclosed. Are we in the centre of the universe? Are we in some remote extremity of the universe? What is the centre, what is an extremity of the universe? If there be a centre, if there be limits to the works of the Almighty, what is there beyond them; and who and what exists where the Almighty Creator does not exist and reign?

14. If we are astonished at the magnitude and distance of these luminaries, how much more so must we be, when we try to think of them collectively, and in motion! We know that like the substances on the earth they are held by the law of gravitation; and we know what strength it requires to move a weight of a few hundred pounds. If we could suppose our comparatively small earth to be a perfectly smooth ball on a plain, it is believed that it would require a mechanical force which no human mind can compute to give it any motion. Yet we know that it moves at the rate of 68,000 miles in every hour, revolving as it flies, yet so easily and surely, that we have no perception of its motion. The planet Mercury moves at the rate of 1750 miles in a single minute; a motion which may be measured by supposing a ball to pass from America to Europe in one minute and three quarters, or around our earth in seventeen minutes.—If the magnitude, the distance, the brightness, the motion and all of these together, speak not a language to the reason of man in the name of the Almighty, then may he number himself with the reptiles of the earth, and lie down with them in the dust of their common mother.

15. Who that claims to have the use of his senses, and the exercise of his reason, will presume to say, that these things are not so? Will he be hardy enough to say that these are the works of chance, and of accident? If so, how came they to be subjects of accident and chance? What are accident and chance, when spoken of in relation to organized systems, which move by unerring laws, through endless ages?

CHAPTER IV.

Proofs drawn from the Globe.

16. If we limit our attention to the Globe on which we live, and consider its connexion with, and dependence on the sun, its own atmosphere, its waters; and consider its objects, and animals, whether beneath or on its surface; wherever, and however minutely we push our inquiries, we shall find, and no less in the least of the animal or vegetable kingdoms, than in the glorious orbs above us, irresistible proofs of the existence and government of the Deity.

17. On the nature and properties of the common air, which surrounds this Globe, volumes might be written, and every truth contained in them would serve to prove the power and wisdom of its Creator. The progress of science, by actual experiment, in modern times, has enlarged surprisingly our knowledge of the agency of this subtle fluid on animal and vegetable existence. We can touch but sparingly on this abundant topic, and can only select some of the more prominent truths in proof of our proposition.

18. From the Earth's surface, the atmosphere (which is from two Greek words meaning 'vapor' and 'sphere') is supposed to extend upwards about 45 miles. It comprises the common air, the electric fluid, fluids that ascend by evaporation, and all substances less heavy than itself. This whole mass is subject to the power of attraction. It goes with the earth in its annual flight, and daily revolution. It is sometimes so still that the lightest substance is unmoved by it; sometimes chilling, and binding in fetters all that it can act upon; sometimes suffocating with its heat; sometimes fanning with its healthy breeze; sometimes scattering pestilence in its transit; sometimes prostrating human abodes; and uprooting the fast holding of the 'gnarled oak.' Subtle and active as it is, its pressure is 15 pounds to every square inch, so that a common sized man sustains a pressure of 3,2000 pounds; which

would instantly crush him, if it were not from the counter pressure from the air within him. The pressure of the whole atmosphere on the earth, is computed at five thousand million of millions of tons; a number of which we have no power to conceive. The constituents of the common air are ascertained, by very modern experiments, to be two gases, (the word gas cannot be otherwise defined, for common use, than by the words elastic airy fluid) of which 21 parts in an 100, are oxygen, 79 are nitrogen. Oxygen is composed of two Greek words signifying 'acid' and 'to generate,' so named from its power of generating acids, and is supposed to constitute the principle of vital air. Nitrogen is composed of two words, from the same language, signifying 'nitre,' and 'to produce' or that principle, of the air which produces nitre; which is a salt, commonly called saltpetre. Science has been able to do no more, in this instance, than in many others, that is to arrive at some knowledge of properties, or qualities; without approaching to any knowledge of essence. That constituent of the air called oxygen, is known to be the principle of combustion, the conductor of heat, the support of animal life; and to be indispensable to vegetable life. Nitrogen has none of these properties, and seems to be mingled with the former to lessen its action. Oxygen seems to be to Nitrogen as 21 drops of one kind of liquid mingled with 79 drops of one of an opposite character. If there were only oxygen in the air, it is said that it would inflame and consume every thing, even metallic substances; if only nitrogen, there would be no flame nor animal, nor vegetable life. Here then the doubling are met by a new and embarrassing inquiry: By whom was the air prepared and tempered to its uses, and by what power is it kept in its dutiful action. By what power was the air made fit for man, for animals, however comparatively large or small, and for every member of the thousand varieties of the vegetable kingdom; and for the action of fire without which man would have no use of the minerals of the earth?

CHAPTER. V.

Proofs drawn from the Action of Water.

19. In further support of the proposition, that the material world must have been the work of design, and that all its parts are necessarily connected, and fitted to each other, we have briefly to notice the element of water. We have seen that the air is connected with animal and vegetable life; so also is water, and both are indispensable. No one is ignorant that if no rain should fall on the earth in our climate, from the commencement of spring to the end of autumn, all vegetable being would perish, and probably most of animated beings.

20. By whose order, and will is it, that the clouds are filled with water, and poured out upon the earth? By whose designing is it, that the ocean, to which all rivers flow, is ever of the same fulness; and that the rivers flow on from year to year from unexhausted fountains? Who has ordained the ocean to be the fountain of the rains that descend upon it, and of the rivers that render their unceasing tribute to it? What power was that which planned, and forever keeps in action, the silent, unseen process of evaporation, through which the waters are gathered in the clouds, borne by the winds, and commanded to fall on the refreshed and fertilized ground, and to replenish the streams, intended to adorn and beautify the earth, and to minister to the comfort of man, and give scope to his enterprise, and his inventive genius? What intelligence was that which so apportioned the water to the earth, and the earth to the water, that by the action of natural laws, the earth is neither too wet nor too dry to permit vegetation, or to furnish the medium essential to animal and vegetable being? This circulation of the waters, from the ocean to the atmosphere; from the atmosphere to the mountains, from the mountains to the ocean, is like the beams of the sun, and the common air, too fa-

miliar to excite one thought of Him, who ordained it, or inspire one emotion of gratitude and praise.

21. It is not (it is believed) by evaporation only that these fountains are supplied. When we consider the analogies of the natural world, it is probable that the water returns to the fountains, not only through the air, but through the earth. If the depths of the sea bear a proportionable relation to the elevation of mountains, it may not be deeper any where than $\frac{5}{900}$ of the earth's diameter. It may be that the waters find their way through the earth by attraction, and become purified from their salt, in the transit. It may be that they are sent on their way, to bring from deep buried mines, solutions necessary, or convenient for human use, or to come forth again to the light of the sun, pure, limpid and healthful, for vegetable and animal existence.

22. The saltness of the ocean is another theme on which much may be said on the design of Providence. It is sufficient to refer to it, and to awaken reflection on this quality, not only as to the universal diffusion of it throughout the immeasurable expanse of waters, but in its uses.

23. The tides and currents of the ocean ought not to be passed by unnoticed. On the contrary they are among the most striking proofs of that order which can have no origin but through intelligence. It is very doubtful whether all the natural causes of the flowing of ocean waters are yet understood. There may be, (however, fanciful it may seem) some analogy between these, and the pulses and currents of the human system.

24. In connexion with this subject, we can only suggest for reflection, that world that lies below the now smooth and glassy face of the deep and the now wild and tremendous action of its waters; the varied forms, qualities and habits of its animated tenants; their subjection to man, and their subserviency to his use. No thoughtful mind can behold the ocean without feeling that it has come into the very presence of its Creator. It seems to be like the ever enduring forest, such as it was when it first began to be. The art

and science of man can make no change in this monument of eternal power. Yet the ocean, seemingly the same from age to age, is ever submitting to the law of revolution and change. The same law reigns among all that its sublime expanse conceals from all human power, but that of imagination. It presents to us a new relation connected with human art, ingenuity and science, by which its pathless surface is made to be the means through which nations know each other, in opposite hemispheres, and through which knowledge, refinement, and the light of eternal truth are conveyed from those who can read and understand, to those 'who sit in darkness and who see no light.'

CHAPTER VI

Proofs from Geology.

25. The presence and the agency of the same infinite mind is disclosed to us on, and beneath, the surface of the globe. The interior of the globe is known but imperfectly, even within the comparatively small extent to which it has been penetrated. The utmost extent (and this in some very few places) in which the earth has been penetrated, is less than one nine thousandth part of its diameter. The knowledge which we have has been obtained by the excavation of mines, from natural caverns, in searching for water, or from examination, requiring a research less deep than is required for those purposes. Some very learned discussions of facts have been presented to the world of late years, and different theories have been founded on these, as to the changes to which our planet has been subjected.

26. These learned writers agree that at some time, and while the earth was the abode of many animals in

different orders of being, it must have undergone some general convulsion, the proof of which is clear, from the examination of its exterior, and of its interior so far as it is known to us. One of these writers says 'the structure of the globe, in all its parts, presents the appearance of a vast ruin. The confusion and overthrow of most of its strata, the irregular succession of those which remain in in their original situations; the wonderful variety which the direction of the veins and the forms of the caverns display; the immense heaps of confused and broken substances, the transposition of enormous blocks to a great distance from the mountains of which they appear to have formed a part, make us feel that the history of our globe reaches back to periods far anterior to the existence of the human race.'

27. These expressions, undoubtedly founded in fact, are not, (as will be elsewhere shown) inconsistant with the scriptural account of the beginning of things. There are not materials from the researches hitherto made which are sufficient to form any satisfactory opinion of what the earth was before this universal convulsion occurred.*

* The proofs that it did occur, are seen in many forms, some of which are the following. In lands far distant from the sea, in every quarter of the earth, shells of animals, whose proper element is the sea, are found in immense quantities; and also at elevations above the level of the sea varying from 6000 to 13000 feet. What is surprising is, that many of them are of an order which no longer exist. The most common proofs, next after that of shells, are remains of fishes, and some of these of descriptions now unknown. These remains are found in similar elevations, embedded in clay, in slate and even in solid rock. Specimens of this sort have been noticed in many places, and among others in the Province of Burgundy in France, in grey calcareous hard stone; and at Narterre near Paris, the remains of a fish exceeding 10 inches in length have been found in a solid bed of stone, at the depth of 17 feet. These, and a multitude of other marine substances, and fossil remains, (fossil is from a latin word which signifies to dig, and is applied, in science, to substances found in a state of preservation) seem to prove the action of overwhelming waters, or that the ocean has retired from the face of the earth. The action of tumultuous waters, conforms to the received opinion as to the deluge. These are fossil remains of various land animals. They are found in all elevations and in different sorts of earth, and in stone and marble. Remains of animals are found which show that there were animals unlike any which now

28. It is well ascertained that among all the researches made, no bones of the human frame have been discovered. The suggestion that human bones might be more easily decomposed than those of other animals has been considered; and it is denied, that there is any such difference, in this respect, as will account for their absence. It is hence inferred that man was created since that convulsion to which these fossil remains are to be referred. In whatever mode the absence of all fossil remains of man may be accounted for, this fact is not inconsistent with the Mosaic account. Moses is supposed to have written 2500 years after the time at which he fixes the creation of the world. His work may have been composed in part, from other works then existing; and it is remarkable, that the geological computations refer the appearances on which they rest, to a date which is consistent with that which Moses assigns to the creation. It is not improbable that the globe had then undergone some tremendous convulsion, and that a new creation had then been made; and that in some prior state of the globe, animals had existed on it, though man did not; and that man was then created; and that a new order of animals was created.

29. It is also probable that the deluge was not that convulsion from which these remains are to be dated; nor is it by any means proved, that the deluge would have occasioned such convulsion. The objection to this may be that Moses speaks of six days as the time within which the creation was made. But it is far from being certain that Moses intended six diurnal revolutions of the earth, as we now measure days. This expression may have been used by him figuratively; and it is said that the Hebrew prophets are often to be so understood; and the prophet Daniel is referred to in proof, that the word day must mean some other lapse of time than the natural day. Geological theories

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exist on the earth; and remains are found in one quarter of the earth where no such living animal is now found. This is said to be the case as to a species of opposum, found near Paris, which is known to exist only in South America.

rather confirm the Mosaic account in assigning to man his origin, at the same period which that account assigns to him.

30. It is to be remarked, that there are two classes of philosophers who entertain opposite opinions as to the changes which have occurred in the earth. The one is called Neptunists (from Neptune the god of the sea) who refer these changes to the action of water; the other is called Vulcanists, (from Vulcan one of the fabled gods as well of the Greeks as Romans, who is supposed to have taught the use of fire as applied to metals;) who refer these changes to the action of fire. The latter suppose that the earth was in a state of igneous fusion, or a liquid mass intensely heated; that it gradually cooled, and was covered with water at a subsequent period.

31. The Neptunists hold, that the earth was first in a state of watery solution, and that the present formation arose from the drying, and from the gravitation of floating parts, and from crystallization, &c., in which form so many substances are known to us. Snow, sugar, salt, frost on the windows, in winter, are crystallizations. Both theories may be in some way true, since there are so many proofs of the action of both these elements in geological science.

CHAPTER VII.

Geological proofs continued.

32. Geology is understood to be that science which treats of the origin of non-organic substances, that form the solid crust of the globe. It includes the structure of the earth, and the nature, qualities, and changes through which the materials of which this crust is com-

posed, may have passed. Mineralogy is the science of defining, and classing these substances: Mineral, therefore, is a very comprehensive term. The substances which it includes, may be properly considered in reference to the power and design of the Creator, in adapting them to the use of man, and man to use them. Perhaps it is not an unreasonable supposition, that the convulsions which interest the curiosity of geologists, were intended to make the earth a convenient and proper place for human abode. Whatever may be thought of this, it is certain that the inexhaustible treasury which is beneath the surface, but within human reach, can be and is, used by man. None of it was placed there in vain, though all the benefit hitherto derived from it, may be far short of that which further experiments may disclose.

33. It is foreign to the present object to enumerate the parts of the mineral kingdom. This has been done by different authors, as is well known, and especially by those who have favored the reading world with chemical discussions, as well as by geologists. The limits of the present object will only permit a brief allusion for the purpose of showing, the consistency of these provisions of the Creator, with the condition which he has assigned to man, and with the faculties which have been given to him. And for these purposes, we may refer to the quantity, variety, and position of coal, which is so indispensable to daily comfort, and to the generation and application of heat, seen in so many and so important uses. The quality imparted to this mineral, constitutes it an agent, by which all other minerals are wholly, or in part, disengaged from the substances with which they are connected, and then fitted to the purposes for which they appear to have been intended. The well known qualities of iron, silver, gold, copper, tin, zinc, lead, platina, and the compounds made of them, are in some way, brought into a state for use by heat. Heat, also, is applied to a great variety of substances, of which lime is a constituent part, and which are called calca-

reous.* Chalk is said to be 'a very ancient chemical decomposition of the altered and obliterated remains of shell fish.' Every description of marble may be reduced to lime, by the action of heat.

34. The almost endless variety of substances, which are known under the common name of stone, all of which are defined and classed, are seen to be intended for human good, not only for necessary purposes, but for those of convenience and elegance. The admiration of successive ages has been secured by the exercise of skill and genius, on marble, devoted to poetic beauty, to historical illustration, or individual renown.

35. To the mineral kingdom, acted upon by science, and art, mankind are indebted also in a thousand ways which can only be glanced at in this limited view. In the various departments of useful industry which bind the individuals of nations together, and which happily connect and make nations dependent on each other, we see in numberless varieties the use of minerals. In this relation, all mechanical operations are means of awakening grateful emotions to the Common Benefactor. The modern science of chemistry is abundant in suggestions of this power and beneficence. From the same treasury, through the same means, and with the like emotions, we see the uses of the mineral kingdom, in relieving bodily infirmity, dispelling pain, restoring health, and prolonging life. There are uses too, though less obvious ones, in all that class of mineral productions which are called the *precious* gems. These include a great variety under the names of topaz, emeralds, garnets, rubies, sapphires, the components of which are well ascertained by chemical action. But the same action is said to have 'dethroned the king of the precious gems, the diamond, by proving that it cannot resist fire, as all true gems do; and it is now reduced to the class of combustibles, and is ranked with sulpher, amber and coal.' Dethroned, as it may be by chemists, it has not lost its rank among what are called

* From being combined with lime, from the Latin word calx, which signifies lime, and also chalk.

riches, nor ceased to sparkle among the lovers of ornament. Yet, by the laws of nature it is no more than purest charcoal, and like it may be made to disappear by fire.

36. we may intrude no farther within the province of the Naturalist. We have ventured so far, only to awaken the thoughtful mind to the truth, that in the regions which the light of the sun does not visit, and whose treasures are brought forth only by human labor, there are, as every where there are, claims to gratitude and to admiration, due only to that Power from which they could proceed.

To test the truth of these suggestions let us only suppose that the mineral kingdom had been denied to the earth, or that man had been denied the intelligence, or the physical capacity to avail himself of it, what would have been the condition of the human family in the present day?

CHAPTER VIII.

Proofs from the Vegetable Kingdom.

37. We are next to notice the works of the Creator in the vegetable kingdom. We include in this all that vegetates, that is, all that grows on, and has a connexion with, the earth, by roots.

38. It is within the notice of most persons that the variation of the seasons is occasioned by the earth's motion around the sun: and the gradual elevation of one pole, and the consequent depression of the other. As there is one region around the centre in which there is perpetual summer, so there is at the poles, alternately, endless winter; and the year is divided into one long day in which the sun never sets, and one long night in which he is never seen. Between this un-

changing summer, and endless winter, every variety of climate and of heat, and cold, and of vegetable productions, is to be found. We must leave to the researches of young aspiring minds to trace out the connexion which necessarily exists between this variety, and the enterprise, employment, comfort, improvement, and happiness, of the human race. It would be an easy and pleasing labor to show, that from these sources may be drawn innumerable proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, in adapting man to use the products of his bounty, and in adopting these products to his use. Still more pleasing would it be to demonstrate, that principally from this variety of vegetable product, the intercourse and consequent refinement of mankind is directly, or remotely derived; in short, that from the vegetable kingdom more than from any other, and all other sources together, in some form, varied as it may be by art and science, come all the commercial dealings of nations. But this is only incidental to the illustration intended to be made.

39. It is not our purpose to intrude into the department of natural history. This is a source, no doubt, of pure religious emotion, and of pious reverence, in all its varieties and divisions. We only allude to it, to illustrate the object in view; we do not treat of it; though we know not of any study which is better adapted to enlarge and elevate the mind, and improve the heart of man, than that of the natural world, when engaged in and pursued with the conviction, that we are perusing the volume which God has opened for our instruction, intending thereby to disclose himself through means adapted to our earthly condition.

40. The vegetable world has this in a manner peculiar to itself, that it is every where, in every grade, from first formation to decay, pleasing and beautiful to the human mind. Even those vegetable substances which contain, by some unknown law, qualities which are poisonous, pain-imparting, or life-destroying to man, are nevertheless beautiful in their growth, and development. There are general laws prescribed, to the vegetable, as

there are to the animal kingdom. To these laws all that is nourished by the earth, refreshed and fed by moisture from the clouds, or warmed and expanded by the beams of the sun, must submit and conform. Yet so varied is vegetable being, that if its varieties were not organized and fitted to render submission and obedience, they could have no place in the scale of Creation.

41. The most imposing object in the vegetable kingdom is the solemn forest. Single trees on a plain, or a sufficient number to form a grove, are objects of beauty, and consequently of pleasure. The dark close forest carries the mind back through an indefinite lapse of time, and conveys to it a sentiment of the actual presence of the work of the Creator, as it came from his hand unchanged by any act of man. With this seeming stamp of originality on it, yet the long enduring forest which appears ever the same, is silently and hourly submitting to the laws of Nature ; ever varying and changing ; and though life, among its members, like life among the members of the human family, has its limits ; and within some definite term, not one of all that are seen will remain, yet it is still the forest, to the human eye. From the most deep-rooted, and long enduring of this vast assembly, down to the many perfect vegetables which are invisible to the naked eye, there are general laws of beginning, continuing, and ending the term of life. Yet, between these extremes there are many genera, or kinds, capable of definite and well understood classification. Among these classes each has its own order of being ; and these are again subdivided, and known by distinctions of form, internal structure, and in foliage, in flowers, in fruits, in juices, and fragrance. Each of them seems to have been given for some purpose pleasing, convenient, or necessary to the animal kingdom. This is the inexhaustible treasury for the supply of life, for the restoration of health, for the rejoicing of the senses, for daily necessities, and luxurious gratification.

42. The continuance of vegetable life, unaided by

human ingenuity is provided for by natural causes. The bear about the germinating influence; yet, however close the neighborhood of various orders may be, there is no confusion from age to age, nor is the order of nature ever deranged or impaired. It is this regularity of the laws of the Creator that we are called on to reverence. It is the adaptation of vegetable to animal life that commands our gratitude, while it adds another to the many proofs of One infinite and adorable Mind.

43. If we are struck with awe in raising our thoughts towards this incomprehensible Being that spoke the worlds of the firmament into existence and motion, so also should we be penetrated with the like emotion, in beholding the grandeur, the utility, the variety, the delicacy, the beauty, the coloring and the fragrance of the natural robe of the earth. All this is the common experience of every observing mind. It is seen to be so, and the inquiry is no further pursued. But what is that principle of reproduction which belongs to all the vegetable kingdom? How is it that the acorn buried in the cold ground, comes forth in a form which bears no resemblance to what was buried, and rises with recurring seasons, by the joint ministry of its mother earth, the refreshing rains, the nursing air, and the far coming light and heat, till its roots, searching out their own fastenings, and its limbs gradually rising and expanding, can resist for ages the ordinary violence of the storm? And has not every vegetable product, in some form, the germ of reproduction? And by whose care is it that all are preserved, and continued, and fitted for duration, each one in its own line of succession, through thousands of years? Can he who sees no divinity in the flower which he crushes beneath his foot, make by his own power, the simplest product of the vegetable race? Can he, unaided by the operation of the natural world, furnish himself with supplies for his craving wants, for a single day? If the commands of the Deity given in the very Creation itself, could be disobeyed by the teeming

earth, how long would the mortal frame of ungrateful and impious man, be saved from mingling with its kindred dust?

CHAPTER IX.

Proofs drawn from the Animal Kingdom.

44. On a sphere so variegated as we know our own to be, and forming as we see it does, from its atmosphere, its waters, its minerals, its vegetables, a place fitted for use, and intended to be used, the purpose of Creation would seem to have failed, if it were not inhabited. All those animals which are inferior to man have been most diligently examined, and divided into classes by learned naturalists. The several genera and the species belonging to each have been accurately defined. It is foreign to our purpose to go into detail in this department of natural history. The present purpose will be accomplished if attention can be awakened to some general truths, which prove in this, and in all other parts of created being, the original and continuing presence of the Author of the Universe.

45. The first fact that strikes us is the exact order which prevails throughout animated being. Each family of the animal kingdom has its peculiar place assigned to it; to that place it is perfectly adapted and to none other. In that appropriate sphere it comes into being, finds its own share in the created world; in that it continues and in that it expires. All its instincts, propensities, faculties, pleasures, aversions, enmities, and wars, have their own peculiar objects. For each of these innumerable classes, from the elephant to the smallest mite that the microscope discloses to us on the dried fruit, or the purest lily's

leaf, and in the transparent drop of spring water, there are laws of being, far more definite and far more faithfully obeyed, than any which proud intellectual man, can make and enforce.

46. That life is a blessing, and intended to be so understood and enjoyed, is proved by the sense which every living thing seems instinctively to have of its value. The endless diversity which is found in preserving, and continuing life, is among the striking proofs of design. Is it not surprising, that among the thousands of varieties, which have been distinctly enumerated and classed, as belonging to the earth, and its waters, mingled together, as they seem to the human eye, that every species appears to know and preserve its place; and each one to keep distinct from all others, from age to age? What is it that preserves each one, and prevents the confusion, which would bring on, in a very short succession, one common ruin? There are some general laws which seem to be common to all animal existence, and among them the necessity of food. From this fact it is certain, that all animated nature is subject to daily waste which demands a daily supply. This demand appears to be intended to be satisfied in part, from the vegetable creation, and in part from the fitness of some animals to furnish food for others.

By this law, the created world seems to go through a successive change by which animals of one kind become parts of others; and the vegetable world makes the like contribution to animal life; and the latter again makes its contribution to the common mother of all, which in due course of exercising its functions, sends forth its preparation for the same revolutionary course. Certainly in all this, there is abundant proof to every contemplative mind of original purpose undeviatingly pursued.

It has been objected that it is inconsistent with divine benevolence that some animated beings are necessary to others as food. A moment's reflection will show, that this objection cannot be maintained consistently with obvious laws. If some sorts of animals

did not prey on others, the common food must be vegetable. Suppose all animals and insects were left to increase in numbers, as we know they would do, and all were to find food from vegetable products, how long would it probably be, before all of them would perish for want of food? Supposing existence a benefit, and considering the numbers that escape destruction, it will be found that this provision, so complained of, is consistent with general laws, and consequently with the benevolence of the Deity. In the ocean, if the same law as to food did not prevail, its inhabitants would soon come to an end. It is known that one fish may produce millions of fish. If the increase were permitted according to this scale, and some fish were not consumed by others, it seems that the whole would perish for want of food. There is another remark worthy of notice; all the animals except the dog and the cat which are domesticated for man's use, live on vegetable food. If they required living animals for food, man could not supply their wants; or the inconveniences of keeping them would be too great to permit the use of them.

48. If we descend from very general views, to some particulars we shall see new proofs of this theory. The sagacity with which some animals are gifted is truly wonderful. The natural history of the spider, may be referred to for this. The migration of birds is another proof. Certain birds, and quadrupeds have a kind of knowledge to which even man is a stranger. Pigeons, and some domestic animals, when carried many miles from their homes, in covered conveyances, have a power of discerning the way back. The common bee knows the straight line to its hive, at all times, however far it may have wandered, and however often it may have crossed its own track.

49. The senses of birds, and animals appear to have been given to them, for the spheres in which they are commanded to live, and move: and in which they are to wage war, fly from danger, or secure their food. Those who are curious in natural history will find

abundant means of gratification in examining the works of the creation; and the more minute the research is, the more will it serve to convince the mind, that God is, and that all things are through and of Him. We venture to assert that this is a conviction from which the human mind cannot escape. And we may add, that this, thoughtfully pursued, leads inevitably to piety and reverence, and fits the mind to receive, as they should be received, the sublime and beautiful expressions concerning the power of the Almighty which are of so frequent recurrence in parts of the sacred volume.

50. Let us examine two or three instances of these proofs as found in the organization of animals. Seeing is necessary to all animals, because all of them are, in some way, connected with objects which are external to them. The law of vision depends on general laws, connected with light, and on the action to which rays of light are subjected, in passing through substances, which permit this passage. It might, therefore, seem to us that there must be one sort of construction of the eye adapted to act with reference to one uniform and invariable law of nature. The principle on which vision depends must be the same, in all eyes, that is on having the image of the object seen, transferred through some medium to the sensitive nerve adapted to receive it. The general law, therefore, is this, the existence of the object seen must be in such a relation to the animal seeing it, that its image can be impressed, by the help of light on the proper space in the interior of the eye. But that which excites our wonder is, the endless variety, among the different orders of being, by which the eye is adapted to its duty, and the means given to preserve it, in a fit state for use. The exceeding sensitiveness of the eye would expose it to irreparable injury, and it might soon be destroyed, if such means were not given. In the human form, in which the hand appears, the injuries to the eye may be remedied by the use of that member.

51. Among animals which have not that member nature has provided other means to this end. Birds,

generally, and many animals, and the horse among others, have a third eye-lid, the constant action of which may be easily observed, and so curiously adapted to use, that it can be passed over the outer surface of the eye in almost every instant, and by its action all offending substances are wiped away. On examination it is found that this eye-lid moves on mechanical principles well understood, but in this instance marvellously applied.

52. The keenness of vision in birds of prey, which see at very great distances, and also at very short ones, requires another conformity to the general law. The eye of these animals is, therefore, so constructed, that it can by means of pliable scales on the outside of the ball of the eye, and by muscles drawn over them, so diminish, or enlarge the size of the eye, that it will perform its duty as to an object, however near and distant it may be. This power of vision enables birds to see, from their airy elevation, far beyond the reach of the human eye, over a wide extent, and to discern their food, and with surprising sagacity they submit themselves to the gravitating power and arrive at the earth's surface with a rapidity, which would seem to be necessarily followed by destruction from the contact. This keenness of vision seems to enable them to know whether the object seen is living or dead, though the position of the body may be the same in either case.

53. Another variation is seen in the *fixed* eye of the insect races; and in the position of it. One or two instances will sufficiently illustrate this. In the common fly are seen two small round projections at the side of the head. These projections contain many thousands of lenses disposed in rows, each one of which is capable of transmitting an impression of outward objects. A German naturalist counted 6236 in the two eyes of a silk worm. Another naturalist counted 14000 in the eyes of a drone fly, 27000 in the eyes of a dragon fly. It has been proved by actual experiment with the help of glasses, that each one of these lenses was capable of receiving an independent and distinct im-

pression. The inference seems necessarily to be, that the retina of these insects may receive, at the same time, some thousands of impressions without any confusion: which is far more wonderful than the single impression made on the retina of our own species, and on those of other animals, who have two eyes with a retina for each.

54. As we have no other purpose than to awaken curiosity and thought in relation to the natural world, we must leave this inexhaustible subject to the inquiring and well disposed. They may feel assured that the thoughtless hours which they pass in early life, may be made instructive and happy, if they will examine the natural world, not as a mere show, but as proofs of that Power and Benevolence by which themselves and the minutest insects, were alike gifted with existence.

CHAPTER X.

Proofs that the existence of Man is a necessary part of the Creation.

55. Doubtless this globe might have performed its annual circuit, and its diurnal revolutions if its surface had been composed of the known expanse of waters, and of barren waste on the land. It might have done the same, if the land had been made, as now it is, capable of producing vegetable beings; and showing only on every continent and on every isle, an enduring forest, and silence unbroken excepting by the roar of waters, the report of the electric fluid, the passing of the storms, and the crush of falling trees. It might have done the same if all animal life inferior to man, had existed as now it does, and the whole earth been subjected to the dominion which brute force and in-

stinct might have made for themselves. Had this been so, to what end would the mineral kingdom have been created? Why should the magnet have been formed? Why should the element of fire, whatever that may be, have been associated in the system? Why should the rivers have been made to flow to the ocean, to return through the atmosphere to their sources, and their fountains to renew their flow? Why should the action of matter upon matter, and why should the wonderful results of that action have been made inherent, and discoverable in matter? Why should metals have been made fusible and malleable, and adapted to any variety of form; why should the power of the screw, of the pulley, of the wedge, have been imparted to matter? Why should metals have been made fit to receive impressions and thereby to make known invisible thought, and transmit the action of the mind through successive ages? Why was matter made fit to be formed into means of conveyance over the pathless ocean; and why were the products found upon and beneath the earth's surface, adapted to displace the forest, and to occupy its space with cultivated fields, with spacious and magnificent cities? If there were no such being as man, all these qualities of matter would have been given without use; and without the knowledge of their existence. If man had not been created, what being would have lived to admire and reverence the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Deity? It seems then to follow, from the attributes which we must ascribe to HIM, that such a being as man necessarily belongs to this system. It may be inferred from like principles, that the worlds which we see from our own comparatively humble one, bear some description of intelligent minds, however varied they may be from our own, whose duty and whose employment it may be to know, to acknowledge, and to render homage to the Almighty Sovereign of the Universe.

56. Reason, by which guide only we are attempting now to find our way, demonstrates, that man be-

longs to the system which he is made capable of perceiving. If we are convinced of this truth; if we see that all things animate and inanimate other than man, have their proper places of action, and exist therein pursuant to laws which are certain, defined, and which cannot be departed from; are there not laws for man also, in his sphere of action? As we know him to be blessed with understanding, is not that superior gift intended to enable him to search out these laws, and to find his own welfare in rendering his obedience to them?

In the examination of man's nature we shall find new proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator; and clearly discern his affinity to some superior order of being to any which he knows on earth.

CHAPTER XI.

Proofs drawn from Human Organization.

57. Man, as he is presented to the organ of sight, is distinguished from all other animals by his form. He is the only one who is erect, and capable of so sustaining and moving himself. All animals but man have a natural permanent covering on the skin. To all others an artificial covering is an incumbrance; to man it is indispensable; and he only is formed with the *hand* capable of providing it. Figure, varying color, and eloquent expression, belong only to the human face; though some few animals are supposed like man to shed tears in suffering, he only can smile, and laugh. Man can, and no other animal can invent artificial means, and use them; and he only can by such means, lengthen the power of his arm and make himself felt and feared, by blows and wounds sent to a far distance.

58. Man alone avails himself of the swiftness, the strength, and productiveness of other animals. Others destroy the living to make them useful, man cherishes the living to make them useful to him. Inventive power, the need of it, physical force and formation necessary to apply it, are not seen in any other living being as in man. He is the only animal who is gifted with ability to make the earth yield its increase, or to fashion natural substances to his own use by changing or modifying their original forms. There is something of superiority and majesty in the form and natural being of man, which other animals instinctively acknowledge, and every one of the inferior grades shrinks before the searching of his eye. He is distinguished from all other animals in this also, that he is the only animal of the earth, who can pass as well on the ocean as on the land. But the eminent distinction of man over all is, the power of uttering articulate sounds, and of communicating thereby intelligible thought. By this power he makes known his wants, his sufferings, his hopes, his fears, his happiness. By this he can instruct, warn, please, command, and terrify; by this, and in one effort, he can move assembled thousands to admire, believe, hate, honor, or pity; to rush on to acts of virtue or of crime; and even to self destruction.

59. Examined as to his interior frame and construction, he is found to be in whole and every minute part a necessary component of the material world, and designed to act on it and to be acted upon by it, and in such variety of modes as could only be conceived by omniscience, and carried into effect by a power to which the human mind cannot imagine any limit.

60. Within the exterior surface of man, some few only of the many proofs of his origin, will be mentioned. His erect form must be so put together as to resist that tendency downwards, which operates on all particles of matter in lines at right angles to the surface of the earth. This invariable law is wonderfully shown in the case of the human frame, comparing the volume of

which it is composed with the base on which it securely rests, and moves. His head, therefore, must be sustained in the straight line of his frame; and yet if it were so sustained, and were immoveable in its place, what a difference would it make in human welfare. The head containing the supposed seat of thought, is provided with an ornamental covering of hair, and an arched covering of bone, capable of defending the brain from all serious injury in the common accidents of life. Heavy as the head is, it is placed so lightly and so firmly on the summit of the spine, and there adapted to move so easily, and effectively, that although it does move, by means of this pivot, and a ball and socket joint, forwards and backwards, and from side to side, millions and millions of times, and even through a long life, no one, in sound health, ever felt a sensation in the act of moving, in the places where this ability to move resides. That which is astonishing is that through this very pivot of motion, the connexion from the brain is carried down through the whole extent of the spine or backbone. This marrow which, may not be improperly regarded as a continuation of the brain, sends forth nerves through the openings of the jointed but connected bones, which contain and protect it. We can see in other animals, how the spine may be divided into joints, since they are not erect. Yet necessary as a straight solid support seems to be from the earth upwards, the human spine has its flexible divisions so as to enable man to throw himself into all the forms which his nature requires. At each part of the human frame where we can comprehend its form and its uses, it seems to us the most excellent, until we proceed to another which claims the like pre-eminence for its purpose.

61. The connexion of the spine with the hips, and these with the lower limbs, and the feet with these, is more within the reach of observation, and every one may easily inform himself of the utility and fitness of these to their obvious design. The junction of the arms to the main bones of the upper part of the

body, and the durable protection, which the heart and lungs have received, show how skilfully man is framed; while below the breast there are no bones, for reasons which every one must perceive, who attends to the positions into which he does, and must throw himself, almost every hour of his life. No one can remain ignorant of the beauty and utility of the human form in the action of the arms and hands, who will give them even the slightest observation; and every one who will notice the form of his own hand, its uses, and its admirable connexion with the wrist, and its facility of motion, must be convinced that such organization could only have sprung from a mind capable of designing and of executing designs. It would enlarge this volume into one on natural history, if minute anatomical descriptions were introduced: we will therefore only further add, as to the human arm and hand, this: let any one look around him and consider the objects within his view, and decide for himself, what the condition of mankind would have been, if the human arm and hand had not been formed and given to man as we see them to be. When this inquiry has been entered upon, let him follow it out, and see where it will lead him.

62. The bony frame of the human figure would be a motionless incumbrance if it were not for the muscles which cover it, and which fill up, and give the beauty of shape which we find in it. These bands, and strings, are so strong, and so curiously placed, and so firmly united with the bones, that they move the whole, or any part of our machine of bones, yet so easily, that the sensation of motion, if felt at all, is always a pleasure in healthy persons, unless overdone, or too long continued. The mechanical operation of the muscles on the bones, we can comprehend; but that which we cannot comprehend, and which is utterly inconceivable is, the connexion between the will and the muscles, and the instantaneous and exact obedience which they render to that sovereign power.

63. That part of the human frame which has the

common name of breast, and that of thorax in science, from the Latin thorax, (*breast*) contains the seat of action on which human life directly depends. Here are the lungs, which by the avenue of the wind-pipe receive about 48000 cubic inches of air every hour in successive respirations. In the lungs the air comes immediately in contact with the blood; and it is computed that the whole mass of blood, which may be 50 pounds, or five gallons, receives, fourteen times within the hour, the life-giving impulse of the air. It is supposed that the whole mass of blood passes through the heart once in every four minutes. From this fact some conception may be formed of the strength of the mechanical action of the heart, which must be sufficient to impel this mass through all the arteries and veins of the system, within that space of time.

There also, is that indescribable power contained in the stomach (an oblong globular sack of eight or ten inches in length, and five or six in depth, which is capable of contraction and expansion) whereby the process is continually going on, to convert the foreign substances passed into it, into living, active, sensitive and perceptive being. In this small cavity, of the breast everything has its appropriate place, and its precise duty, and upon the harmonious action of each and every one, and unceasingly, that which we call life, depends; and that, which is the most admirable of all is, that the vital action of the whole system goes on independently of man's will; and entirely beyond its control. All who have read *Paley* will remember his striking remark, that the action of the vital organs is not confided to man's care. His ignorance, or improvidence, if it were so, might soon, and easily, close his career.

64. We have no room to follow out the consequences of this mechanical action. But as there will be occasion to refer to human form and movement in other places, for other purposes, we must notice the craving want of the stomach that daily returns upon it; that it can and does receive with pleasure, and impu-

nity, a given quantity of food in a given time; that the system is known to lose more than half of all it takes in as food, through its three hundred thousand millions of pores of the skin in every twenty-four hours: that continued excess in quantity is the parent of pain, suffering, disease and death: that certain substances, are certain and immediate death'; and that certain others, though received through habit, and from craving desire, will occasion a slow, though as certain death, involving the gradual destruction of the intellectual power, the moral sense, and of all that distinguishes men from brutes. This criminal indulgence places man far below the brutes, since they are incapable of such depravity.

CHAPTER XII.

Proofs drawn from the Senses.

65. It is to the senses of man that we come, with pleasure, in contemplating the power and goodness of the Creator. The eye is commonly selected as the most striking evidence of design, and is emphatically so, as a part of the human system. We cannot undertake to describe this delicate organ for any other purpose than the general one of rendering just homage to the Creator, and of warning all of the interest which they have in knowing its delicacy and of preserving it in a sound condition; and because its action is open in some degree to common observation. It is first to be noticed that the bones which project around the eye, seem to be intended to preserve it from exterior injury. The eyelids are given to close at every intimation of danger, and to guard the eye while we sleep. Between the eyelids, in the open eye, in the exterior front, the first thing we see is the cornea. This word

is taken from the Latin cornu, (*horn*,) because this part of the eye resembles horn. This is a transparent substance through which light passes into the eye. The cornea is continued all around the globe of the eye; it is only in the front part that it is so called; the continuation around the eye is known by the name of sclerotica, from a Greek word which signifies hardness. As all the coats of the eye but this are soft, and might lose their form, this hardness seems necessary to preserve it.

66. Immediately behind the cornea is a distinct separate part called the aqueous humor, from the Latin aqua (*water*), which means, merely, a watery liquid. Immediately behind this humor is the pupil, (commonly called apple of the eye) which is a round dark spot which every one can see with the help of a mirror. The word pupil has no descriptive meaning. It is through this dark spot that the light which comes in at the cornea passes still further into the eye.

67. That colored circle which surrounds the pupil (or apple) and which is either black, hazle, grey, or blue, and from which the eye has its color, is called the iris, which word is the Latin for rainbow. The iris is supposed to have the power of compressing the pupil of the eye by means of minute muscles, or permitting its expansion by relaxing these muscles so as to adapt the pupil to receive more or less light, as may be necessary; this action of the iris seems to go on mechanically, and without any operation of the will, as any one may know who goes from a lighted room into a dark one. In such case one sees better in a few moments, which is occasioned by the spontaneous action of the iris in providing for the expansion of the pupil. The iris extends also, all around the globe of the eye, inside the sclerotica, but it loses its name after it leaves the front of the eye, and is called choroides, which name is from two Greek words which mean a membrane enclosing something.

68. Immediately behind the pupil lies the crystalline lens; a common burning glass or magnifying

glass, is a lens, from the Latin word lens. Chrystalline (nearly the same word in Latin, Greek, and English) means transparent or clear. This lens in the human eye is a remarkable substance; it is much easier to say what sort of substance it is not, than to say what it is. Its place is in the front centre of the vitreous humor, which is so named from the word vitrum, (*glass*,) because it resembles melted glass. This humor or liquid fills all the residue of the ball, until it comes in contact with the nerve, called the optic nerve, from a Greek word meaning vision.

69. This nerve is also called the retina, from reta, (*a net.*) The retina is the seat of vision; that is, it is the part of the eye on which the figure of the objects seen is pictured. The retina is the expansion of the nerve which comes from the brain in a round form about the size of a wheat straw, and as soon as it enters the eye through the opening made for it in the back part of the eye, it expands into this minutely delicate net-work and encloses the vitreous humor, precisely as a globular bottle with a solid neck to it, expands from the neck. To see an object there must be the cornea, the aqueous humor, the pupil, the crhystalline lens, the vitreous humor, and the retina, and all of them must be in a condition to perform their several offices. All of them are of such indescribable delicacy that it is astonishing that they can be preserved for a single day: how much more so is it that they are so generally preserved through all the vicissitudes of life, even to old age. This description of the eye is very general, and very simple. No attempt is made to describe the more minute parts, their nerves, blood-vessels, connexion of parts, general sympathy of the parts; even so far as is known by anatomists. By the most skilful of them, many parts of the eye are very imperfectly understood.

70. Thus far human knowledge goes, and no farther. By what law is it that the eye is so formed that it can see? What is seeing? How is it that the impression

of a figure on the retina conveys a clear and distinct perception to the mind, and makes the object so perceived a subject of memory, and of thought. Who but that Being who framed and preserves the eye, can answer this?

71. The rapid, easy and unfelt motion of the eye, is also a matter of grateful wonder. In the strong and sound, the eye is kept in front, and in its proper place by soft substances, which yield the liquid matter necesary to its action; and the motion depends on muscles which turn the eye in every direction. When these muscles are disproportioned in length, that defect is occasioned which is called cross-eyed. When disease overtakes us, and the waste of the body cannot be supplied, this is felt in the eye, as elsewhere, and the globe of the eye sinks within the socket.

72. The philosophical theory of vision as now received in the world is this: Every object seen, reflects or emits rays of light. These rays, passing through the several departments of the eye, make the figure of the object seen to fall on the retina in an inverted form. In all representations of vision, the rays of light are drawn from the object to the retina. Color too is said to depend on the manner in which rays of light act on the objects which appear colored to our eye. There is no doubt that light is necessary to see the figure and the color of objects. But some one may hereafter be bold enough to doubt, whether this theory of vision is satisfactory. May not the eye have a power of vision to which light is necessary to be sure, but of which light is not the cause? When one is watching the coming on of the morning, or the gradual return of night, there is no gradual change in the coloring of objects. It is not satisfactory to common sense, that objects and persons well known to us, are not the same *even in color* in the night, and in the day time. We are certain of this, that when there is light from the sun, or light from artificial means, the eye can and does take impressions on the retina of external objects, and that they go thence into the mind. What is

doubted is this, that rays of light are reflected from, or emitted by every object that is seen; and that *their* rays must fall on the retina to make it seen.

73. It is said by an eminent modern philosopher, who is still living, that particles of light pass by any fixed point at the rate of 500 millions of millions of times in a single second; and that it is by such movements of light, communicated to the eye, that vision is effected. That motion of light at the rate of 482 millions of millions of times produces the sensation of redness; 542 millions of millions of times in a second produces the sensation of yellowness; and that motion of light at the rate of 707 millions of millions of times in a second produces that of violet.

If it be proved, or must be admitted, that the action of light does make color, is there not a picture of every object seen, on the retina; and how can rays of light passing from that object, make that picture? May it not be that the eye had a power somewhat analogous to the reflection of a mirror; and that external objects pictured on the retina, are, in some incomprehensible manner, reflected to the mind.

CHAPTER XIII.

Further Proofs from the Senses.

74. The sense of hearing is even less understood than that of vision; the uses of the organs of this sense are more difficult to comprehend; and it is less easy to make known the little that we do comprehend, by words, or illustrations by drawings. It will be sufficient for the present purpose, that is to prove the certainty of design, or of means used to an end, to advert to a quality of the common air which every one is familiar with, that by exerting the human voice

through a common trumpet, it can be sent to a far greater distance than when committed to the air without using such an instrument. The ear has some, but a very slight resemblance to a trumpet inverted. That part which is visible seems to be intended in men, and animals to collect sound, and conduct it inward, until it strikes on a thin membrane, called the tympanum, drawn across the outward end of the barrel or drum of the ear; *tympanum* is from a Latin word meaning drum. Between this membrane and an interior one in the hollow of the ear, there are four very small bones which seem to connect the two membranes. The use of these bones, in conducting sound is not known; one of them is connected by one end with the tympanum, and with the second at the other end, and this with the third, and that with the fourth and this with the inner membrane, drawn across another space, and within or behind this membrane is a cavity deeply encompassed with the bone of the skull, containing a liquid, wherein the auditory nerve, (from audire, to *hear*,) proceeding from the brain, develops itself, much in the same way as does the optic nerve in the eye.

75. To have the perception of hearing sound it must pass through the ear to this nerve, and through it the effect is made on the mind. When we consider what the variety and the number of sounds are, which must affect this organ, in the ordinary purposes of life, and its distinguishing power, and its nice adaptation to the end designed, we are left in no doubt as to the intelligence which its mere contrivance required. But however faithfully anatomical investigation may disclose the component parts of the ear, it does not nor can any investigation which art or science has hitherto made, bring the least conception of the nature of hearing to our minds. How sound affects that organization, and how it communicates with the mind is incomprehensible.

76. The commonly received theory of hearing is very unsatisfactory. Particles of air, it is said, being affected by some impulse given by the organs used in speaking, or any other sound-making agent, communi-

cate that impulse to adjoining particles of air, and they to others, and so on, until those which are in contact with the tympanum affect it, and thus sound goes to the brain. That air is necessary to the conveyance of sound every where, above the surface of water; and that water is necessary to the conveyance of sound made in water, and that sound glides along the smooth surface of water to a greater distance than it can on the surface of the ground, every body knows. But that sound is nothing but an agitation of the air it is dfficult to believe. When one is speaking to a numerous assembly in a large apartment, he may make himself distinctly heard, and understood, even in the most rapid and minute articulation of which he is capable, by those persons who are most remote from him. But no effort of his lungs would affect in the least degree the lightest substance which floats in the air, at one half, or perhaps one quarter, of that distance. So one may make a violent agitation of all the air in a large apartment by swinging a door backwards and forwards, but he will make thereby no sound. Sound can be made to pass from one apartment to another, through a solid wall, and when the air on one side of it cannot receive any impulse from the air on the other. Sound passes through wood, metals, and other substances, with far greater rapidity than through air or water. And through some it cannot pass.

77. Is there then something in nature, hitherto unknown, which is sound; as there may be something, which is vision? That human ingenuity has gone no further as yet, in the philosophy of sound and vision, is no reproach to it. Looking back on its inventions and discoveries, it would be some reproach to it to assume, that it has attained its utmost limits on these subjects.

78. The other senses must be passed over with a few words. That of feeling seems to be diffused throughout the system. The sensation is always local, whether in the extremities, in the organs of sense, or in the brain itself. So also tasting and smelling are local. The connexion between these and the mind is

alike hidden from us. The only peculiarity between these three senses, and those of seeing and hearing is, that as to the three former, perception has a locality in the system, that is, feeling is every where, tasting is in the organs of taste, smelling is in the organs assigned to give that perception, but the organs of seeing and hearing give no organic sensation, and we only learn from experience that it is the eye that sees, and the ear that hears. In these truths we have one more proof of the Intelligence which framed us. The action of the eye and of the ear depends upon no volitions of our own. If they were *physically touched* by the objects which they convey notice of to the mind, as the other senses seem to be, would they not from their wonderful complication and delicacy of structure, soon wear out, and become unfit for their offices? Is there not something which may be called intellectual in the action of these two senses? But these are inquiries not necessary to the present purposes, if they are deserving of any notice.

79. If the purpose in view thus far has been sufficiently accomplished, to make that purpose understood, it has been shown, that there is a created material universe, of which man constitutes a part. That he is curiously and wonderfully prepared and designed to act on this universe, and that it is in like manner prepared and designed to act on him. There is reason to believe from what we know him to have been able to do in relation to this material system, that there is no part of it with which he cannot connect himself to some useful purpose. Surely this is true as to all things and beings on earth to which he has access. It is even true as to the far distant luminaries of the firmament. He has made himself acquainted with the laws which govern them. He has made them, millions of miles from him as they are, minister to his necessities, his wants, and his pleasures. They make known to him the precise point on which he happens to be on the surface of his own little globe, the existence of which is perhaps unnoticed and unknown to the intelli-

gent beings who may inhabit them. They have served him to enlarge his mind, to invent rules of science, and they have served him to elevate his conceptions, and to raise himself to that high station in the scale of being, mortal as he is, which permits him to know and to adore and to render his humble tribute to the infinite and awful Mind, of whom, and through whom, all things are ordained.

CHAPTER XIV.

Proofs from Human Intellect.

80. We have endeavored to find man's place in the material world. We have next to consider him in his intellectual character. In this respect it will appear that his material formation, and that of his mind, have an intimate and necessary connexion. Whatever the mind may be, and in whatsoever manner it is connected with its material dwelling place, it does not display its powers until it has been acted upon by the senses. This fact has led to the belief of the materiality of the mind, and has been the subject of many refined discussions. It is certain that the physical and mental action of one human being, is known to any other by and through the senses only. These truths force on us the necessity of considering the action of the senses in connexion with, and inseparably from, what is known of the qualities of the mind. This will be found to be at best a very limited knowledge.

81. The human mind has been the subject of many learned works. These have been given to the world at different periods. Each successive author has had the opportunity of studying the theories of his predecessors, and of adopting, modifying, disproving or rejecting them, and of attempting to establish his own.

It is not intended to compare different systems, if the ability to do this could be assumed, nor to pronounce which of them should be received, nor which of them should be rejected. All of them are far too learned, and refined for elementary instruction. It is proposed, as sufficient for the present object, to invite those who are of competent years to do it, to examine their own intellectual acts as the simplest and easiest, and perhaps, the most satisfactory mode of instruction.

82. No one knows how his earliest steps in the acquirement of knowledge were taken; but he knows what the fact is with his juniors, and he infers truly that his own course must have been similar. It is thus known to every one, that in earliest infancy the human being is of all animals the most helpless: that months elapse before there is any apparent sensation, but that which arises from the want of food, or a sense of suffering. The eye and the ear are for a long time insensible, and when age enough is obtained to put these organs to use, they have every thing apparently to learn. The discrimination between different sounds, and the knowledge of figure, magnitude, color and distance of external objects, are very slowly obtained, and only by experiments often repeated. Less is known of the acquirements of the other senses, excepting that the sense of feeling appears to be always on the alert, and its disagreeable effect is frequently manifested.

83. After some few years, all the senses appear to have undergone the discipline of experience to the effect of answering the common purposes of life. What the senses have attained to by experience, must depend on the sort of experience, or on the employment in which they have been engaged. The senses of a number of young persons who are equally gifted by nature in this respect, will acquire different habits, according to the accidental circumstances, in which they are placed. Children brought up in a city, those who have been only in a small village, those who have been at school, and those who have been employed in manual labor, will have their senses very differently disciplin-

ed. If each of these were brought together, and acted upon at the same time, by the same causes, each class would be differently affected, and the individuals of the same class would be affected in different degrees. The senses therefore may be said to be subjects of instruction from experience, from early infancy.

84. The only proposition which it is necessary to establish is, that the senses are subjects of discipline and of habit in every person, whatever his vocations in life may be. Another proposition which is self-evident is that all knowledge of external objects and substances must be obtained through the senses. Those who are blind from birth, cannot have any knowledge of forms, of comparative distances, except the imperfect knowledge which the other senses give; and they must be entirely ignorant of color, and of all other acquirements to which the use of the eye is indispensable. The deaf, from birth, must be entirely ignorant of all knowledge of sounds. The senses are therefore necessary avenues of knowledge to the mind.

85. It must be admitted, therefore, that the action of the senses is indispensable to the development of the mind. It does not follow from this well known fact, that the mind is not independent in itself, of material organization. We are apt to suppose that the mind is a perfect independent being, and is so from the commencement of life. It is quite as reasonable to suppose that the mind expands, and is progressive in conformity to the action made on it first through the senses, and then by its own operation.

86. It is not improbable that the soul, or mind, or spirit (meaning by these terms the same thing, that is, the immortal part of our being) is generally taken to be something perfect in its own nature, which takes up its residence in the human frame when life begins, and continues that residence while life remains.

It is not inconsistent with some analogies in nature, that the principle of the soul is originally given to every human being, and that the action of life developes and makes it whatsoever it becomes. It is not more dif-

ficult to suppose that the Creator intended that the soul of man should take its character from the experience of life, than to suppose that it is given, at first, a separate, independent perfect being, and that it goes through no change from birth till death. On the contrary, it accords with our perceptions of moral accountability, that the immortal part of man should be adapted to its future state in the scenes of this life. At the same time it may be supposed that the righteous Judge of all the earth, exacts no accountability, but according to the means enjoyed of finding out duty, and according to the obedience or disobedience which follows a knowledge of it. If this supposition be admissible it may reconcile some disputed points, and may support the proposition which is to be illustrated, viz. that the capacity to learn the law is given, and that neglect of it, refusal to follow it, or voluntary breach of it, are the omissions and acts for which we shall be held accountable. Whether this supposition be well or ill founded, and entitled to respect or not, still the truth as to the action of the senses on the mind, is to be sought out. From this source and from what we know of the operations of the mind on the materials which the senses transfer to it, we must rest the sum of all knowledge on this subject.

87. It is certain from observing those who are deprived of one, or more of the senses, that their agency is indispensable to the development of the faculties of the mind. It is also certain that the senses have a kind of community among themselves. If the sense of smelling be entirely obstructed, that of tasting seems to be equally so. Sight and touch have a like community. The sense of hearing is connected with organs, with which that sense has no apparent physical connexion. It is connected with sight, and sight is often indispensable in deciding from what place sound proceeds. This is curiously exemplified in the art of ventriloquism. The deaf are dumb, because they cannot imitate sounds. But the senses which remain render some services which belong to

those which are lost, or not given. The blind hear, and touch, better than those who see. The deaf and dumb touch and see, more perfectly than those who have all the senses. It is also certain that the senses are the subjects of discipline and of habit. No doubt the retina of every eye, which is perfect, has precisely the same picture made on it, which is made by the same object, on every other perfect eye. But the report made of that picture to the mind, depends on the discipline and habit of the eye, and on the habit of the mind in receiving and using that report.

88. Let us suppose that a military chief, a husbandman, a mathematician, the captain of a ship of war, and a physician, are examining, from the same point of vision, a numerous body of soldiery, prepared for the exercise of their vocation; each of these individuals would have the same picture made on the retina, but each of them would have very different perceptions, and very different intellectual action from this picture. From this truth it follows, that the eye and mind are disciplined by habit. Suppose the same persons are equally perfect in the sense of hearing, and that all of them hear the same sound at the same time. Each of them would have the like quantity of the same sort of action, on the organ of hearing, but the ear of each would notice and report to the mind according to the habit of that sense, and according to the use which the mind has been habituated to make of the report derived through that sense.

89. The senses of individuals vary not only in consequence of habitual discipline, but also, in their natural and original formation. Some persons whose organs of vision are apparently perfect, and who see as far and as clearly as any do, cannot distinguish colors; or only very imperfectly. The same sounds are to some ears sweet and harmonious music, to others indifferent, and to others disagreeable. The sense of hearing is variously affected by the common tones of voice. The same tones are fascinating, indifferent, or disgusting, according to the ear on which they fall.

90. The inference to be drawn from such facts seems to be this, that the connexion which is formed between the senses, and the mind depends on two things, the original formation of the senses, as to perfection or the falling short of it; and on the habits which have been formed in using them. The mind is, what its original faculties and powers, its own discipline and habits, in attending to the reports of the senses; and its power and habits in retaining and using these reports, have made it to be. This is all that is known on this very difficult subject; and it is very little. How impressions, from exterior substances are made on the senses; and how the mind takes cognizance of these impressions is entirely hidden from all human search. Although we are thus ignorant of these subjects, we have attained to some knowledge of the faculties and operations of the mind, which we shall next consider.

CHAPTER XV.

Proofs drawn from the Human Intellect, continued.

91. It seems to be the most satisfactory way to learn all that can be known of the human mind, to examine our own experience. Let us suppose that a person of competent age, and the common degree of intelligence and instruction, should turn his thoughts inwards, and ascertain for himself what he can of his own mind.

92. The first thing that will strike him as certain, is, that he exists; that he is conscious of that fact. No reasonable person can doubt that he is a human being. No one can doubt that he may act, or not act; that he can command the use of his muscles. No one doubts that he has perceptions of external objects; nor that he can recall and think of them, when they are not act-

ing on him; nor that he is capable of feeling pain, and of having pleasing and grateful emotions. No one doubts that he can remember what he did a few hours ago, nor that he can think of what he will do a few hours hence; and resolve on the means of doing what he wants to do. Such things are the common, every day experience of all persons.

93. Suppose such a person seated in a room, and accidentally reminded of Eve's affectionate address to Adam in Milton,

> 'To whom thus Eve, with perfect beauty adorn'd—
> My author, and disposer, what thou bidd'st
> Unargued I obey: so God ordains:
> God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more
> Is woman's happiest knowledge, and her praise.
> With thee conversing, I forget all time;
> All seasons and their change, all please alike,' &c.

He recollects that he could repeat it; he attempts to do it, but his memory fails him. He remembers the place in which his volume of Milton is; he rises, and takes it down, resumes his place, and reads over the lines, closes his book, and finds that the lines have resumed their place in his memory, and that he can repeat them. This simple and every day occurrence is full of mysteries. What is that power of muscular motion which is so perfectly obedient to the will; the faculty of memory; the recurrence of former impressions; the connexion between thoughts recalled, or any thoughts, and the power of speech? and whence, and what, is that emotion of pleasure, found in the imaginary language of tenderness, and piety, which existed only in the mind of the poet? All this is incomprehensible, as to its causes and nature; but, it is so, and this is all that can be discerned.

94. Let such a person employ himself in calling to mind the events of his past life.

Suppose him to have arrived at the age when manhood begins. He can call to mind many events of the last year, and so can go back from year to year, till he

comes to the earliest circumstances, and events, which he can remember. It is probable that such an exercise of the mind will bring to his view persons, and facts, which he has not thought of for many years; and that he will seem to see them again, with all the freshness of the first impressions. In this exercise of the mind he cannot doubt that it was himself, and not another, who witnessed these things which he so calls to mind. He may be able to recollect, that in his school exercises he recited some piece of poetry, or prose, and with some effort may be able to recall it, and the very book from which he learned it, and that he can repeat the whole again. By this exercise of the mind he satisfies himself that he has one quality, or power of the mind, to which he gives (in common with all other persons) the name of *memory*. He may know also, that the memory can be charged with remembering, and preserving what is committed to it; that by frequent calling on it to perform duties, and tasks, it will perform them more easily and effectively. There is then a faculty of the mind called memory, which is the subject of discipline and habit.

95. When he has thus made himself acquainted with memory, he will have attained to a certain degree of knowledge of this intellectual faculty. But what does it amount to? No more than this, viz. that he has such faculty, and can exercise it. But what it is in itself, he is no better informed than before he exercised its power. Where were those impressions stored up, which he has called to his view? How is it that he recalls them? And how is it that they do not come instantly, but often slowly and after repeated efforts? And how is it that the memory serves him as to some things, and not as to others, which he cannot but know to have happened in relation to himself? How is it that some of his impressions are so very vivid, and clear, that by closing his eyes he seems to see the original objects again; while of others, he has only a very indistinct recollection, as though it were the fading away of a dream. All that one thus certainly knows is, that he

has the faculty of memory, that it serves him for better or worse, probably from its original power, and from the discipline which he has bestowed upon it.

96. In such a process of recalling past events, one may find that his mind sometimes goes off from the proposed purpose, and engages itself in something which is incidental. Thus, if one should arrive at a point in retracing events, in which he recollects to have been one of a numerous audience, he may remember the impressions which some speaker made on him at the time, and also the subject spoken of. He may find that his mind, unbidden by him, engages itself upon the speaker, or the subject of the speech, and that the recollection of the one, or the other, or both, diverts him from following back the train of events in his own life, and that he has entirely forgotten himself, in this new pursuit. After some time his mind gives up this pursuit, and returns to that in which he was engaged: and he will be surprised to find how far he has wandered from the employment with which he commenced. But this incident teaches him another quality of the mind, that is, that thoughts are associated with other thoughts, and that the presence of the one introduces the other. This quality, faculty or power, is called association of ideas.

97. This faculty of the mind has the strongest influence on human life and happiness. It is on this faculty that intellectual eminence is principally founded. It may be divided into two parts, that of having acquired the information, or knowledge, or experience, which gives to the mind the power of forming such associations; and, secondly, the readiness with which the mind makes its associations. In all intellectual operations this principle of association takes a most active part. An act is to be done, or an act done is to be judged of; All similar acts, and all similar judgments, have relation to these. Those who have had experience are skilful, because of the facility with which these associations are formed in their minds. This faculty extends to all the vocations in life. Known

truths, and inferences from these truths, are brought to bear on the subject to be acted upon. It is this faculty which has led to so many important discoveries in Natural Philosophy. It appears eminently in the mind of Sir Isaac Newton, and in that of the philosophic Lord Bacon. But it applies alike in all professional and mechanical employments. These associations are sometimes the fruit of laborious research, and continued labor; but repeated operations make them come uncalled for, no less in mental, than in muscular action. The principle is the same in the acts of a skilful surgeon, an extemporaneous orator, an adroit mechanic, a long practised musician, and a graceful ropedancer. All the learning which has been devoted to intellectual operations, comes only to this result, that the mind perceives, retains, and remembers. It applies what it has thus acquired to the acts in which it is engaged. This is common to all vocations, however varied the acts of human life may be, and however varied the knowledge with which these acts may be associated.

98. Another faculty of the mind will have been disclosed in making the proposed inquiry. The mind may, or may not be able to go back, without any deviation, in the straight line of one's experience, from manhood to infancy; and may refuse to go out of its way, or to permit any thing to attract it from its direct course. This faculty of fixing the mind on the subject proposed, and excluding all things else, whatever be the subject pursued, is, in common phrase, minding what one is about; philosophers call it *attention*. It is very certain that those who mind, or attend to that which they undertake to do, are sure to do it sooner and better than if the mind be often drawn off to other objects, and has to return to find where it was, and how employed when it deviated. If one has to go from one point to another on the earth, he may go in a certain space of time, or he may deviate to see every object that attracts him, and return to his path as often as he has left it; if he do not deviate so far, as to be unable to find it. It is a truth, for example,

but not a self-evident one, that if any person should draw a figure composed of straight lines, each one of which lines should be of different length, and should thus form a triangle; and should then make a square on each side of the triangle, the square on the largest side, would be equal in its superficial extent, to the two squares on the smaller sides. But to prove that such equality exists, a process of reasoning must be gone through. To make out that proof, one must remember or associate with the demonstration he is engaged in, the elementary truths which are laid up in his memory, and which are intended to be applied in such mensuration; and he must have a faculty in associating these truths, as he goes on, with his demonstration; and he must mind what he is doing, that is, he must give his exclusive attention to his object; for, if his mind flies off to something else, the chain of demonstration will be broken, and he will probably, nay necessarily, begin again, and form every link anew.

99. Memory, association, and attention are all faculties of the mind, capable of discipline, education, and habits. Perhaps we would not hazard too much in saying, that the fruits of education are to be found in these three qualities, as to the ability of the mind. It is quite questionable whether these faculties are yet systematically and effectively disciplined, to their full extent. Nor is the best mode of disciplining them, probably, yet known. Memory is treated of very lightly in many schools; and whether cultivated in the best manner, in any, is very doubtful. Usually it is a painful effort to exercise the memory. Is there no way of making it pleasant, or at least tolerable?

100. Every one knows that the power of minding what one is about, or attending to that which is doing, can be subjected to obedience. If a master should be moving among his pupils, with a whip in his hand, and should make its lash felt by every inattentive boy, he would certainly fix attention on the lesson to be learned. But with older persons, and even with such pupils, other motives may be applied and with far better effects.

No one doubts that a habit of attention may be acquired, and is acquired. It is one of those qualities which enables the mind to do its best. It is sometimes considered the fair rival of genius; and to be capable of supplying its place. A man of singular eminence for intellectual power, was lately asked, by one of his familiar friends, which of the faculties of his mind had secured to him his remarkable distinction; He answered, modestly, that if he had any pretension to be superior to men, in general, in anything, it was in the ability to take up a subject, and to fix his mind on it as long as he pleased, to the exclusion of every thought not properly connected with the object in view.

101. Although these three faculties of the mind may be spoken of with certainty, as to their existence, their uses, and the cultivation of them, yet what they are in themselves, is entirely unknown to us. The operations of memory are known only by experience. Those of association and attention are known in like manner only. That facility which some men have of disclosing connexions between distinct ideas, and that power which is exerted at pleasure, of devoting the whole mind to a subject, disclose nothing of the mind or its faculties but this, that it is so; and this is the limit of all inquiry.

102. Every person who has the power of remembering, and whose mind associates thoughts, and who can give his attention to his thoughts, must have exercised faculties of the mind which are in use before these faculties can be used. He must have had thousands of impressions made on his mind, through his senses. When the mind is attending to impressions made through the senses, it is exercising that faculty which is called perception. The act of the senses, by which the perception of the mind is obtained, is observation. The eye, for example, is engaged in comparing the merits of two pictures. The eye is *observing*. The impression made on the retina by one picture, and then by the other, enables it to *perceive* them. The mind in judging of them, associates what it remembers of impressions made by other pictures. The intensity, or

singleness of its devotion to the act it is engaged in, marks the degree of attention.

103. When the mind remembers what it has perceived, it has ideas or images within it of the things perceived. Any one who saw the eclipse of Feb. 12, 1831, had a direct perception of that event. If he recalls that event by an act of his memory, he then has an idea or conception of it. The words idea, and conception, have the same meaning when used in relation to a past impression. If one who did not see that eclipse, and should hear it described, or read a description of it, he would have in his mind an idea or conception of it. This idea or conception is understood to mean the existence in the mind of some past event, or fact, or of something not present to the senses; of this nature are all geographical and historical descriptions, whether real, or imaginary.

104. There is another class of ideas which the mind makes for itself, out of ideas of sensation, that is out of ideas which come through the senses, which are called *ideas of reflection.* These are obtained by the power which the mind has to think, or reflect, upon the impressions which the senses have furnished it with. Every one has seen many different kinds of vegetable products, which grow on trees, bushes, and vines. He knows each one by itself, by some name. Collectively he knows all these products under the name of fruit. This power of the mind in classing many, and giving a general name, is one idea of reflection. A particular individual known to us, is a man. A number of such individuals, associated for a particular purpose, may be a mob, an army, a religious or legislative assembly. A particular family is one; many families constitute inhabitants of a city, a county, or a state. Generalization, is necessary in the arts and sciences, and in all intellectual operations. The respective members of the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdoms, are classed and known by general terms. Without this power of classification human knowledge would be exceedingly limited.

105. Abstraction is the separation of certain qualities from the subject in which they appear. This also is an idea of reflection. A rose, linen, paper, snow, are white. We abstract that quality, and form an idea of reflection, known to us under the name of whiteness. These ideas are unnumbered; virtue vice, right, wrong, loveliness, deformity, hardness, suffering, bravery, cowardice, truth, and falsehood, are of this description. It is said we can conceive of such things separately, or abstractly from any subject, or person. It is also said that we have not such power. Each one must settle this for himself by attempting to conceive of vice and virtue independently of human beings; or of whiteness or blackness entirely separate from some physical substance. Thus it is apparent that the mind has the power of classing and bringing many particulars under some general term; and also of abstracting from many particulars, some quality common to them all. Every person, without the aid of learned treatises, can master the theory of generalizing, and abstracting, by examining the materials of knowledge collected in his own mind. The word animal is one of the most general terms in use. Any one may follow this into many classes. Perhaps the most learned man that ever lived could not follow it into all classes in nature. Abstraction is a more simple operation. The abstraction is easily made. The difficulty lies in the application of it to particular subjects. Fusion, for example, is an abstract term. Certain substances can be melted or fused, that is, brought from a solid, into a liquid state. All substances cannot be fused. It is unknown whether certain substances can be or not. It is known that some substances cannot be melted, by the application of heat; but will either be dissipated or reduced to ashes.

106. Imagination is another department of the mind which is considered by some writers as including that of conception. It appears to be that faculty by which the images in the mind are divided, reformed, combined, increased, or diminished; and also that, by which the realities perceived through the senses, are

dealt with by imaginary additions and changes. But it will be found, in analyzing any and every product of the imagination, that it is made up of perceptions originally derived through the senses, and then managed according to this power of the mind. What a wonderful power is that by which one may create in his head, an imaginary world; cover its surface with vegetation; place on it varieties of animal life; endow its tenants with active powers, physical and intellectual, and furnish them with motives and passions, and engage them in connected and consecutive efforts. Beauty, deformity, virtue, vice, the kindest affections, the most generous and magnanimous feelings, the most malicious and diabolical propensities, may figure under the power of the imagination.

107. Among the imperishable products of this power is Milton's Paradise Lost, more read and admired at the distance of one hundred and sixty four years from its appearance, than in any preceding time. Another production of the same family are the dramatic works of Shakspeare, some of which have the further recommendation of being historical, though, in many parts, more fit in these days for the closet than any other use. And another instance is found, still of the same order, but for very different use, in the poem so well known under the name of Thompson's Seasons, now familiar to the reading world for about a century; and which is full of extraordinary beauty of description, and a high tone of moral and pious feeling, delightfully expressed.

108. But here again we are entirely ignorant of this power of the mind, and can only say that such an one there is, and such are its uses. It is to be noticed that this faculty of imagination has its laws. However fanciful it may be, all its products are derived from ideas of sensation and reflection. These are limits which it cannot transcend. Dreaming seems to be the sporting of the imagination, with ideas of sensation and reflection; but in this sport, it apparently uses none other; and philosophically can use no

other, however extravagant its operations may be. Insanity is, probably, a diseased action of the imagination; as when one imagines himself to be some person which he is not, or in circumstances or relations which are not real. Insanity is commonly said to be a *false* perception through the senses; or *false* conclusions, from *true* perceptions. If this account of mental alienation be a just one, many persons are, in some degree insane, who are not thought to be so; and probably all persons are so, on this supposition, who are under the influence of any violent passion.

109. Every person who will attend to what his own mind does in the daily action of his life will know, that he is engaged in comparing one thing with another, and one motive with another. Some persons, who are actively employed will find that they make many such comparisons in every hour. All persons, of all ages make these comparisons in subjects of more or less importance Philosophers, statesmen, professional men, and mechanics are continually employed in this process; and so even are children, in their sports and amusements. The mind then has a power of making comparisons; and of judging, and the result which the mind comes to, is a judgment. Wherefore, it is said that there is a faculty of the mind called judgment. But it rather seems proper to say, that the mind has a faculty of forming a judgment by comparison. Human life is a continued series of actions, and every action has some motive which arises from comparing or judging, though these judgments are formed so rapidly, as not to be noticed by the mind. Every one knows that these motives, so formed by comparison, determine him to act, or not to act. He also knows that when a motive is sufficiently operative to move the mind to do, or to put the muscles of the material being into action, (when the motive has reference to them) an act of the mind, or body follows. This determination to do, or not to do, an act is an exercise of a faculty of the mind which is called the *will*.

110. The motive of the will, has been discussed by very able minds, and opposite, and irreconcileable opinions have been presented to the world, under the authority of great names. Some of these writers maintain that the will is determined by causes over which the mind has no control, and that every act done, or omitted, is from an absolute necessity. They say that every act, and every thought, is an unavoidable consequence of preceding actions, or thoughts. That this must be so, because the Deity foresees every thing that occurs, and that nothing can happen but in pursuance of his will. On the other hand, it is said, that such a doctrine is directly opposed to the experience of every rational being. That no one doubts, for a moment, that as to all acts which are within his power, and which he is not restrained, by some consideration, from doing, may be done, or not, at his own pleasure. Can any one doubt that he can rise and walk, or sit still; that he can turn his face towards the East, the North, the West, or the South, or that he can speak, or be silent? If he receive the opposite doctrine, and give credit to that, disregarding the fallacy on which it must rest, he takes that to be true, which is contradicted by every act of his life. The very men who maintain this doctrine, act throughout all their lives, in direct opposition to it. Is it possible, that when we feel regret and remorse, at doing wrong, and satisfaction for doing right, that we so feel though we could not but do the acts from which these feelings arise? Such a doctrine makes of man a mere machine, denies him the influence of all motives; and annihilates, at a blow, all notions of accountability to ourselves, to society, and to the Creator. If this doctrine, so repugnant to common sense, be true, then it is a part of it, that men shall suffer and mourn, in consequence of acts which they were compelled to do; and with the perplexing conviction, that it was impossible to avoid doing the acts, the very *doing* of which, is the cause of their distress. Such things are subversive of all reverence for the Deity.

111. We shall not enter into this abstruse controversy, nor into any other which is in its own nature, incomprehensible. Such disputes arise from assuming something to be true, which cannot be denied, or disproved; and then founding on the assumption, a train of reasoning which cannot be refuted, though it flatly contradict at the same time, the experience of every rational mind. The doctrine of necessity rests on this proposition, the Deity foresees every thing. This cannot be denied; and then follows the reasoning which seems to be sound, and conclusive. But it must be in something unsound, and false, or religion and morality have no foundation. In the investigation undertaken in these pages, we go by the light of reason in search after truths, and to draw from them the inferences which they afford; we believe that nothing more is required, and nothing more permitted to us, in the present state of being.

112. We consider man to be thus far a free agent, that he wills to do, or not to do; that his will is determined by the strongest motives acting upon it; that the nature and influence of motives depend, upon his original mind, and upon the intelligence and discipline imparted to it, and through these, on the respect which he feels for commands and prohibitions, arising from the laws of nature, of society, and of his Creator. We believe, finally, that the mind of man is distinguishable, from the thinking power which other animals have (which may be in many respects, especially in some animals, very like that of the human mind) in this, that man can, and that no other animal can, form opinions of abstract truths. By this we mean, that man can comprehend the nature of a law, and its general application, and the consequences of obeying it, or disobeying it. That he can comprehend the abstract truths of science, morality, and religion, and that no other animal has this power. He can comprehend that he is required, under some penalties, to govern himself by these truths. We believe that in these respects man is, and was intended to be, exalted

far above all other animated beings. And that this is the comprehensive mark put between him and them, and raises him to the hope of another, and superior life.

113. The conclusion we come to is this: That the faculties of the mind are developed by the action of the senses; that the knowledge transferred to the mind through these, enables it to exercise its faculties, and to expand, enlarge, and perfect them, so far as human life permits; that among these are memory, association, attention, generalizing, abstraction, comparing or judging, and forming judgments; that judgments are motives, which put the will into action; that the will is formed, and qualified, by the sum of intelligence, and acquirements, which the mind arrives at; and that willing, and consequent action, may be right or wrong; virtuous or vicious, or neither the one nor the other, but indifferent. If we are well founded in these propositions we have cleared the way to morals.

CHAPTER XVI.

On Moral Accountability.

114. However much man may be distinguished from all other animals by his physical and intellectual qualities, he is much more so by those which are called moral. He is certainly the only animal who is capable of conceiving beforehand, whether an intended act will, or will not conform to some known law, or rule of right. It is equally certain that he only, of all animals, is capable of forming abstract rules, and applying them to actions, as they rise. He only is capable of feeling a sense of compunction and remorse; and, beyond all question, the only one who can associate with transgres-

sion, the apprehension of punishment from an authority higher than any found in this life. However inscrutable may be the physical and intellectual nature of man, the powers which are given him are fully sufficient to dispel all darkness and mystery, concerning all his duties.

115. It will not be attempted to settle a question much discussed among ethical writers whether man has, or has not, that natural perception of right and wrong, which is referred to what is called 'the moral sense.' But we venture to express this opinion, that man was placed here in an entirely different relation to his Creator, and to everything created, from all other animals; that he only has the capacity to improve his condition, and to ascend from a state of infancy, as to his intellectual and moral qualities, to a state of comparative superiority. We can see no reason to doubt, that this capability is guided by established laws; that among them is the necessity of being able to discern what will advance his happiness, and what will prevent, or retard it. Whether the cultivation of his faculties does, or does not develope, and bring into action the moral sense, in like manner as the cultivation of his faculties brings into action, other powers of his mind, as we know it does, is a very fair subject of inquiry.

116. It may be admitted, that the rude and uncultivated mind of man is not furnished with rules of right and wrong, so as to be capable of discerning between virtue and vice, or anything, which is itself good or bad, unless it be in a very limited degree. We suppose it to be true, that man has not been found any where, destitute of all perception, of right and wrong; though he has been found with very imperfect, and misguided perceptions in many instances, in different parts of the earth. We entertain no doubt, that what may be called the moral sense, does exist in the mind as a faculty, in all men to some extent, as a necessary consequence of their existence as men; and that this sense may be developed, and disciplined, in like manner as the other faculties of the mind may be; and that by suitable culti-

vation, this moral sense acquires a discriminating power, which may be called almost intuitive with respect to right and wrong. It seems quite reasonable to suppose, that there may be persons who have this sense so developed by long continued discipline, that they judge infallibly as soon as a proposition is presented to them, of its character, in relation to the most refined rules of fitness and propriety.

117. If we are right in this supposition, we think the moral sense is derived from a clear perception, and ready application, of the laws which the Creator prescribed for human conduct, and from like perception and application of the conventional laws, which originate in social life. In proportion as the mind becomes well instructed in the meaning and use of the former description of laws, those which are of human institution are found to be right or wrong, just as they do or do not conform to those laws. We cannot resist the conviction that if the Deity intended we should be happy, he must have intended that we should be so, by conforming to laws which he has prescribed; and this purpose would evidently be defeated, if those who are the objects of laws were not made capable of comprehending them, and of making their own laws consistent with them.

118. In a multitude of instances the duty of obedience to laws, whether taken to be divine, natural, or human, must depend upon an immediate perception of their application to that which is to be done, or avoided. To this it may be answered that this is no more than the use of that intelligence, which discipline imparts to all the intellectual faculties. But if it be admitted that a highly gifted and greatly experienced professional man, statesman, or military-chief, may be said to have attained to a certain degree of facility in deciding on the course to be pursued, in the exigencies of his condition, so also may there be an acute discernment of moral fitness and propriety. And the rather in the latter case, than in the supposed one, because in these the thing to be decided, and the rules by which it is to be decided may be entirely arbitrary, whereas those of

moral fitness must be, in their own nature, incapable of error. But whether there be any such moral sense or not, in the original formation of man, it will sufficiently answer the present purpose to establish, that by a course of discipline, man may attain to a knowledge of all those rules which are adapted to secure to him all the happiness of which he is capable; and to qualify him for the attainments which he is enabled to expect.

119. The word morals is used in many senses. We often hear it used in connexion with some other words, as in moral agency, moral power, moral effect, moral fitness, &c. This use of the word may not convey any very definite meaning. That which is meant by moral philosophy in this volume, is that code of laws prescribed by the Creator, and adapted to the government of mankind for this life, and in the expectation of a future one.

120. We lay out of the inquiry here, as we have done in all preceding pages, the revealed law of the Deity. The law of Morality is to be sought in the constitution of men and things. Do we believe that the material world proceeded from, and is governed by, the Deity? That it is governed by laws to which he has exacted an obedience, which cannot be departed from? Do we believe that intellectual being proceeded from him, and that it is in like manner subjected to laws; that intellectuality, as it exists in man, allows to him the liberty of choosing, whether he will act in one manner or another? Do we believe that this liberty of choosing could have been given to man, unaccompanied with a capacity to learn the consequences of choosing well or ill? Do we believe that man has availed himself, to some extent, of this capacity; and that he has learned, more or less perfectly, what these laws are, which were intended to govern his choice? Do we believe that he has improved his condition, from age to age, by studying and applying these laws? Do we believe that in all the term of life permitted to each individual, he is under the necessity of doing certain acts for himself, and relatively to those with whom he

is associated by family ties, by social bonds, and by the using of those things which minister to his well being, consistently with the rights which others may have therein? Do we believe that he ought to abstain from acts which are injurious to himself, and to others; and from acts which disturb the good order and harmony, of the political association of which he is necessarily a member?

121. If we so believe, then such belief must be followed by the conviction, that we must ascertain and conform to, the rules which are adapted to accomplish these ends of our being. Morality then lies in knowing and in conforming to these rules. In the proportion in which these rules are known to us, and observed by us, we shall conform to the will of the Creator, as discernible by us in the nature of his creation; and in the proportion in which we are uninstructed in these laws, or are disobedient to them, when known to us, we shall fall short of obtaining the good of which we are capable. Gross ignorance, and wilful disobedience, are the causes of suffering in body, and in mind.

122. Those who are instructed, are favored with a monitor under the name of *conscience*, which never fails to perform its duty. The character of this monitor is derived from the state of improvement to which the human race attain. It is such, in each individual, as he makes it to be. In some individuals its influence is feeble, in some ever active and severe; in some misdirected, and leading to absurd consequences. This may be so, because of the narrow and misconceived rules, which conscience enforces. Conscience operates in every mind; it operates well or ill, usefully or mischievously, according to the character of the mind in which it resides; one may be strictly conscientious in things of imaginary importance, and even revolting to sound reason, and good sense.

123. Without adverting to revelation to prove that the spirit of man is immortal, we have assumed that it is so, in the preceding pages. But this all-important fact, cannot be left on assumption, merely. We have then to inquire whether the light of nature discloses to

us *immortality*. We know not that the tenor of human life ought to be different from what it should be, whether the spirit of man is transferred to another life, or not. We discern nothing in revealed law, which ought to vary that conduct which will result in man's greatest earthly good, if he is not to live again. Whatever revelation may add to man's duties, it takes away no law, and impairs no law, which it would not be for his good faithfully to observe, if life begins and ends in this frail being.

CHAPTER XVII.

On Immortality.—There is an Immortal Spirit in Man.

124. We propose to consider this subject of immortality, by the same light which has hitherto guided us. We do not say that we expect to demonstrate the immortality of the soul; but we do expect to find truths, which will furnish inferences that it is immortal.

The proofs of this proposition, as derived from revealed religion, are not now to be considered. We shall go by the truths which the human mind is capable of perceiving, and by the inferences which can be drawn from these truths. We shall be met, perhaps at the threshold with the objection, that nothing in the nature of proof can be drawn from this source, because, there is no truth within our knowledge, which proves the existence of an immortal spirit; nor any truths from which an inference can be reasonably drawn that there is such a spirit. If this be so, we admit that the argument must fail. It is also admitted, that with the exceptions which are found in the Scriptures, there is no satisfactory evidence that the disembodied spirit has been seen by any mortal. We know not of any useful purpose, (with the exceptions above referred to) which would

require that the spirit of man should be seen of the living. And we think it is irreconcileable with the qualities of our nature, so far as we can comprehend them, that spirit, whatever that may be, should be perceptible by mortals. There are many narrations which tend to show, that supernatural appearances have been witnessed. No credit is due to these. They are to be accounted for by recurring to truths, and to inferences from them. It is a truth that the mind may be effected by delusions. External objects may seem to the mind to exist, which do not exist. There are many well authenticated facts of this sort.

125. How this delusion, which has no being but in the mind, is produced, is not known to us. All accounts of apparitions and supernatural occurrences, are undoubtedly to be referred to some mental error. We think it may be assumed, that it is contrary to the truths known to us, and to the inferences which must be drawn from them, that the immortal spirit can be perceived in a disembodied state, by the human senses. What natural evidence, then, can we have that there is such spirit? We answer, that we are to take all the truths that bear on this inquiry, and make reasonable inferences from them. Among these truths we rank the following.

126. I. The universe is the work of one God. All its parts constitute a united, consentaneous whole. Every part acts, or may act, when motion is given to it, relatively to the whole. There are laws of analogy which pervade the whole; as well as general and particular laws, which act always in like circumstances, to the same ends. Among these analogies we may select as examples: The great principle of waste, supply, and renovation; the analogy of organic bodies; the resemblance which the vegetable creation bears to animated being, in the vessels ramifications and circulations, and the analogy which exists between the circulation of fluids, in vegetable and animal being, and that of the waters of the earth. The principle of universal attraction, and the relation which every one of the globes

floating in the vast expanse around us, bears to all others. Every part of created being has some relation to, and connexion with, all other parts. We do not certainly know that all this is so; but we know certainly so many truths, as will yield to us inferences which are so satisfactory, and conclusive, that the mind cannot refuse its assent to them.

127. Secondly: We must admit that all created being came from the universal Deity, whose attributes, so far as we can discern, are forced upon our minds. From these truths we infer, that nothing which He has made was made in vain, or without design, or without some useful purpose. All that is known of man, comes within these general rules, always keeping in view, that man is a free agent, and that we are not to suppose that the Deity intended he should necessarily commit the errors, follies, and crimes, which spring from the exercise of the liberty given to him. We are not to judge of man from the ignorance and vice, which mark the course of certain individuals, nor from the benighted and low condition in which some nations are seen. But we are to judge of him by this undeniable truth: that he is made capable of improvement, and that the progress of improvement must, from obvious causes be slow; and that what is generally true of all the human race, under all the variety of circumstances in which they are seen, must be founded in the general law of man's nature, ordained by his Creator. These circumstances depend on the kind of government under which men live, the national habits, the degree of intelligence which they have attained to, and the influence which the knowing and the privileged, have exercised over the mass of men, and on the climate in which they happen to be placed; and perhaps, more than on everything else put together, on traditionary habit, everywhere the relentless enemy of improvement. To mankind. however thus diversified, the sentiment of immortality has been almost common. Some persons who do not believe in immortality, and even some who maintain it, allow no weight to the uni-

versality of this sentiment. They say it proves nothing; that it is natural to man to desire to live again; and that such desire establishes nothing as to the certainty of future life. To this we disagree. We go back to the truth, that the sentiment springs from the organization of the human mind. That it appears under all the aspects in which man appears. That it could not, and would not appear, if it did not spring from that power from which man himself originates. Why should the thought of immortality have entered the human mind naturally, if it have no foundation? Is there anything else which men imagine of themselves which is known to be unfounded, or believed to be so? Since then, the Creator has given this sentiment so commonly to the human mind, and since we cannot suppose that any sentiment is found there, and especially one so materially affecting existence, as this, without his authority, we think it is entitled to great respect in estimating the certainty of future life.

128. Thirdly. It is a truth known to every one that there is something in him which he calls mind. It is with this part of himself that he recalls the past, acts on the present, and regards the future. It is with this that he conceives of the Deity, and forms the sublime conception of his existence, attributes and presence. However depraved, and shocking the sentiment is sometimes seen to be in some nations of the earth, it is, nevertheless, an universal one, among mankind, that there is some intelligence, superior to themselves, which is to be worshipped. This is the natural offspring of the thinking part of our nature, and this is a truth. Is the inference fairly to be made from that truth, that this something may exist when the organization in which it appears, returns to dust? What sound reason is there for supposing that this is not a mere consequence of organization of material substance? We answer to this, that it cannot be conceived that matter, whatever matter may be, can have that power. How can we conceive that any arrangement of material particles should produce memory,

imagination, reasoning, love, fear, conscience, religion? That matter should ever have this power, is irreconcileable with truths which press irresistibly on every observing mind. This thinking something, then, is not matter. Some persons who deny to man an immortal spirit, but who must admit that he thinks, say this: let it be that man thinks, and that matter cannot think, and that there is something in man which is distinguishable from matter, and that through that something he is immortal, have not other animals that same something in them? Do not animals think? And if immortality is to be affirmed of all animals that think, are not other animals, as well as man, immortal? To this we answer, that there is no truth, there is no inference from any truth, that leads to the conclusion that other animals think, or if they do that the sort of thinking which they are gifted with, is connected with immortality. We shall not shun, nor attempt to conceal the inference which the apparent intelligence of animals seems to furnish. We admit that this argument is plausible. We meet it by assuming, that the very best intelligence found in the animal creation, does not prove that they have any of that intellectuality which connects them with future life. We rely on this truth; that no animal which has not the discipline of human intelligence is capable of any improvement. To each one of all the varied tribes, there is a prescribed, an unchangeable law, from age to age. By that law they are bound. The most intelligent of the animal creation, and the most teachable are the dog, the horse, and the elephant. They are man's pupils. Left to themselves they are incapable of change. They are the same now, which they were from the earliest knowledge of them. The skilful beaver, and the more skilful bee, are the same which they were when first known to man. It is not so with our race; we are moving on in the long course of improvement. We are removing gradually the veil which is hung over the natural world; we are casting stronger and stronger lights, on the moral and social nature of man;

we are gradually obtaining, by the light of reason, more clear and more grateful perceptions of the one only and true Sovereign of the Universe. These are the qualities of man which distinguish him from the brute; and these truths force on us the inference, that brutes are of the earth, and return to the earth; that man is of another, and far more exalted being, and to that he is destined.

129. Fourthly. Such reasonings, it may be replied, are plausible, but not satisfactory. The brute returns to the dust, and does not man return to the dust? When that unknown something in him which we call life ceases, does he not decompose and mingle with the natural world? and how is this well known truth to be reconciled with the supposition, that something in him survives this ruin?

Certainly that which came from the earth returns to it. But we have shown that there is something in man which cannot be of the earth. If this be so, it only remains to show, that this something may survive that which is earthly ruin. This cannot be directly proved, for as we have before remarked, no one has seen the disembodied spirit. But as this thinking something did exist, as the sentiment is universal that it may continue to exist, independently of the material frame; as this something has a progressive nature, as we have seen in the power which man has to improve; as it is not impossible that there should be a separate existence, what are the inferences which the mind is enabled to draw as to a future state of being? Let us first dispose of some objections which have been often urged against the proposition of future life. Among these are, that so far as we can know, man belongs to a material system; and that it is irrational to suppose that being seen to be such, there should be anything in his nature, which is separable from that system. This objection has been impliedly answered before.

130. No one will deny that there is a Creator, and that he is of superior immaterial intelligence, and that this intelligence acts on the material universe. No

one will deny that this universe is one united whole; that material and intellectual man composes part of it. What truth or what inference from any truth forces on us the belief, that so much as is intellectual must be limited to this earth; and cannot exist elsewhere? Is existence elsewhere, so irreconcileable to reason, that reason must reject it? Why is it so? because we cannot see how it should be so. Let us see how many things and facts there are, within our daily observation, which are no less marvellous, than would be the fact, that the thinking something survives. Can any one account for the fact that his muscles obey his will? that the vegetable and animal substances which he receives as food, assimilate with and become part of himself? Can any one account for the action of his memory? For the connexion between the will and the utterance of articulate sounds? Can any one account for the succession of vegetable and animal being? What is that in a seed which sends one part of it downwards into the earth in the form of roots, and another part of it upwards through the surface into the air? How are all the transformations from one sort of animal being into another effected? How are the essences of flowers, and vegetables, made capable of a distinct and continued existence, when the organization from which they come, has been destroyed in the process?

131. We do not insist, that because no answer can be given to these questions, that therefore the human soul survives the ruin of the body; but this, that if it do, it is not more wonderful than that such things, which are within our observation, should occur. But then it may be said, that though all these things do occur, they belong to what we know to be the mere revolutionary succession of the natural world. All these things are confined within a limited sphere, viz. to this earth. This is true. But does it follow, that the thinking substance manifested through an earthly organization, necessarily belongs to the sphere of the earth? What is the limit of its action while so manifested? Does it not fly from world to world, search

out the laws of the Creator, and come into his very presence in the admiration of his works, and in the feeling, which no man can escape from, of obedience to his will? Is it then limited to the earth? or does it belong to some proper sphere in the universe, of which the earthly being, is one, and perhaps the first of a succession, though far beyond the limited view which is permitted to us here?

132. We do not assume that it is, or can be demonstrated by the light of nature only, that man has an immortal spirit. But we say that all the truths which he can put together, and the necessary inferences from them, fasten upon him a strong assurance that it is so; and on the other hand we assume, that there is no truth, and no inference from any truth, that presses upon him a conclusion, that this cannot be so. If then there were nothing but the light of nature for our guide the judgment of the rational mind would be, that there is no probability that earthly death is the end of life; its judgment further is, that all which comes to that mind in the form of truth, and all the fair deductions therefrom, place the expectation of life near to certainty. We have one thing more to add: let us look through the created system; let us consider man as he is, and may be, physically, intellectually, and morally; let us consider his term of years; what he suffers and enjoys; the restless action of his mind; his abstract conception of death, its certainty as to him, and his apprehensions of what may follow it; conception, certainty and apprehension, which are unknown to every animal but man. Let us consider, too, man's views of the Deity; of his awful works, of his own state of being as connected with one of endless duration; and, also, that so far as we can discern, nothing that is created is *annihilated*, though it may often change its state of being. Then, these things being so, how can we reconcile it with our conceptions of the Deity, that he intended for man, no more or better, than that he should come forth like a flower, eat like a brute, laugh and

weep, through his brief moment, and disappear, and be lost, in the revolutions of the material world.

133. We are left in no doubt on these subjects. All the natural hopes and aspirations of man, are assured to him by the Creator's own revelation of himself. Is this so? How are we assured of it? By the Christian religion. Certainly there is such religion in the earth. There are very many who profess that religion. Its professors entertain very different opinions of its nature and obligations. Some creeds, and modes of worship, are apparently of human invention, and do no honor to a merciful and omniscient God. If it were of divine origin, would it not be better understood, and better applied to human wants and duties than we see it to be? How can it be, that such a God should have sent to the earth as a beneficent gift, such disclosure of himself, and of human relation to himself, as we see to be declared by men? Nor only declared, but maintained with the most intolerant spirit, and even with bloody and exterminating violence, wherever its votaries can use the arm of power? This religion then does not prove itself. Its assumed origin cannot be proved to human conception, in any other manner than that by which all other things are proved, that is, by reason. If reason tells us that there is such a religion, and what it is, we must receive it and obey it; otherwise we must rank it with the exploded fables of the heathen world.

134. We will proceed then to examine this serious subject by the light of reason. We will keep in view, what the Deity has manifested himself to be, in his magnificent works; and what He has made or permitted man to be, and where he has placed him in the scale of being, and thence attempt to know, whether there be a revelation of God's will to man, and what it means.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Revealed Religion.

INTRODUCTION.

135. We have hitherto followed plain reason as the proper guide to a knowledge of the Creator's purposes. We know not of any other guide to a knowledge of Christian truth. If there be such a thing as a religion revealed to man, by the Deity, it must be known to man in one of two modes; first, by direct inspiration; secondly, by examining the evidence of its truth, and judging of it by the understanding. In these days, no one pretends to be inspired. Those who pretend to comprehend the nature of religion in any other way than that in which they understand any other matter, necessarily received, or rejected, upon evidence, must be deceivers, or deceived. Many men have been very sincere Christians, who were gifted with extraordinary powers of mind, and who had attained to great eminence in all the departments of learning. Their natural powers, and the diligent cultivation of them, qualified such men the better to investigate Christian truth by the same rational means, which they applied to acquire the knowledge of truth, in natural and intellectual philosophy. At the head of such men, (independently of those who have officially devoted themselves to religion) we may place *Sir Isaac Newton* and *John Locke*. There are many others who are entitled to eminent distinction. In some respects, *Lord Bacon* is their equal. But the two first have given, in the most decided manner, their testimony to the truth of revelation, after a long and searching examination, which no two other men, that ever lived, were more capable of making. It is well known that Locke, who was an original discriminating thinker, a man of business, and a polished man of the world, and who left but little to his followers to do in illustrating the qualities of the human mind, distinguished himself in proving the truth and rea-

sonableness of revelation. He passed his long, busy, and happy life, in the observance of Christian precepts, and died, in the certainty of their divine origin. He found nothing mysterious, and incomprehensible in Christianity. On the contrary, he regarded it, as a clear and simple exposition of those rules which enjoin duty to one's self, to one's fellow men, and to the Creator. He seems to have been aware that religion had been greatly misconceived of, and injuriously perverted. He, therefore, warns the pious against enthusiasm, and against mysterious delusions, which lead them away from the practical, and salutary uses, of Christian belief. Can it be doubted, that the calm, rational, and satisfying views of this eminent man, are worthy of respectful imitation?

136. We are sensible of the grave responsibility of introducing the subject of religion, among youthful persons; the more so, because there are many denominations of Christians in this country. We consider this difference, to be the natural consequence of the freedom of opinion which reigns in this happy land. It is not to be expected that all minds should entertain the same belief. It is seen, that there are differences of opinion on all other subjects, whether serious, or insignificant. Unanimity is the less to be expected in a matter so serious as that, which prescribes the duty of the created, to the Creator. Each one knows, that in this responsibility, he must act for himself; and that he must take the final, and lasting consequences of conformity, or error. We are not sure that difference of opinion, in religious belief, has not a quickening, and beneficial effect. Suppose that there were a perfect accordance among all who profess Christianity, would not interest in religion be far less fervent than it now is known to be? The world has seen such an experiment, carried on for nearly a thousand years. From the beginning of the sixth, to the beginning of the sixteenth century, there was but one faith, and one Supreme Head, of the only church, known throughout

Christendom. What Christianity was, and what it was not, through this long lapse, history has not failed to disclose. It was in this time, that the darkness of ignorance, and barbarism, overshadowed society; and bound the mind, as well as the person, in chains. The first step in dispelling this darkness, was a difference in religious opinion. The character of society began, then, to change, and has been changing for the better, continually since. We assume not to judge, which of the various denominations, is right, or wrong. We know that *all Christians*, do, and must agree in one thing; that is, that among the fruits of Christianity, is proper moral conduct. With religion so far, and no farther, we presume to go. We disturb no one in his religious faith; nor shall we, in the attempt to describe religion, as the sanction of morals, express one sentiment that has any reference to sectarian faith or practice.

137. *Revealed Religion.* The word Religion is derived from the Latin language. It is said to be formed from *re* and *ligo, to bind anew*, and to have been used to express an oath or vow to the gods, which the Romans regarded as a sacred obligation. An eminent Roman derives this word from *religare*, to *reconsider*, in which sense it may mean, diligent study of whatever pertains to God. Others derive it from *religare*, *to bind fast;* in this sense it may mean the obligation which exists in the mind in relation to some superior power. The commonly received meaning of Religion, among Christians, is a belief in the revelation of God's will to man; by which, duty to ourselves, to our fellow men, and to God, is made known. It implies obedience to that will, accountability, and rewards and punishments. The word Religion is also used as meaning the creeds and forms of worship, which prevail among all nations who are ignorant of the Christian dispensation. In this general sense, all human beings have some sort of religion, unless the miserable race who were found in Australia, in modern days, are an exception. In this comprehen-

sive sense it includes Christianity, and all the varieties of Pagan and Mahometan worship. In no aspect does man appear more odious and revolting, than in religious belief and worship, where Christianity is unknown. Nor is it to be denied, that many things of human invention, have been associated with the religion which was declared by Jesus of Nazareth. The wars, the cruel persecutions, and the consequent sufferings which have occurred, in the name of Christianity, are suited to the irrational and barbarous nature of Paganism, and are wholly irreconcileable with the mild and peaceable spirit of the Gospel. Such events should be charged where they rightfully belong, that is, to human folly, error, and crime, and not to the teaching of revelation. Tears and blood have flowed so copiously, because man has assumed to judge for his fellow men, how they should believe and worship; and because he has used the force of temporal power, to establish this odious despotism. Regarded in its true and intended uses, revelation is the most gracious and important of all the gifts which have been bestowed on the human family. It lights the way through what would be, without it, a dark and incomprehensible region which human reason had attempted in vain to explore.

138. If revelation be entitled to be received as true, its importance cannot be overrated; and no greater service can be rendered to youthful minds than to make it understood and believed by them. This we shall attempt to do, proceeding however under the guidance of great and illustrious men; and assuming no more than to present their views in the simplicity which the occasion calls for.

139. The Old Testament is held by all Christians to contain the history of a people, who were selected by the Deity to receive the revelation of his will. All who have read this volume as it should be read, know, that it sets forth in the most unquestionable manner, the existence, the presence, and the government of the Supreme Being, and the promise of a future life. No writings have come down to us from any one of

the many nations who were contemporaneous with this people. And although the Old Testament is a connected history of the Jews through 1700 centuries, it no where appears from it, that any of the nations with whom the Jews were in some way connected, or engaged, had any writings of a prophetic or historical nature among them. This circumstance adds something to the proofs that the Jews were a people chosen to receive and to perpetuate a revelation made to them, and to them only. The proofs which the Old Testament contains of its own authenticity, and purposes, are most conclusive, and most certainly so to all reasonable minds when considered in connexion with events therein foretold, and now known to have occurred. The internal evidence of the authenticity of the Old Testament is found in the character of its writings. Many of these writings were made at a time when all other nations but the Jews, were in a state of comparative ignorance, and barbarism. Yet the writings of the inspired historians and prophets of the Jews, are for sublimity of thought, and beauty of expression, unrivalled among all the works which cultivated and refined genius has since been able to produce. When we desire to speak, as becomes us of the attributes of the Deity, we borrow the language of Job. If we would set forth the overruling providence of the Almighty, we use the words of the prophets, who claimed to have inspiration from him. In all Christian churches when we would render just adoration to the Most High, we repeat the devotional poems of David. When we would speak of man as he is, and of the world as it is, we find the terms which we want in the wisdom of Solomon. But that which commands our assent to this sacred volume is the prophetic declaration of events, then far hidden in futurity, and which we now know to have occurred, and to be in the course of fulfilment.

140. There are different interpretations of the prophetic writings, but the most respected writers agree, that many events which have occurred at different periods,

correspond strictly with prophesy. These have been pointed out, and applied by different authors. We do not intend to enter into the prophesies if we could do it. This would be going far beyond our limits, and is unnecessary to the purpose. There is one however within general notice, in the dispersion of the Jews, and in the preservation of their distinct national character throughout the world, while every nation which existed at the time of their dispersion, has long since disappeared. We need only to express a concurrence with those writers, who consider the appearance of the Messiah to have been distinctly and clearly foretold, and especially with *Paley*, who has given the authority of his name to this opinion. He appears to have been aware of the objections which had been raised to the prophetic authority, but he considers the three last verses of the 52d chapter and the whole of the 53d chapter of Isaiah, as intended to disclose the advent of the Saviour. This prophesy was announced seven hundred years before the happening of the event. We find the same opinion maintained by an eminent scholar who belonged to the gospel ministry in our own country, whose removal from his labors in the midst of usefulness and years, is still feelingly remembered. His words are,

141. 'It is certain that about eighteen hundred years ago, Jesus, this extraordinary person, appeared, whose birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension, completed a series of astonishing and, as we believe, miraculous events. This Jesus claimed the character of the long expected Messiah, the light and salvation of the world; and under this character he is received by all who embrace his religion and acknowledge his divine authority.

'When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his son. The fitness of the moment appears, in the first place, from this undeniable fact, that there was, at that time, a general expectation throughout the world of the advent of some illustrious prophet and deliverer, who should change the aspect of human affairs. The rumor seems to have advanced from the east, and to

have even reached the ears of the Roman emperor. We shall omit the scriptural proofs of this general expectation till we have produced some remarkable passages from three independent and unbiassed authors of that age. The first is from Josephus, the Jewish annalist of that tremendous war which ended in the destruction of his nation; a man, all whose prejudices were against the Messiahship and religion of Jesus. He is speaking of the causes, which stimulated the Jews to revolt from the authority of the Romans. "But that which principally encouraged them to the war," says he, "was an ambiguous oracle, found also in our sacred writings, that about that time some one from Judea should obtain the empire of the world. This they understood to belong to themselves, and many of their wise men were mistaken in their judgment; for this oracle referred to the government of Vespasian, who was proclaimed emperor in Judea." This you observe is the explanation of Josephus, in compliment to his imperial master. The second is from Suetonius, a Roman historian, who wrote, about the same time, the biography of the Emperors. His words are these: "There had been for a long time all over the east, a notion firmly believed, that it was in the books of the fates, that some one from Judea was destined, about that time, to obtain the empire of the world." The third passage is from Tacitus, an historian of veracity and universal credit. He had been relating the calamities of the Jews, which preceded the destruction of their city, and then observes, "that the mass of the people entertained a strong persuasion, that it was mentioned in the ancient writings of priests, that at that very time the east should prevail, and some one from Judea obtain the empire of the world. These ambiguities," says Tacitus like the rest, "predicted Vespasian and Titus; but the common people, according to the usual influence of human passions, having once appropriated to themselves this destined greatness, could not be brought to understand the true meaning by all their adversities." There are other passages in heathen au-

thors, which I think it unnecessary to mention, which prove that this expectation was prevalent at this time in the oriental world, and especially in Judea. These surely are remarkable attestations; and the many instances of persons, who appeared in Judea about this time pretending to be the Messiah, and collecting vast numbers of deluded Jews around them, facts repeatedly mentioned by the historians of that day, are additional proofs of this general persuasion.'

142. 'If we turn now to the New Testament, we shall find this state of things corroborated there by many incidental circumstances. The state of the public mind in Judea is indicated by the anxiety of Herod upon hearing of the birth of a remarkable child in Bethlehem, and by the visit of the eastern Magi. Still more illustrative is the thronging of the multitude to John upon his first appearance, and the message of the Pharisees and priests to inquire, if he were the Christ.'

143. 'In a word, every thing in profane history and, in the evangelical narrative proves, that the minds of the men of that age were wrought to a high pitch of expectation, that the great prophet and king would soon come into the world. But what was the source of this universal expectation at this moment? I answer, that I can discover or imagine nothing, except what these historians themselves assign as the authority, the oracles of the Jewish scriptures. This was the fulness of time for the advent of the Messiah, because it was the time predicted in prophecy. To the prophets, Christ and his apostles, repeatedly refer; and to me it appears, that if every other prediction of a Messiah in the Old Testament were allowed to be ambiguous, the single prophecy in the fifty third chapter of Isaiah would be sufficient to mark out the person we have acknowledged. It is too long to be quoted here, but it may safely be asserted that the description contained in it applies, in the most remarkable manner, to Jesus of Nazareth, and to no other person within our knowledge, who ever lived. It is the prophecy, which engaged the attention of the Ethiopian eunuch, and which Philip ex-

plained to him in the only manner in which it can be appropriated by any ingenuous man, who has read the history of Jesus of Nazareth.'

144. 'But you will inquire, perhaps, what prediction so accurately marks the time of the Messiah's advent, as to have excited this extraodinary expectation at this precise period. I must acknowledge, that some of those passages which are commonly alleged, particularly the mention of Shiloh, in Genesis, and the desire of all nations, in Haggai, do not appear to me sufficiently indubitable in any interpretation, which they have hitherto received. There is however a remarkable passage in Daniel. The celebrated prophecy of the seventy weeks, which, if there were no other, appears to me sufficient to have authorized the general expectation we have mentioned. In this celebrated prediction then, it clearly appears that in about five hundred years from the decree to rebuild Jerusalem, after the captivity, the Messiah should appear. From whatever date the reckoning is made, or whatever length is assigned to the years, the variations are not, upon any supposition, so great as to prevent our acknowledging that such a prophecy, wherever it was read, must have excited the expectations, which we are sure prevailed, of the appearance of the Messiah about the very time that Jesus lived.'

145. 'If you add to these considerations, that more than one intimation is given in the prophets, that the Messiah should come while the second temple was standing, that it was well understood that he should be born of the family of David, and of the tribe of Judah, you will instantly perceive that he must have appeared, if at all, before the destruction of Jerusalem. For who does not know, that since that unparalleled desolation, the Jews have been dispersed throughout the habitable globe; that they have not now the vestige of a temple; that their distinction of tribes is confounded, that their families and genealogies are utterly lost, and that it became and has remained, from the hour of this overthrow, utterly impossible to apply the distinctive marks of the

Messiah to any future pretender? Christ, then, must have appeared at the period he did, or not at all; and in our controversy with the Jews this circumstance appears nearly decisive. It was the fulness of time, the consummation of prophecy, the closing period of the Jewish state.'

146. These are the opinions of two eminent men who devoted their lives to the investigation of the truth of Christianity, and to make that known to others, on the pledge of their sincerity, which they had found to be true. To these authorities, hundreds of others might be added, proceeding from men of like eminence for ability to know, and for sincerity in declaring what they knew. If there be not weight enough in these illustrations to convince, it would be in vain to add others.

147. If it must be admitted that the coming of the Messiah was foretold, the proof that Jesus of Nazareth was that person may be distributed under the following heads.

1. The state of the world as to religion and morality at the time he came, and the probability that a new revelation would then be made.
2. The character of our Saviour as made known in the New Testament, compared with prophecy.
3. The miracles which were wrought by him.
4. His death and resurrection from the dead.
5. The faith and practice which he taught.
6. The effect of revelation in human affairs.
7. The progressive diffusion of Christianity, and the probability that it will become the only religion throughout the earth.

On the first point the need of a new revelation to mankind, we present in the compendious and striking words of the writer last quoted, all that we think necessary to offer in the nature of proof.

148. 'The testimony of Josephus, in numerous passages corroborates that of the apostle Paul to the depravity of the Jews: and he somewhere observes that never was there a time, from the beginning of the

world more fruitful in wickedness, than that in which he lived; and that if the Romans had delayed to come against their city, it must have been swallowed up by an earthquake, or overwhelmed by a deluge. Surely if ever the extreme corruption of a national religion could demand the interposition of Jehovah, this was the fulness of time for the appearance of his Son.

149. 'The moral and religious condition of the heathen world, at the period of Christ's birth, is another proof that this was the most proper time for his appearance. In consequence of the progress of philosophy and other causes, the polytheism of ancient times had lost all its influence except with the lowest of the people, and there was nothing left to supply its place in the minds of the great. The fear of the gods had vanished, and with it almost all sense of moral obligation. Power and wealth had introduced into the Roman nation the most effeminate and selfish corruption, and the early virtues of the commonwealth were no longer known. In Greece the worship of the gods was the mode, and their temples were the theatres of an inconceivable profligacy; and in truth the remains of their idolatrous superstition seemed to exist only for the more public encouragement of every species of infamy. The glowing description which Paul gives in the first chapter of Romans of the corruptions of that age, is confirmed by innumerable passages in Pagan writers. To say all in one word, they had united the more dissolute vices of a luxurious age, with the more sanguinary crimes of a ruder state of society.'

150. On the second point the proof lies in comparing the Old and the New Testament together. This comparison has been made by learned men, and their opinions have been published. But works of this nature embrace many other subjects than the prophecies which apply particularly to the Messiah. We know not whether there be any work limited to this object. If there be not, it is worth consideration whether such a one might be of important use. This comparison of the Old and New Testaments we do not assume to be

able to make; and if we could it would carry us away from our purpose.

151. 3d. On the miracles which were wrought by our Saviour. We are not of opinion as many are, that assent to Christianity as a divine revelation, depends, at this day, merely on a belief in the miracles which are recorded, because we believe that, independently of miracles there is abundant proof to establish its truth. But we think it may be proved that these miracles did occur, with as much certainty as would be required in the administration of justice, to dispose of property, to punish crimes, and even to take away life.

152. The human mind is so framed as to be compelled to judge on evidence of two descriptions; first that which comes directly through our own senses. If one sees, hears, touches, smells or tastes for himself, and believes that his own senses do not deceive him, he has the highest evidence of which he is capable. This sort of evidence relates to a very small portion of the facts which we believe and act upon. The second sort of evidence is derived from the declarations of persons who have used their senses; and on the credit to which their declarations are entitled. This second division is well known to be capable of numerous subdivisions. These need not be noticed. It is on the second sort of evidence that the assent to the recorded miracles depends. If there were rational credible beings who saw these miracles performed, and if they have truly recorded what they saw; if their word has come down to us in such a manner as to command our assent; then we have that evidence of the existence of miracles which we have of all facts not witnessed by ourselves. To this it will be answered that such evidence applies to facts which could exist; not to miracles for they could not exist, for they are contrary to the laws of nature. We have then to consider whether miracles could exist; and then to consider what the evidence of them before us, is.

153. What is a miracle? That which those who deny the recorded miracles say, is this: The material

world is governed by certain established laws. Every thing that we and others have witnessed, conforms to these laws. All experience of them is so uniform and certain, that when we are told that an event has happened which is inconsistent with these laws, we have to ask this question, Is it most probable that such event did happen, or, that he who says it did, means to deceive us, or was himself deceived? They answer that it is most probable in every case, that such event did not happen.

154. It is admitted that a miracle is an event, or fact, which could not have occurred consistently with the laws of the material world, as known to us by experience. If we should see a human being rise into the air, as a bird does, overcoming the known law of gravitation, we should call this a miracle, because this is contrary to the experience of ourselves and others. Now, to know whether a miracle may or may not be, we make several propositions, admitting that whenever any person finds that he must give a negative answer to any one in the series, the argument must stop as to that person, and we leave him where we found him.

1. Is there a Supreme Being? 2. Did the material universe proceed from him? 3. Did he ordain the laws by which it is continued in the order in which it appears to the human mind? 4. Do our conceptions of the power of the Supreme Being, convince us that he can terminate existing and substitute new orders, of vegetable and animal life? 5. Is it demonstrated by geological and fossil remains that he has, at some past time, made such changes? 6. If our conceptions of the Deity compel us to believe that he can change the condition of this globe and of all that live on it, at his pleasure, can it be denied that he may change, or suspend, his own laws *in part* for any purpose? 7. Is man in his material, intellectual and moral powers, a part of created being, and subject to the Divine will? 8. May not the Deity make known his will in any manner suited to human powers of perception? 9. Has

not man the liberty of acting or not acting in conformity to that will, when declared? 10. If he has not that liberty, is not the supposition of moral accountability, as applied to man, absurd? 11. Is there satisfactory evidence that the state of the world about eighteen hundred years ago required a new revelation? 12. Would the Deity have instantaneously illumined all minds, and thereby negatived human liberty of will, or have taken a course of showing his will, which would be convincing, in that mode of perception to which the human mind is accustomed to arrive at truth? 13. Was the revelation of a new moral code, affecting the welfare of man in this life, and announcing to him the certainty of another, an occasion of sufficient dignity to make that revelation known by means which arrest human attention, and thereby affect the design? 14. Can any mode be conceived of, more suitably adapted to that end, than to invest the messenger sent to the earth with power, to suspend, or change, or substitute, some other law for that which was universally known and confided in? 15. If this variation from common experience may be considered as the most suitable means to the end, could it be manifested in any manner so striking and convincing, as when addressed to the human senses in things of instantaneous operation, as restoring lost senses, and withered limbs, and dispelling or exterminating disease, and in showing that the dead may rise from the tomb?

155. Now we do not insist that these inquiries, and propositions must be answered affirmatively; we think it sufficient to insist that these things may be so. If an adequate and intelligible cause is demanded for every effect which is produced, how many things of daily occurrence would fall under the denomination of miracles. We say that it is sufficient to show that the recorded miracles might have happened. No known truth, nor any inference from known truths, is opposed to the supposition that affirmative answers may be given to every one of the propositions before stated. We add that affirmative answers are consistent with our conceptions of the Deity, with our knowledge of the state of the world

at the advent of the Saviour, and with the providence of the Deity, in relation to the human mind and character, as we necessarily understand it.

156. If miracles might occur, what is the evidence that they did occur? It must be admitted that the New Testament, merely as a book of history, is as much entitled to credit as any other book of history, written eighteen hundred years ago. It stands on much stronger grounds in this respect than any other history. It is not the work of one man, but of many who write on the same subject, at different times, and places, and without any concert with each other. Yet all its parts taken together constitute an accordant whole. Assuming then that it was written by the persons who purport to be its authors, and about thirty years after the crucifixion, (and most of it probably very soon after that event) and by persons who knew the Saviour, or by persons who knew those who well knew him, the next inquiry is whether the facts which it sets forth, are entitled to credit.

157. Those who deny the truth of revelation say, that these historians were deceivers, or that they were deceived themselves.

Were they deceivers? This question has been ably and repeatedly answered in this manner: It is inconceivable that any number of persons should plan, and carry into effect, any scheme of deception without intending for themselves some sort of benefit. Such schemes must, from the very nature of man, intend to get riches or earthly power, or to gratify some evil propensity in making others suffer. It cannot be even pretended that the first professors of Christianity sought wealth. All of them are represented as poor and dependent. They did not seek to exercise any earthly power over others. They did not meddle with rulers or their subjects, politically. They sought neither the purse nor the sword. No one can imagine that they were under the dominion of malicious motives. They addressed themselves to the reason not of any one man, or class of men, but to all classes. They proposed to

them nothing but to promote their own welfare, by abstaining from folly, vice, and crime; to practise those virtues which adorn human life; and to entitle themselves to another and better one, when this life shall end. It is impossible to reconcile that teaching with any scheme founded on the hope of wealth or power, or the gratification of malice.

158. Were they deceived? It is not pretended that they were deceived in any respect, unless in the character and mission of the Saviour, or in relation to the miracles which are ascribed to him. Whether they were deceived in the character and mission depends on the general view of the whole subject, including the prophetic annunciation, the life of the Saviour, his teachings, his own declarations of what awaited himself, and those whom he had chosen to follow him, and the death upon the cross, and the effect which revelation has had upon the world. All this, it may be said, does not prove that miracles were wrought, and all this may be referred to possible natural causes. We are still without proof as to the fact, that these persons were not deceived as to those acts which are opposed to the known laws of nature. To this it hasbeen answered, that there is not in the history of the world any account of miracles, except in the Jewish history, and in that of our Saviour, and as to those miracles which were wrought in his name. All others, of which there are thousands in different ages of the world, are well known to be frauds. The Christian miracles were wrought in open day-light, in the presence of many witnesses, and where all concert and contrivance were negatived; and where the common use of the human senses could be exercised, and where the witnesses were not, and could not have been prepared for the effect of deception. In most instances if not all, the effect produced, was unlooked for. The proof then depends on this; whether these witnesses did see or hear that which they declare to have occurred. There is no known theory of evidence on which it can be asserted that they did not, but this; the laws of Nature

tell us that it is more probable that they were deceived, than what they declare, is true. This is the last resort to which those who deny the evidence of miracles must come. It resolves itself merely into experience. Such reasoners cannot say, unless they deny the power of the Deity, that such things could not have been, but only that the probability is that they did not occur, because such things were never known to have occurred. When any event contrary to uniform experience is declared to have occurred, it is not to be taken on the dry question, whether that fact is, or is not contrary to experience, but all accompanying circumstances are to be taken into account. The question is not, whether one did or did not call a dead man from the grave, as in the case of Lazarus; but all preceding and subsequent facts are to be taken in connexion with that which is asserted. Among these facts, are the character and purpose of the agent, the authority under which he acted, the prophetic declarations as to this purpose, the credit given to him by contemporaries, and the general prevalence of his doctrines at the present day.

159. It has already been shown how the miracles might have occurred consistently with our conceptions of the Deity. It is historically certain that thousands who lived in our Saviour's time and within the first century afterwards, found the probability that they did occur, so conclusive, that they devoted their lives to the faith and practice, connected with belief in these miracles, and did submit to every privation, to every suffering which earthly power and malice could inflict, and to the most distressing and cruel death. These, as we understand the arguments, are the grounds on which the evidence of miracles rests.

160. Did He, who was crucified, rise from the dead? Whether this fact was so or not, depends on the evidence of those who declare it to have been so, and on facts connected with that event. It is objected to on the ground, that such an event is opposed to the laws of Nature, and to all experience. The same reasoning is resorted to in this case as in that of miracles. It is

not said that this event is impossible, but only that it is improbable. This objection has been refuted a thousand times. The question here, as before, is, not whether one who died by violence, could raise himself from the dead, but whether this particular person, taken in connexion with all that preceded and followed the resurrection, even down to the present day, did rise from the tomb?

161. When the miracle of the resurrection is denied on the ground of experience, the objection should include, that we have no experience concerning the coming of a heavenly messenger, the character and purpose of his coming, and of its consequences. In this view we have no experience, because the connected history, and its consequences do, and necessarily must, stand alone. There is one circumstance only, in this history, to which we think it useful to advert. It has been regarded by candid and enlightened inquirers, as conclusive. It is this:

That the disciples of the Saviour, were discouraged and dispersed by his condemnation and death. This event naturally terminated all their hopes, since he on whom they reposed had died between two common malefactors. Unless their full belief had been attained to before that event, something more was needed, and something which would remove the disbelief which the crucifixion must have occasioned. One of the disciples, it will be remembered, denied his master thrice in one night, as he had been told he would do, and only one of the whole number attended him to witness the last scene. Yet it is certain, that amidst all the terrors and denunciations which the enraged Jews could oppose to the further perseverance in belief of the real character of the Saviour, the remaining eleven of the disciples did reassemble after the time appointed for the resurrection, and did profess their belief, and did live accordingly; and did go forth to teach the faith revealed by him who was known to have died on the cross, and did submit themselves to the well known consequences of the course which they voluntarily

adopted. Certainly these things could not have been, unless these men had evidence which they could not resist, that Christ had risen from the dead. The Scriptures say they had that evidence by his personal presence, and that many others had it. And unless this was so, nothing but a course of delusion which cannot be reconciled with any experience which any one has had of human nature, will account for the firmness, constancy and perseverance of the disciples, of their associates, and of those who were taught by them. It is difficult to persuade one's self that these facts, should have been publicly stated in Jerusalem, and persevered in against the temporal power of that time, and against the malignant and cruel dispositions of individuals of that city, generally, and in a matter in which all who rejected revelation were most deeply interested, and yet, that nothing should have come down to us, in Jewish history, which has any tendency to discredit these facts.

CHAPTER XIX.

Of the Internal, and other Evidence, that Revelation is of Divine Origin.

162. Those who lived at the time when our Saviour was on earth, and who saw the recorded miracles, and knew of the resurrection, and those who believed through them at that time, had that evidence which we now have, so far as we give credit to their testimony. They had also prospective evidence of the utility of revelation in its effect on the conduct and character of human life. We have stronger evidence in this respect than they had. We know what its effect has been through eighteen centuries. We can see for ourselves what its adaptation is to human welfare, as com-

prising a code of moral and religious rules. We can see this, through all the perversions and corruptions, to which the system has been subjected by the worldly purposes of pretended, and the ignorant zeal of sincere professors. We can see also, what it would have been, at this day, if it had been understood and practised upon, according to its true meaning. With all the deductions and allowances which are to be made for such reasons, and many others, and especially for the reason of its association with temporal power, we can plainly see what the work of revelation is, by comparing Christian society, with that which exists in countries where the Mahometan and Pagan religions still prevail. We can, from such comparison, judge what the state of the Christian world would be, and may be, if what this religion teaches were every where understood, and applied, in its true character.

163. It has been objected to revelation by Deistical writers, that it contains no moral precepts but those which were recognized by certain heathen philosophers, existing and teaching about the time the Christian era began, and two or three centuries before. This objection has been ably refuted. Those who maintain it, assume the historical account of the Messiah, and consider him to be a person of low origin, and without education. If this were so, how could he have acquired a knowledge of the precepts of heathen philosophy? If he were such a person, how could he at an early age, have formed a system out of that philosophy, which, not only equals in every thing which is merely moral, but far surpasses all the moral beauty which can be extracted from all of them together? The assertion that the moral teaching of the heathens, and of Jesus of Nazareth, is alike, cannot be admitted to be true. The wise men among the heathens differed most essentially among themselves. Though many of their precepts were entitled, and still are, to high respect; yet, all the philosophy of all of them, may be resolved into a sullen submission to inevitable fate, when the evils of life could not be avoided; and into the faith

that it was lawful to take refuge in voluntary death, when these evils became intolerable. They referred the duty of submission to moral precepts to no higher authority than to what could be learned from their perceptions of nature's laws. Conformity to the will of a Superior Being, and accountability to him beyond the duration of this life, were not maintained nor hardly glanced at, in any of these systems. Their doctrines, if they applied effectively to any person, did so to the enlightened few. They offered no efficient restraints to the indulgence of the passions of men: nor any compulsion beyond the power of the political law.

164. The Christian system addresses itself to every member of the human family. Its precepts can be understood by every one. It makes no distinctions among persons, whatever their earthly distinctions may be. It requires fidelity and truth in every one, whatsoever may be his station. Although it includes the duties prescribed by the political law of every people, it includes also the strict observance of duties which no political law can embrace. It enjoins the practice of these duties as best suited to this transitory life, and refers to that which is to come to enforce obedience. Nothing is found in the moral code of Christianity which is inconsistent with the rational enjoyment of every good for which man is fitted; so far from this, it was undoubtedly intended to be adapted to the progressive improvement of social life. The precise character assumed in the beginning, which was then necessary to make the required impression and consequent change, is not suited to the present state of the world. The gracious and bountiful Author of the Universe could not have intended that human life should pass in privations, gloom, and penitence. Such a life belongs only to those who know, and feel, that they are voluntary and habitual sinners; and not to those who strive to live according to the Divine law, as disclosed to us in the created world, and in the revealed will. It is irreconcilable to reason, that the Deity intended that

we should pass through this life in continued fear, and suffering, (if we do no intentional wrong) when we could know, if we would, what right and wrong are. And as to those evils which are natural, and inevitable, according to the system which he has ordained, he has given us the assurance that all these events are right, and has given us the power to trust that they are so, however incomprehensible they may be in the narrow limits to which our perceptions extend.

165. Surely no doubt should be entertained that this life was intended to be a happy and a cheerful one : That all the faculties with which we are gifted should be cultivated and improved ; that all the means of rational and innocent pleasure should be cherished. Is the earth wrapped up in a gloomy mantle, or in a delightful verdure? Does the vegetable world put forth its leaves, its blossoms, and its fruits, and its delightful fragrance in sadness and mourning, or in joy and thanksgiving ? Does the returning sleep of exhausted nature, awaken emotions of distrust and despondency, or teach us a tranquillizing lesson of the change which is to happen in human being ? Does the storm of winter, and the snowy covering in which it clothes the earth, terrify us with the power of the Almighty, or awaken new thoughts of praise and adoration ?

Is the animal world destined to pain and misery, or to pleasure and gladness ? which of its many tribes does not cling to life as a precious gift? Why then should innocent, moral, Christian man regard his God as a stern inexorable tyrant, and not as a gracious and beneficent sovereign over all who comprehend and do his will?

166. Lastly. There is no reasonable doubt that the creed of the Christian, and his practice, when reasonably taught, and reasonably understood, will diffuse itself, in the appointed time, throughout the earth. However slowly that day may seem, to short sighted mortals to be coming, that day will come. Why has Christianity made so little progress in eighteen centuries? This question can be satisfactorily answered only

by recurrence to the history of the world during that long lapse of time. If we had space for such a purpose, it could be easily proved, that it is rather wonderful that Christianity has made so much, rather than that it has not made greater progress. When it shall come to be understood as a matter to be judged of by reason, there will be no cause of discouragement as to its universal diffusion.

It is an unquestionable truth that the best means of disseminating Christian faith and practise, is to cultivate the human mind, and to impart to it comprehensive and philosophic knowledge. The wisest men have been the truest Christians. There are many different constructions of the nature and obligations of the Christian faith. All cannot be best. That which is so, will be known only as general intelligence is diffused; and as the intelligent are led to inquire, and to judge.

Even the contentions among Christians themselves, tend to this result. The true light of the gospel will eventually come out of these controversies. The people of the United States are singularly blessed that no regal or sacerdotal power, no political authority, presents any obstacle to free inquiry. The tongue, the pen, and the press, will bring about the true doctrine and practice of the Christian dispensation, whatever that may be found to be.

167. If there be any one who faithfully examines the book of Nature, and the book of revelation, to ascertain the truth, just as he would inquire into the reasons and probabilities on which he must found the expectation of any temporal benefit; if after having done this, he finds no assurance, and still doubts, let him ask himself this question: Although these things are not proved to my mind, is it proved to me that these things cannot be so? If they MAY BE SO, how earnestly does it concern me to live as though they were most clearly demonstrated!

168. We have thus attempted, with what success others must judge, to find a reasonable foundation for the mo-

ral code which governs, or should govern, throughout human life. We have attempted to show that there is a Supreme Ruler, who is discoverable in his works, and that he has created man as we see him to exist, and bound him by laws which he cannot break, without offending and suffering;—and that these laws founded in his own nature, as disclosed by reason, are confirmed by positive revelation. We assume them as the basis of moral law, the will of God. It remains to discern how this will applies to human condition.

169. We are aware that in attempting to define moral duty we have to meet and dispose of the question, how can it be reconciled with the goodness of the Deity that he has permitted *natural*, as well as moral evil? Is it certain that there *is* natural evil in the world? The operation of general laws of which we have at best a most imperfect knowledge, may seem to us causes of unnecessary suffering. If other animals than man could reason on this subject, and explain all that they find to be inconvenient and painful, it is probable that taking each class by itself, the whole creation might seem to be unwise, and ill ordered. It is more rational to suppose that what seems error or unreasonable, or unnecessary, is perfectly consistent with just conceptions of the Deity. It is probable also, that if we were as enlightened as we might be, and may become, by our own exertions, that no small part of what we take to be natural evil is, in truth, moral evil; for infirmities of body and mind are often referred to natural evil. Most of them may be of our own making. How far these suggestions are well founded we shall endeavor to show in future pages.

CHAPTER XX.

Moral Duty.

170. We venture to hope that the fair inferences to be drawn from the introductory matter which has been offered, are the following:

1. The true relation which man bears to the created universe.

2. His intellectual and moral nature, which distinguishes him from all other animals.

3. That he has an immortal spirit, and is an accountable being.

171. Assuming that these are truths to all rational minds, we proceed to establish the principles of moral action.

1. Man belongs a to system which is undergoing an unceasing change and revolution; and in which nothing, which bears the stamp of animal or vegetable life, is for a moment stationary.

2. That man's life is divided into two alternating portions, sleep and action. That when not reposing, his mind is ever active, and is so whether he wills it to be so, or not; that it is active for good, or for evil; for profitable, or for vain purposes: That his bodily structure is active; some portions of it continually so, even without his will, and when he sleeps; and that absolute stillness, when repose is not called for, is unnatural to him. That he cannot remain in any one position without weariness, and the desire of change; that he is necessarily striving to keep what he has, or acquire something new. That he is pressed by wants and desires, which create relations between himself, and the things around him, and between himself, and other similarly constituted beings. Hence the law of his intellectual and material being is *action*, relating to himself, and to others, and to his Creator.

3. That man is capable of improvement by cultivating his mind, and disciplining his bodily powers; that

there are no known limits to his capacity to improve in those things which tend to his well-being.

4. That man is a free agent, and permitted to choose for good or for evil, according to his knowledge; and according to his firmness in conforming to knowledge.

172. If these propositions are denied by any one, we expect no credit with him. To those who admit the truth of them, we further purpose to show, that well-being here and hereafter, depends on the actions which we perform, and on the motives to these actions; That proper actions, founded on proper motives, arise from knowledge of the laws of our being, and from obedience to them; that actions which are wrong in themselves, or which proceed from bad motives, are occasioned by ignorance, which man is capable of preventing, and from disobedience for which he is answerable. We express no opinion on the difficult question, whether wrong actions, arising from positive ignorance, are punishable. This, however, is certain, that in this life, all wrong actions, whether arising from ignorance, or wilful disobedience, are followed by suffering. Perhaps those who can enlighten others, and wilfully neglect to do it, may be the proper subjects of punishment. We hope to show that the whole of moral life, whether considered in relation to those who are well or ill informed, depends on two great principles. First: Striving to obtain or hold what is, or seems to be good. Second: Striving to be freed from, to avoid, or prevent, what is, or seems to be evil. To these two principles we shall attempt to bring *morality*, by which we understand nothing more or less, than the mode of acting in human life.

173. The duties enjoined on rational beings,—are,

Duties which one owes to himself.

Duties which arise from domestic relations.

Duties which arise in the communities of which each one is peculiarly a member.

Duties which arise from the political relations of society.

Duties which arise between individuals who are of different nations.

Duties which are to be performed to the Creator, in obeying his commands, and in rendering that adoration and thanksgiving which are the reasonable tribute from the created to the Creator.

In attempting to show what are the rules by which human beings are to be governed in these several relations, we shall take for our guides natural law, and revealed law. We shall use all the commentaries on these laws, known to us, which enlightened minds have given to the world, whenever these are applicable to the intended purpose; though without encumbering the pages by quotations or references. We suppose that there cannot be any new thoughts on moral action; and that every thought expressed in this book, and worthy of respect, may be found in some other book.

CHAPTER XXI.

Duties which one owes to Himself.

174. *Life as a whole.* The whole of life must be taken together to acquire a knowledge of its duties. In this respect there is a strong analogy to the natural world. Every thing which appears to be made of matter, has a beginning, a duration, and an end. We are told that this will be so with all material being. Life is a succession of parts; infancy, youth, manhood, maturity, decline, old age, and death. As with the vegetable kingdom, so is it with man. What he becomes, depends in part on his genealogy; as his ininfancy is, so will be his youth; as his youth is, so will be his manhood; as his manhood is, so will be his maturity; as maturity is, so will be decline; as decline is, so will be old age. If youth be passed in idleness, ignorance, folly and crime, how can one hold his way in the world, side by side with the intelligent, the worthy, and the virtuous? If manhood has been

passed in low pursuits, in rooting in the heart evil propensities; in wasting natural vigor, what awaits one in old age but poverty, pity, and contempt? If infancy be devoted to the reasonable expansion of the physical and intellectual powers; if knowledge of human duty be acquired, and be rightly used, will not manhood be worthy, maturity respectable, decline honored, and old age venerable? Life then must be taken as one event, made up of many successive ones. On these unquestionable truths we found all that is worthy of any notice in the following pages.

175. *Purposes of Life.* We believe that human life rightly understood and rightly used is a beneficent gift: that it can be so understood and used. It is irreconcilable to reason that man was sent into this world only to suffer and to mourn; it is from his own ignorance, folly, or error that he does so. He is capable of informing himself; the means of doing this are within his power. If he were truly informed, he would not have to weep over his follies and errors. It is not pretended that every one can escape at once, from a benighted condition, and break into the region of reason and good sense. But it is most clear from what is well known to have happened in the world, that each generation may improve upon its preceding one; and that each individual, in every successive period of time, may better know the true path, from perceiving how others have gone before him. There can be no miracle in this. It will, at best, be a slow progress: and the wisdom arrived at in one age, must command the respect of succeeding ones, and receive from them the melioration which they can contribute. We understand nothing of what is called the perfectability of human nature; but we understand this, that if human nature can be made to know wherein its greatest good consists, it may be presumed that this good will be sought and obtained. Man was created on this principle, he acts on this principle, although he is seen so frequently, to make the most deplorable and distressing mistakes. If it be not admitted that mankind will

always strive to obtain whatsoever seems to them good, and strive to avoid whatsoever seems to them evil, their moral teaching is in vain. If this principle be admitted, the sole inquiry is, what is good, and what is evil.

176. *Infancy.* We incline to the opinion of those who think every human being comes into the world with physical and intellectual qualities, propensities, and aptitudes, which distinguish him as much from all other beings, as he differs from them in figure and appearance. As society is a consequence of the Creator's will, as the proper divisions of labor, are a necessary consequence of society, it is not irrational to suppose, that individuals are born with adaptation to labor in some departments, and not in others. In the early stages of life, these qualities are sometimes developed whether they happen to be understood or not. But almost immediately after gaining some hold on life, all human beings become subject to the incidents which tend to strengthen original qualities, or to obscure or stop their progress; and even to suppress them, and engraft on the original stock those which are entirely different. It would be unjust to make infancy responsible for the evils and errors which arise in this manner; but certainly those who have the guidance of infancy are responsible, and will be held to be so. Children have a right to complain, and society has a right to complain, if duties to children are neglected; and if the belief spoken of, in preceding pages, is well founded, there is another, and inevitable accountability of a far more serious character. We shall have occasion to remark on the very sober duties of these, who, according to the order of natural and necessary law, are entrusted with forming and giving effect to natural qualities. This matter properly belongs to another place.

177. *Youth.* We come now to a period when accountability begins, in all the relations which were placed in the divisions of duties. If it be asked at what age this is to be fixed, we answer, that the good sense of judicial law recognizes, that a child may be a witness in solemn judicial proceedings when inquiries ad-

dressed to him are so answered as to make it certain, that he understands the nature and the obligation of an Oath. This may be at the age of 10 or 12 years. But the perception of right and wrong, and the sense of duty, begin at an earlier age. There certainly are children of the age of eight years who have a very clear sense of moral propriety; and very many who between that age and twelve, can discern and reason on right and wrong, and arrive at a very sound judgment. We shall presume that all into whose hands this volume may fall, will be fully capable of comprehending its purpose, and of judging of its fitness to be useful to them. We must assume then, that we are speaking to those who are willing to be instructed in serious things; and that they will not reject instruction from any source, however unpretending it may be, if it come to them in a manner which they can reconcile with their own reason, and with their own duty to themselves. Young persons think that they can see for themselves; and that they need not to be told what others have seen. But let us reduce this to common sense. Suppose a person to be under the necessity of going from the place in which he has lived, and which is familiar to him, to a far distant place. Let it be supposed that the road he must travel is crossed by many roads, and that he is frequently to find himself at points where several roads are seen, either one of which, so far as he can discern, may be the right one. Will it be of use to him to have been told, before he departs, which of these many roads to take? Will it help him onward to his destination, when he is bewildered and unable to decide for himself, to find some one who can assure him of the right course? Life is a journey. Every step we take in it brings us to something new; something unexpected; and perhaps entirely different from that which was looked for. Those who have gone through it before us, have left us their instructions in what manner it is to be undertaken and accomplished. They tell us of their own troubles and difficulties;

they warn us how to avoid the like in our own journey. Which is wisest, to listen to them, and weigh the worth of their warning, or to push on heedlessly, and take the consequences?

178. *Health.* We suppose that every child of the ages last spoken of, can form some opinion of the value of health. Most of them have suffered, more or less, by that time. They are now old enough to consider the purposes for which life has been given to them. They then feel that the purpose is to be pleased, and gratified; to want, and to have; and that restraint is disagreeable. But let them remember that life is a whole; that though all of them will not, yet some of them will attain to its longest duration, and that it is wholly uncertain to whom that lot will fall. Long life may depend, and often does depend, on what children do, or omit, at an early age. Among the first gratifications which are looked for at this period is the indulgence of the appetite for food. Here comes in a rigid law of the Creator. It cannot be broken without consequent suffering, nor repeatedly broken without impairing, and perhaps destroying, the material frame which has been shown to be so fearfully and wonderfully made. To require of that delicate machinery on which the action of life depends that which it is not qualified to do and which it cannot do; to force it to do that which is offensive to it; and to make this requisition habitually, is a sin against natural law. Its punishments are well known. The restless sleep, the heavy head, the many sensations of uneasiness, the positive pain, the disgusting remedies, are the punishments which follow. They are not all. Nature loses its charms; companions their interest, duties become irksome; the mind hates its labor, penalties are incurred. Parents or teachers are regarded with displeasure. These are the fruits of momentary gratification of the appetites; we have seen that it is also a law of Nature that food shall be grateful. It is required to supply the daily waste, to continue life. If there were not a craving want, we should take food as

a mere necessary duty. It is kindly made to be a pleasure, and like every other pleasure it is to be used and not abused. Thus, by ignorant or wilful pursuit of pleasure, we violate a law which brings with its just punishment, not only the loss of the like pleasure for a time to come, but also pain and suffering from indispensable remedies. When children are sick, they are subjects of tenderness and pity; but, in most instances, they rather deserve to be punished; for they have broken a law wilfully, since they have disregarded their own experience. As to kinds of food, nature is not unreasonably nice about this. That which it complains of is quantity.*

175. *Cleanliness.* This is not a mere matter of decency. It is one of the positive commands arising from the constituted order of things. Be it remembered that every thing that lives, vegetable or animal, is wasting while life continues. And that all which is sent forth through the millions of openings, by the skin, has run its round and is lifeless, and that more than half of

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* However descending from the dignity of our subject it may be, we venture to speak against a kind of food which is one of the real causes of sickness, and of inflammatory diseases, impure skin, and corrupted blood, and which is the unknown root of many an evil:—that is, the free use of gravies, fat and greasy substances, which belong rather to certain manufactories than to the human stomach. The use of such food is the cause of that very common inconvenience called the heart-burn. If adults choose indulge in such food, they are old enough to bear the consequences, as they can; but to children such food should be prohibited. It can be proved by the laws of nature, that such substances cannot be taken habitually with impunity. Even those whose bodily action occasions a waste which fits the stomach to take almost anythng that offers, come at length to severe sufferings from this cause. The true way to test the worth of the gratification derived from food is, to ask the reasonable question, which will be seen to apply to so many other cases, In what way shall I obtain the greatest good?—Will it be by giving way to my present inclination, or resisting it? Shall I have a momentary pleasure and a lasting pain? Shall I not esteem myself enough for my forbearance, to compensate me abundantly for the loss of this seeming good? But there is a still more imposing question. Am I not commanded in the law of the Deity, to do good and not evil to myself? and if I know that what I am desirous of doing, is evil, do I not break his law in taking that evil on myself?

all the food taken comes forth in this manner. If perspiration sensible and insensible, be permitted to rest on the skin, and stop the way of that which is coming, nature is offended, and will show that she is so. Such neglect is one of the causes of disease. This fact was probably well known to eastern nations, since it was part of their religious duty to cleanse the skin. These nations were ignorant of the modern comfort of wearing a garment next the skin which can be frequently changed. The absence of this comfort was one of the causes of those dreadful diseases of which we read, and which are now unknown among Christian nations. There are classes of laborers and mechanics, whose health would be preserved, and their lives prolonged, if they knew how much depended on periodical cleansing. It may be said that there is a connexion between cleanliness and moral feeling. Perhaps it may be going too far to say, that those who habitually disregard cleanliness and prefer to be dirty, have no moral perception; but it may be truly said, that those who are morally sensitive, are the more so from respecting this virtue. There is a close affinity beween moral depravity, and physical degradation. The vicious poor, are always shockingly filthy. The depraved rich are visited by worse penalties. They may have clean garments; but what can wash away the impurities which vice has made part of themselves. There are few such cases in this country; but many in some other countries. History abounds with them. That of Henry VIII. of England is well known to many. It is not for one'self only, that the virtue of cleanliness commends itself. Every one comes within the observation of others. However uncleanly one may be himself, he is not the less offended at the like neglect in those whom he observes. Now it is every one's duty to himself to recommend himself to others, so far as he innocently and reasonably can, and to obtain their respect. Clean and costly garments may fall very short of doing this, if it be seen that they are a covering for the neglect of this important law. If there be a lovely object to the hu-

man eye, it is a clean, clear-faced, healthy, innocent, neatly clad, happy child. There are few children who may not, if they will, be neatly dressed, for this does not depend on that of which the dress is made. There are fewer who may not have a clean skin, and healthy look, if they are properly fed, and sleep in pure air: There are none who may not have a clean skin, for we speak to those who are old enough to judge for themselves. And let it be added for their inducement, that in obeying the command to be clean, they are performing a moral duty; in neglecting it, they are inflicting an evil on themselves in two ways. 1. In diminishing their own comfort: 2. In losing the esteem of others.*

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* We again venture to speak of a subject at the risk of being thought to notice trifles. We not only think the matter now to be noticed *not a trifle*, but one of serious importance. The Americans are remarkable for neglecting the *teeth*. Paley says that 'God did not make the teeth to ache.' It is the most unpardonable neglect that makes them ache. The teeth were given to us for many highly necessary purposes. They are indispensable in preparing food for the stomach; equally so in speech. They may be highly ornamental, or otherwise. They suffer as much as the skin by neglect; and they make known their complaints, when neglected, in a manner which cannot be disregarded. Notwithstanding these things are so, probably not one child in some hundreds, in the United States, knows that there is such a thing as a *brush* for the teeth. Whatsoever the Creator has given to us, he has required of us to use according to his laws, and, consequently, we are to preserve what he has given to be used. This is not the less true of the teeth, than it is of the eyes, the muscles, or the digestive power. We frequently see males and females, whose intelligent and pleasing expression of countenance prepossesses us in their favor, but the minute they go to speak, and laugh, the charm vanishes, and we feel a sensation of disappointment at the disclosure which they make. This is the consequence of ignorance or neglect, for which parents are directly chargeable. Ignorance is not an excuse for the violation of any plain law of nature. Voluntary neglect aggravates the wrong. If a child has once learned the comfort of cleanliness in this respect, he will duly value it, and never give it up.

There is a kind of suffering to which children are subjected, which may be one reason why they associate washing with displeasure. They are subjected to the management of persons to be made clean, who treat them very roughly. The water is applied to their faces, and the wiping is done, in a manner, which necessarily leads children to think of this process as they do of punishments; and they acquire a disgust which may never be removed. The operators, on

180. *Air.* Among the generally unknown causes of loss of health is the respiration of impure air. In a former section some notice has been taken of the qualities of air. We have seen the number of cubic inches which must visit the lungs in a measured time to continue the blood in a healthy action. The congregation of many persons in one apartment, especially when artificial light, in great quantity, is permitted, is a cause of more maladies than is commonly supposed. Three causes, in such case, combine to destroy the fitness of the air for respiration. The animal heat of the assembly, the lights, and the breathing of the same air again and again. There must be such assemblies. The remedy is proper ventilation. The smoke of lamps has frequently occasioned death. No lamp is properly trimmed if it emit anything more than a pure bright flame. It is a common practice to keep sleeping apartments shut up. If there be several persons in a small room which has been shut up for several hours, it would be shocking to know, how often they must breathe again and again the same air, and how unfit it is to be breathed after it has once visited the lungs. Add to this the impurity of the air, which is continually in contact with the furniture prepared and

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these occasions, think it of no consequence, whether the water, and the towel, be clean or dirty. The most proper article with which to wash the face, or person, is a common sponge. All who have used it would feel it to be a serious privation not to have it to use. Things that tend to convenience and comfort, especially which are of most frequent occurrence, are not unworthy of being noticed. One of the natural and genuine luxuries of life, (the more beneficial the oftener it is used,) will be found in a simple machinery, which every family in this nation may have at a very little expense, and which will be alike useful to every member of it. It will be comprised in a tin vessel, (well painted, to prevent rust,) shaped like a shallow hat; the crown to be four inches deep, and about two feet in diameter; the brim nine or ten inches broad, and resembling the brim of a hat, when the brim is turned down all around. When placed on the floor, crown downwards, the outer edge of the brim will be nine inches perpendicularly from the floor, and the inner edge, where it joins the crown, four inches. In this vessel, with one gallon of water, and a proper sponge, one may become as clean, in five minutes, as a Roman emperor, who had reposed an hour in a marble bath.

constantly used for sleeping, in an unaired apartment. It is not mere nicety, or fastidious delicacy, which requires that the pure air should be admitted where the human lungs are in action, but it is a law as old as the creation of man, and cannot be disregarded. A skilful observer might select among many, from the appearance of the countenance, those who have just left an apartment in which they have been respiring for hours a spoiled atmosphere. No doubt that this cause long continued, so affects the whole mass of blood as to bring on many diseases. If pure air be peculiarly necessary to any class of persons, it is so to children. We believe a more useful suggestion could not be made on the subject of health to the whole community than to invite them to respect this law of nature, that there cannot be perfect health where the air is impure; and that this applies especially to apartments appropriated to sleep. Visiting friends are often put into sleeping apartments which have not been opened for days and weeks: this is far enough from kind treatment, however innocently it be done. *

CHAPTER XXII.

Duties to One's-self.

181. *Time.* Every person connects himself in his usual thoughts of himself, with all the lapse of time in which he can remember, and with all the lapse of time through which he expects to live. This he calls his life. He does not live in time that is past, nor in time

* One of the most common, and most annoying discomforts in our country is, the bad state of the sleepingapartments in which travellers are obliged *to attempt* to repose. This is occasioned, not so much by the sort of bed which is used, as by the ignorance, that pure air is essential to comfort and to health.

that is to come. He actually lives only in the present moment. Yet, he feels that he lives in the past, and will live in the time to come, because the past, the present, and the future, are so connected, that he cannot separate them. Man seems to rise and stand upon the surface of a rapid stream. It is incessantly passing from under his feet; he stands not on that which is to come, nor on that which came, and is gone. But his consciousness extends while his standing continues to all that will come, and to all that is past. His effort is to keep his standing, and to avoid as long as he can, the accidents and changes, which will sink him below the surface. It is, then, a law prescribed to us, from which no one can free himself, that he shall suffer in the passing moment for the wrongs done in time gone by, and for the evils of which he dreads the approach. As this is certainly so, how little does he regard the operation of inflexible law, who provides for himself a load of self-reproach, for any gratification which he can procure, by error or by crime.

182. Let us lay out of the case those errors and crimes which have been alluded to, and consider negligencies and follies. We have shown that man was meant for action. His actions were intended to enable him to secure good to himself. Good to himself depends on the performance of his duties to himself. Duty to himself requires that he should improve his faculties, and should avail himself of all the opportunities given to him for that purpose. The hours, then, which are permitted to slide by without any improvement, are lost. In so losing them he breaks the law of the Creator. Apply this to the vocations in which one is to cultivate his mind in any business, mechanical, scientific, or learned. When one sees himself surpassed by others, and left far in the rear; when he is called on to measure himself against another; and when he sees that comparisons are made between him and others, greatly to his disadvantage, he may feel, and most men do feel, that they are thus depreciated because the precious time which was allotted to im-

provement has been passed in trifling amusements, or in idle pursuits. To some minds the suffering from such causes is extremely acute. They have no one to blame but themselves. The bitter remembrance which they have of the past, as connected with the present, and the future, is the punishment for breaking a positive law. They may console themselves, perhaps, with the firm resolution that they will repair the wrong done in the past time, by diligence in the time to come; but they find that time brings with it its own demands. They are fortunate indeed, if they can do in one space that which belongs to it, and that also that which belonged to another, and in another season of life.

183. One cannot innocently say his time is his own, and that he may dispose of it as he pleases. His time is his life. It is given to him in trust. Like other trustees he will be held to an account, in which there is no possibility of concealment, and where nothing will depend on proof. It may be supposed that it will be said to him, There was confided to your use a term of time. You knew, or could know, the laws prescribed to you, in performing your trust. Are you come from that trust to render an account of it, burthened with reproach from your own conscience, and with marks of guilt, which you cannot hide? or, are you come, without any advancement in the knowledge of your duties, and with no other account than that your days rolled by in childish pursuits, or idle amusement, *no wiser* when you were severed from the world, than when you left the cradle of infancy? or, are you come with the exalted acquirements which you might have, and with that innocence and purity which you would have, if you had read the laws of the created world; and those which have been revealed, and placed before your eyes? Where have you read in these laws, that no duties to yourself, and to your associates, nor to the *Lawgiver*, were enjoined upon you? Have you not been told by every breath you drew, by every movement of your frame, by every thought of your immortal mind, by every just pleasure, that you have had, by every

pang that you have suffered, and by all that you have been made capable of perceiving, and learning, that there were laws prescribed to you in your trust, and that an account of your stewardship would be exacted, from a judge who cannot be deceived?

184. *Self-love.* It is an invariable law of Nature that every human being shall do those acts which he thinks will secure good to him, and that he shall avoid those acts which will occasion evil to him. Why then should not every one do any and every act in his power, by which his own will may be gratified, and avoid doing any and every act which is disagreeable to him? The only answer that can be given to this question is this, that man is a free agent, entrusted with the power, and charged with the duty, of ascertaining for himself what is good and what is evil; and that this power and duty extend to those with whom he dwells in society, and also to his Creator.

185. Children always conform to the natural impulse of self-love, until they learn from the discipline which is applied to them, that they cannot have their own will without subjecting themselves to a suffering, the dread of which controls the natural impulse. They learn, after a time, that the greater good lies in giving up what they will to do, and doing what is required of them, rather than to meet the certain consequences. We think that the whole science of morals will be found in the principles contained in the truth above stated.

186. Self-love is just as strong throughout life as it is in childhood. It is that quality of our nature to which all excellence may be referred; but it is also that to which all unworthiness may be referred. As the dread of punishment, or an unwillingness to displease those whose kindness a child desires, will restain him, or put him into action; so in more advanced life, the dread of suffering a certain or probable evil, and the certainty of losing the good will of others, will restrain, or impel to act. With those whose minds have been properly disciplined, and who have learned to comprehend their relation to the Creator, there is a far higher motive, which

is founded in a submission to the Creator's laws. As one goes on in life, he may or may not acquire more and more clear and just perceptions, of what will be the greatest good to himself, and how he can obtain it. It is a self-evident proposition that if a person could certainly know what it would be best for him to do, or not to do, in relation to all things and persons, and under all circumstances, and if he should conform to this knowledge, he would best obey the impulse of self-love, and most exactly conform to the laws prescribed for his good.

187. It cannot be too often impressed upon the youthful mind, that *life is to be taken as a whole.* For, if this extended view be not taken, it must frequently happen, that it will seem right in certain circumstances, and when the view is limited to these circumstances, that certain acts may be done, or avoided as the greatest good. Yet, if the consequences could be foreseen, they would disclose that this seeming good would turn out to be a positive evil. It often seems good to the young to avoid the performance of labors which are assigned to them, and to spend, in amusement, the time which should be devoted to fit them for duties which will be incident to future condition. This misapprehension of good is to be lamented; but with some, this is not all. Their own self-love prompts them to engage in a course of folly, so that not only do they fail to obtain that which is real good, but they find, under the mask of pleasure that which proves to them to be the most grievous suffering.

188. The same truth runs, in an endless variety of forms, into manhood, and through all the stages of life. We are impelled by self-love not only to provide for the craving wants of our nature, but to seek pleasure, riches, power, distinction, and luxuries. These propensities are given for wise and beneficent purposes. It is the misapplication of them, as seen in the world, which constitutes human misery. He is called brave and honorable who defends himself even at the risk of life, against those who would do to him that injustice, and

wrong, which would make the gift of life of no value. But the brave, who invade the rights of others, and subject them, by violence, to losses and to sufferings, without cause, misapply this principle of action. To get riches by honest industry or the reasonable exercise of one's talents, is a commendable use of self-love. To get riches by unfair and dishonest means, to hoard them up, and to brood over them in secret, is a pitiful misuse of this commendable impulse. To have power over one's fellow-men, and to use it faithfully, and for their benefit, is a relation which one may honestly and commendably desire, as a reasonable exercise of self-love. To seek such power by deceitful representations, and to obtain it by violence and fraud, and to use it for purposes of supposed self-benefit, and to the injury and oppression of others, is another form of self-love. But there are few, if any cases, in the history of mankind, in which self-love has appeared, in the latter form, without, eventually, overwhelming the agent with disappointment and sorrow. It is true, that for a time, such an one may seem to flourish in his schemes, and command the applauses of those who look up to him in his apparently fortunate elevation. But in the very nature of things, if his heart could be sounded, there is no one whom he looks down upon, who is not more at ease than himself. His day of humiliation may be at hand, in the course of events which he cannot control: and, if not, he learns, when it is too late to correct his error, that he has misapplied the impulse of self-love. This misapplication is to be seen in many cases of daily occurrence, and in things of little, as well as in those of comparatively great importance. The principle is every where the same.

189. We shall be answered, perhaps, that all this is incident to human nature. There is no help, it is said, for these evils. Every boy who has learned Latin, repeats the maxim, *humanum est errare*, (it is human to err.) A more mischievous maxim was never invented. If men understood, as most certainly they may do, that they need not err, and that it is best for them

they should not, they would rather adopt as a maxim that none but the wilfully ignorant, and the wilfully foolish, *err*. Such a state of things is yet afar off. It may seem to be foolish indeed, to assert that any society should ever come to be so well informed as to make a proper use of self-love. Let us not despair. We may improve very slowly; yet, if every one does even the little that he can, in showing, by precept and example, what things a rational and accountable being should desire, and what he should avoid, and reject, certainly the time may come when self-love will never be so misapplied, as to be necessarily followed by penitence and sorrow.

190. Will it be denied, that there is a certain best course of action for every human being, in every possible condition in which he may find himself? Or, that no small proportion of human suffering arises from not having discerned that it was best, in past circumstances, to have acted differently, or not to have acted at all? Or, that whether one did or did not act, in the supposed case, that his motive was to secure to himself the greatest good of which that case was supposed to allow? If these things cannot be denied, then the great end of life is so to regulate self-love as that it may secure the greatest good. Let us suppose that every person in society knew what it would be best for him to do or not to do, so that his physical, intellectual and moral condition should be as good as he could make it. His self-love would never be directed to any end which would impair his bodily powers, or keep his mind in ignorance, or misinformed, or make him a subject of reproach, or contempt, in his own view, or in that of others. This, it will be said, is an impossible state of things. So it was said that it would be impossible to root out the use of *ardent spirits*. This great change is not wholly accomplished, but does any one doubt that great advance has been made towards its entire abolition? Let us go on, then, in the work of improvement. Let every one try to show the proper uses of self-love. The day may

come when every one will admit, that all the sufferings which may visit the human family, are of their own making, those only excepted which arise from the general laws of the Creator. As to those, they may be greatly mitigated by intelligent moral agency. When these come, they can and will be endured with piety and resignation, if the sufferer can console himself with the certainty, that he has done no wrong thing, nor neglected any proper one, to which the cause of his sufferings may be referred.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

191. *Labor.* It is commonly considered that labor is the *curse* declared to mankind, as a consequence of the transgression of the *first man.* It is foreign to our purpose to enter into any discussion, as to the true meaning of this historical, or allegorical account; the Christian revelation may not be dependent on a literal understanding of it. However this may be regarded, under the influence of further reasonable research, we must take man as he is; and so considering him, labor is not an *evil*, but a *pleasure.* Is it a curse to man, as he now is, to be enabled *by labor*, to comprehend the existence of the Deity, and the beauty and utility of his works? to adorn the earth and bring its productive power into action? to apply the material substances of the earth to reasonable use, convenience, and ornament? to expand and improve the human mind? To cultivate and strengthen the moral power? Certainly these are the effects of labor, and labor so applied constitutes man's highest happiness.

192. There are two kinds of labor: 1. Mere bodily

labor; 2. Labor of the mind. These two are sometimes necessarily combined. The mind, and the body, demand some sort of employment. No one whose mind is free from natural defect can prevent its action. It will think of something, good or evil, profitable or foolish. Every one who attends to the operations of his own mind must be convinced that this is so. The body and limbs cannot be kept in any one position for any considerable space of time, unless they have been in action, and demand repose. If it were painful to us to direct the action of the mind to useful labor; and if it were distressing or inconvenient to us to exercise our muscles, for purposes which we believe to be proper, then it might be that labor is a curse. But many, nay all, who require of the mind to perform its duties to any useful purpose, and especially those who have disciplined the mind to an accustomed service, find that the absence of employment is an affliction. We cannot see how this should be otherwise, if we rightly comprehend man's relation to the universe, of which he constitutes a necessary part.

193. As to bodily action, it is seen that children in their sports go through a series of exertions, often exceedingly violent too, from mere pleasure. Men frequently exercise the body much more severely in matters of amusement, than they have any occasion to do in necessary labor. This action seems to be a dictate of nature. In many cases of indisposition, bodily motion is the prescribed remedy, and is commonly a successful one. There are sound reasons why this should be so. We have noticed in a former section, the universal action of the material system to which man belongs; and the continual waste and demand for supply. Excepting only in the involuntary movements in man's structure which are not confided to his care, he is required to aid nature in her operations. If he would put himself in the best condition to receive, and derive pleasure from his daily food, he must keep himself in action. Those who have the least pleasure in using, what was given to be used, as the means of

pleasure to the senses, are those who keep the body inactive. This is true of those who labor with the mind only; more strikingly true of those whom affluence excuses from labor, of body and mind. They seek happiness in indolence, and in luxury. They find it not, because they violate a law of nature. No product of the vineyard, the field, or the sea, however aided by inventive art, will furnish a welcome repast to one who sits in listless idleness, on a downy cushion, from breakfast time, till dinner. The day laborer who sits down to his coarse meal, has a pleasure to which the luxurious idler is a stranger. The one receives a rational benefit from the kind and just bounty of nature; the other seeks it where nature has decreed that it shall not be found.

194. The labor of muscular action is not only in itself a pleasure, but it is the means prescribed to us for the acquirement of subsistence; for the gradual improvement of society; for applying natural and artificial products to our comforts, to our convenience, and to reasonable luxuries. Nor only so: this is the ground-work of all the beautiful and imitative arts; of the discovery and application of the chemical power of matter; of the wonderful contrivances by which man securely moves on the face of the ocean; by which he cultivates his acquaintance with the stars, and raises his thoughts to the Author of all being. Let us not then regard labor as a curse, but a blessing, and rank it among the many causes for thankfulness. It is obvious that muscular action would have been given to us in vain, if it were not directed by intelligence. There must then, be labor of the mind. This is no where said to be a curse. If there be anything for which we should be specially thankful, certainly it is that we are blessed with the power of mental exertion. This labor is, in itself, a source of happiness; and in its fruits, has made, out of savage men, a rational and improving social being. The most restless and comfortless of all creatures is he, who has no occupation for his mind. If one would invent the most miserable

condition for a human being, other than mere physical suffering of the most excruciating kind that can be without extinguishing life, it would be, to deprive him of all employment of body and of mind.

195. Can there be a doubt, that in man's present condition, the ability to labor is his exalted privilege? And is he not accountable for this privilege? Is not reason given to direct him in the use of it? It is well known to those who have compared the condition of mankind in different ages, how much the labor of body and mind has been able to accomplish. Even within the last half century the most surprising changes for the better, have taken place, from the right use of this productive power. On this depends the condition of the human family. From the joint labors of all who wish well to their fellow men, there will be obtained, eventually, the knowledge of the best manner of using the products of the earth; the best mode of ruling men in their social relations, the just homage due to the Creator, and the true purpose for which human life has been given.

196. To some descriptions of persons labor is irksome. They are obliged, in their vocations, to use certain muscles, and those only They repeat the same act throughout the day. Their labor becomes tedious, because it requires little or no action of the mind. To this numerous class we venture to offer a relief which is within the easy reach of many of them. It is well known that the nature of habit is such that the hands will do, what they have been accustomed to do, without any obvious attention, and the mind is left to do what it will. The mind might be employed, while the hands are busy, in pursuing some connected train of thought. Muscular action, so far from being an interruption to the action of the mind, may be made to assist it. Persons who think intently are often seen to have some habitual movement. The relief which we suggest is, that sedentary laborers should provide themselves with subjects for reflection, and exact of their minds to attend to these subjects. By such simple

effort of the mind seems to be all that is required, and even an effort so inconsiderable and rapid, as not to be the subject of notice. On this truth seems to depend the astonishing facility of action, to which (among many other instances) jugglers and musicians attain. This is called *habit*, which word is derived from a Latin word which signifies custom or use. There are customs, or habits, of the mind, as well as of the muscles. Persons who accustom themselves to extemporaneous speaking, acquire a surprising ease and readiness in the complicated action of conceiving, uttering and expressing by sounds, by looks, and gestures, whatsoever they would impress upon an audience. The mind has its own habits also, in the quiet of contemplation, and in exercising its various powers. It has its own associations too, with external objects, of which many curious instances are stated in philosophical works.

199. The moral deduction which we make from these general principles is this; that there is a continual craving to do some act, to obtain some object; or a continually recurring necessity to do some act to prevent an evil, or inconvenience. The frequency of this call upon us to do something, whether it be for eventual good or evil, leads to the practice, custom or habit of doing; and in some cases, the impulse to act becomes so powerful that reason, self-respect, the laws of society, and even those of the Law-giver of the Universe, (if these are heeded,) present no sufficient barrier to the impulse. It is to this all-important truth, in the nature of man, that we earnestly invite the attention of the young. The capacity to create habits, is the consequence of the power given to us to promote our own welfare individually, socially, and as accountable beings. This capacity was designed to fasten us down to that course of action which will accomplish these ends of our existence. Like everything else, with which we are entrusted, it may be rightly and profitably used; or may be misused, and perverted to our certain ruin. Habit is the kindest

friend, or the cruelest foe to human welfare. When it assumes the latter character, it approaches us in the most deceitful and seductive forms. It comes, wearing attractive smiles; it delights; it fascinates; it substitutes its own irresistible will for our own; it triumphantly points to the gulph to which it bears us. The fly caught in the spider's web, is a faint illustration of the power of habit. He knows, from the first moment, his destiny. The gambler, the drunkard, and the felon, when, and how do they learn that they have been caught in the web of habit!

200. *Intemperance.* This word has attained a meaning more limited than its proper one. It is applied commonly to persons who take, habitually, ardent spirits; but it is equally applicable to all transgressions of the law of moderation. All acts which may be lawfully done, for one's own good, when carried to excess, are acts of intemperance; and all such acts are sooner or later, followed by some sort of suffering, according to their nature and degree. Excessive labor of body or mind, are as much acts of intemperance, as to make one's self dull and stupid by taking food, or irrational and giddy by taking spirit. But there is a wide difference in the degree of immorality in the kinds of excess. An intemperance in study, which brings untimely death in some instances, is not condemned as an immoral transgression, (though it certainly is such,) for the motive which leads to this intemperance, is an honorable one. The loss of health and character, from abusing the privilege of taking nourishment, is universally condemned, because the motive, and the acts done in obedience to its impulse, are irrational, and disgraceful.

201. There are two kinds of intemperance against which the young should be warned. The one is drinking, not for nourishment, but for pleasure; the other is, using tobacco. It has been demonstrated in former pages, that nature requires a certain quantity of proper food, to maintain a healthy and happy condition of body, and mind; also, that excess, of any kind, will

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be followed by suffering. This is just as certain, as that a full vessel must throw off just as much as is added to its contents. It is very natural that young persons should assemble for the sake of society; being assembled, they must have some employment for the muscles of the body, and the craving of the mind. We have shown that such propensities spring from natural constitution, and that they must be satisfied. There must be a community of purpose in the meeting. That may be found in any muscular action in which all can join, and which has some definite object, as athletic games; or, it may be found in some intellectual employment which is common to all present. Unhappily the common bond in such meetings is *to drink*, for in this all can join. Connected by this common attraction, the mind is called into action; but for what purposes? Those who frequent places of public entertainment can answer this question. Some who are sent to public seminaries can also answer it; and some can answer it who know that they are maintained *there*, by pinching economy *at home*. Some others could answer it, who never had a serious thought why such places were established, nor for what uses they were intended.

202. We refer again to the demonstration heretofore made, that the law of nature, which cannot be broken with impunity, inexorably admits so much, and no more. Let us then look in upon a gay company of young persons, around a table, and half concealed by tobacco smoke. What sort of air are they breathing; what sort of substances are they casting into their physical system, already bursting with excess; what sort of thoughts have they in their minds; and what sort of words are flowing from their lips? We *could*, but will not answer these questions for them. Let us pass by this revel, and go to the next day's morning. We might then propound some other questions. Are not their heads heavy, hot and throbbing? Are not their eyes thick and burning? Are not their tongues white, and parched? Do not the nerves tremble?

Is not the mind muddy and confused? In what condition are they to perform duties to themselves, to those they serve, to instructers, to affectionate parents? *Is not this dear bought pleasure?* How long can nature bear to be *pleased* in this manner? This matter does not stop here. The same scene is repeated again and again. *Soon, habit asserts its awful dominion;* and then the scene *must* be repeated. The craving cannot be resisted. From social drinking, the step is an easy one to solitary drinking. *There is no resting place for habit; everything in this system of being must keep on, or end.*

203. It is believed that the sort of criminal excesses to which we allude are not from the promptings of nature. We venture to assert that they are entirely artificial in the beginning. It seems irrational that any one should like to take more of anything than nature requires; and more so that one should naturally desire to take burning liquids, to the degree of intoxication, or perhaps to take them at all. It is believed there is no such natural propensity; but that such liqnids when first taken, afford less pleasure than pure water. The taste for these articles is created by association, by imitation, by fellowship; and above all because there is a kind of tradition that it is *manly* to drink. Songs in praise of the juice of the grape, (we do not remember to have heard of any in praise of brandy or whiskey,) have some effect in the delusion of drinking. There is a fascination in combined poetry and melody. Such combinations are well known to have the most powerful influence in national associations. They inspire a feeling which bears men on to victory, or death. The songs of Bacchus do the same. They conquer the strength of those who sing, and of those who listen to them, and sometimes lay their admirers, not in the bed of honor, but of contempt. We have nothing to say against poetry and music; far otherwise. We believe this world was made for human happiness. Poetry and music are means to that end. We condemn them not, as we shall hereafter show, but the use of them, as inducements to intemperate drinking.

204. If one could get the ear of such a misguided youth, he would not do much by reasoning with him. He might do something by getting him to reason for himself. It would be necessary to bring to his view some facts from which he could reason. He must be made to know what a wonderful contrivance the digestive power is, and by *whom* it was contrived. That its purpose is to take the inanimate substances, which nature provides for it, and convert them into living, sensitive being, and, possibly, into thinking power, and immortal spirit. He must be reminded how easily every human contrivance may be deranged, and the more so, and irreparably, in proportion to the minuteness and delicacy of construction. But as one might fail to make a thoughtless boy comprehend the nature of the principle of life which resides in his own bosom, because he cannot see it, some illustration must be made. Unhappily there is none which can be effective to this end. The nearest that occurs, is this. Let us suppose, then, one knows the use and the value of the human eye in its physical, intellectual and moral relations; that he knows he must take care of it, and frequently bathe it in cold water, as well to cleanse it, as to refresh and brace it, so that it may still be an eye to him, when decline and old age shall come. Let us further suppose that instead of so using and so preserving this delicate organ he should, when he first rises in the morning, let fall into it a drop of burning spirit; and at eleven o'clock another, and so on, at the proper hours, until he sleeps again: How long would the power of vision remain to him, and how soon will this organ of delight, become a source of insufferable pain? It must be much the same with the digestive organs as to the abuse of them.

205. If one could, in some such way, bring home to the perception of an erring youth, the grievous wrong which he is inflicting on himself, he might be prepared to reason on his own case, and might be asked some such questions as these: Is it of any consequence to you to be free from suffering and sorrow? As you

must inevitably keep company with yourself as long as you live, is it of consequence to you to make of yourself, a pleasant and agreeable companion, and not one who will be continually complaining, and upbraiding? Is health of any value to you? can you use your limbs, and the faculties of your mind, as you would like to do, without it? Can you have health, if your habit is to throw into that delicate part of your system, whereon the action of life depends, substances, which excite it to an unnatural exertion, or deprive it of all power of exertion? Does not every part of your system sympathize with the injustice which you do to your digestive organs? Will not your brain, and consequently your mind suffer by this violence? Do you expect to attain middle age, and old age? Will not the seeds you are now sowing come up, in that space of time? Will they come up in the form of enfeebled muscles; chronic aches, self-reproaching thoughts; the loss of the capacity to enjoy the bounties and beauties of creation? Will they grow up to overshadow your moral sense, and shut out the delights of intellectual power? Was life given to you for the few years in which you can sing, drink, and 'enjoy yourself,' or, that you may enjoy life in every stage of it, as a rational being, and by rendering your homage to nature in obeying her laws, and your gratitude to Him, who ordained these laws, for your happiness? Do you not look forward yourself, to be at some time a parent? Have your own parents ever so conducted themselves towards you, that you have a right to punish and afflict them? Are you willing that your parents should see you, and know you, as you know yourself? If you should be a parent, are you willing that your children should be told with whom, and in what manner, you 'enjoy yourself?' Would you tell them how you spent your youthful days and nights, and recommend to them to take yourself as an example?

205. *Tobacco.* It is not to be supposed that the Deity has made anything in vain. The proper uses of all things that exist are far from being known. Ad-

ditions are often made to our stock of knowledge in these respects. There may be proper uses for tobacco. There are some persons so employed in life, that they may, perhaps, use it with impunity. They are persons who labor hard, with the body, and who have little call for mental action. Such persons are sometimes engaged in solitary tedious duty. The continual craving for action in the material system, that is, for something to do, is in some degree supplied by this vegetable. Such persons balance its evils, by physical action, which invigorates the action of the stomach. Of this description are soldiers and sailors. It is probable then in the lonely midnight watch, tobacco may be a soothing friend. Yet it may well be doubted whether the sum of human happiness may not have been greatly diminished by the use of it. Even to soldiers and sailors it has become necessary under that friend *and* foe of the human family, habit. For, every one knows, who has subjected himself to this habit, how painful and disgusting were the first steps towards it. It may be set down as an established and unquestionable law of nature, that tobacco is pernicious to every one, who is not habitually in strong bodily action. It is consequently pernicious to all who rely on the labor of the mind, and with whom bodily action is a secondary concern. Tobacco is considered by medical men as a poison. They demonstrate, that taken in powder it does two evils, first it finds its way to the brain, and disturbs its action, and sometimes palsies the nerves of that seat of reason. Second, it finds its way to the stomach, disorders the digestive power, and sends from that centre of action, through the system, the infirmities which it engenders there. Taken in smoke, it visits not only the brain and the stomach, but the lungs. We have seen what the lungs were made for; certainly not to receive and transmit tobacco smoke. The weakness of digestion, the enfeebled limbs, and overcast intellect, which sedentary men, and students, complain of, are obtained from the delights of the cigar; although it is said that one who has smoked long enough to make

his lungs as black as his shoe, cannot tell with his eyes shut, whether his cigar is lighted or not. The remaining mode of using tobacco is probably that from which there is the most of evil. It lies in this. It is found that those operations of nature on which the most is made to depend, are provided for by correspondent delicacy and adaptation to the effect to be produced. The continuance of life, therefore, as the first object, is provided for by a process which begins with the first reception of food into the mouth. There are organs there, fitted to yield a liquid by the excitement of food, which is indispensable to digestion. Every one knows what is meant by having his mouth water. This use of tobacco calls forth, and misapplies this liquid. So does smoking. Both create an unnatural thirst. By the third mode of using tobacco, its evil consequences are more directly communicated to the stomach. Here is the seat of strength and power, if rationally used; here, also, is the seat, *from abuse*, of feebleness, trembling, faintness, palsy, apoplexy, and death. Those who put an end to themselves by rum and tobacco, are of some use in the world. They are like crosses set up in catholic countries by the way side, to show that a murder was committed on that spot. But those who put themselves to death by their own follies, show, not only that a murder has been committed, but *who* it was, *how* done, and *by whom*.

206. All consumers of tobacco know two things. 1. That they came to the use of it through painful struggles. 2. That they cannot break the chain of habit, without struggles still more painful. How does it happen, then, that tobacco is so commonly used? Its use, and that of opium, which is the same thing in a more hateful form, began with savages, Turks, and Asiatics, to fill that aching void, which belongs to all idle and uncultivated minds. It has found its way, unhappily, to those who need no relief from such cause; but who might if they would, fill up every moment, innocently, and profitably. It has become so general, from ignorance and thoughtlessness. A still more efficient

cause is, the propensity to imitation, and the natural anticipation of approaching stages in life. A boy wants to be a man. He likes to do those things which men do. Men use tobacco, therefore boys must use it; and boys soon find themselves entrapped in a habit, and act as all other persons do who are so entrapped.

207. Is there any remedy for this evil? Perhaps, there is none but this, *not to begin*. And why should one *begin*? Suppose all who use it were asked, if you had never begun, would you, knowing what you do, have had a pleasanter life without it, than you have had with it? One cannot know what the general answer would be; but every one must know this, that from some persons the answer would be, that tobacco has been to me the most distressing evil; I bitterly lament that I ever began this truly afflictive practice; but it has become a part of my existence; no operation of my will can disengage me from it. Some might answer doubtingly, and others would not ascribe to this use the evils which they have suffered from it. Why should a young person take upon himself a want voluntarily, which may lead to painful consequences, and the gratification of which is not only not called for by nature, but which is most expressly condemned by this high authority? Some reasons have been given why it is so condemned. There are many others. Those already spoken of, and many others that might be, regard the direct injury to the consumer of tobacco. Others relate to those with whom the consumer associates. It may be considered as unquestionably true, that every person who uses tobacco, is, in some way, troublesome, or disgusting, to every person in whose presence he uses it. This is a breach of social law. No one has a right to follow a pleasure, which is a grievous displeasure to those who must witness it. If one has been so unfortunate in early life as to fall into the use of tobacco, as it is entirely a solitary pleasure, he should use it in solitude, and not where he will poison the atmosphere which others must breathe, or do those acts which violate the decencies of civilized life.

An eminent statesman of this country, who had returned from the court of France, was asked whether gentlemen smoked in France? 'Gentlemen,' said he, 'smoke no where.'

CHAPTER XXIV.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

208. *Truth and Falsehood.* These two subjects relate to two parties; 1, that one who speaks truth or falsehood; 2, that one to whom it is spoken. We propose to consider this matter only in relation to the first party, and as to him in two views. 1. Whether there be any, and what law, which requires that the truth should be spoken; and 2. What good or evil one may do to himself by lying.

1. One reason why truth should be spoken is that the knowledge which any one person can have from the use of his own senses, in many things which it most materially concerns him to know, is very limited. He must, therefore often depend, for his knowledge, on what others say to him; and when the thing spoken of, is exclusively known to the party speaking, the other must rely entirely on what he says. If, therefore, it be considered how great a part of the most serious concerns in life proceed on declarations made by one person to another, if these could not be relied on, the affairs of mankind would be greatly embarrassed; and confidence, in each other, would be destroyed. As this matter of speaking the truth is one which concerns all persons, so all persons agree in holding liars in contempt. Even the very lowest persons consider themselves to be disgraced, when charged with the guilt of lying. They can endure charges which would subject them to public punishment, with more composure than

has an individual separate physical being, so every one has a *separate circle* within which he exists, and into which, no one has a right to intrude. His thoughts, motives, opinions, and policy, are his own. What he will, or will not do, (so that no wrong be done to others, and no act of duty be withheld from them) is for him to decide upon. Within this circle, he makes up his judgments on all persons and things. In his outward deportment, he must frequently act in a manner, not consistent with these judgments. As an example; one has made up, from repeated observations of a certain individual, a very clear, but very unfavorable judgment of his qualities; but, there is no occasion to disclose what the judgment is. The observer is obliged, or finds it convenient, to meet this individual, and to deal with him, and perhaps to interchange courtesies with him. It is undoubtedly proper to manifest the respect, in such case, which the decencies of life require; and to show the common proofs of good will. There is no insincerity in this. Though no one can possibly avoid forming judgments of others, nor avoid liking or disliking them, even including very near friends and relatives, yet there may be a positive violation of duty in publishing these judgments, or in disclosing these feelings. The divine law, 'judge not that ye be not judged,' does not, it is believed, interdict these judgments, because they cannot but be made; but, it forbids the wanton, unnecessary, and injurious publication, or manifestation of them. Those who are keen observers of their fellow men, see in their faces, in their manners, in their modes of speaking, in their tones of voice, in the sentiments which they express, &c., causes for respect, esteem, confidence, and approbation, or, they may see causes for disrespect, suspicion, strong disapprobation, and disgust. But all these things belong to the *individual circle*. It is not insincere to keep them there. On the contrary, society would be intolerable if they were not kept there; it is very hazardous to the observer to let them out, unnecessarily. He may be mistaken, both as to the fa-

vorable and unfavorable judgments which he forms. Further observation; new circumstances, unexpected changes may essentially correct his judgment; and, therefore, a prudent man will keep them to himself. They are his own peculiar property; and were obtained for his own use. It sometimes happens, that one must associate with, or have something to do with, persons, who are exceedingly repulsive and disagreeable to him, though that person may not be so to all, if to any others; and no moral effort will be effectual to remove these impressions. The dutiful course seems to be, not to disclose these impressions, even to the party who causes them, if it can be avoided. One may be quite as disagreeable and repulsive himself to other persons, though he may have no suspicion that he is so. He would not like to be told of this, nor would he be able, probably, to change the relation for the better, if he were.

211. The world gets over these difficulties by establishing a kind of common currency under the name of *politeness*. Those who understand it, are never deceived as to its value. They know the coin in all its denominations, and how much of it is to be parted with, on all occasions. They know the precise point, in human intercourse, where its value ceases, and where recourse must be had to other means. The rules of civility, settle many points in these difficulties. Civility is, however, distinguishable from politeness. The latter is a coin of the world; the former is the manifestation of christian feeling. They are often confounded; as their practical effect is much the same. They are *insincere* who lavish the currency of politeness, and who lead others to believe that far better opinions are entertained of them than really are. They are contemptibly insincere, who for their own selfish purposes, or from the weakness of desiring to render themselves agreeable, stoop to commend directly, or by insinuation, qualities in others, which they affect to see, but which they well know do not exist in them. This is called *flattery*, which word is derived from a Latin word, which

signifies wind, breath, puff. This is a kind of aliment, which perverted self-love finds to be exceedingly pleasant. Although it is, in truth, precisely what its origin indicates, there is hardly a man, woman or child who is not disposed to partake of it, if it be artfully disguised. But, on the other hand, all sensible persons, of whatever age or sex, who see what it is, and why offered, feel for the flatterer, the contempt which he deserves. This insincerity is, and ought to be deemed a high offence. It implies, art and deceit in the flatterer, and sufficient weakness in the flattered, to be subdued to the purpose in view. The flatterer's purpose may be, to secure to himself no more than a better esteem than he can have any pretence to; and, it may be, through that, to secure to himself something which may be very costly to his victim.

212. *Civility.* The well-being of society would be greatly promoted, if the nature and use of this Christian virtue were more generally known. We take this to be, in personal intercourse, the observance of the command, Do to others as you would that others should do to you. The most rapid glance at any community, shows this: That some of its members are brought into contact in matters of business, necessarily; others meet, incidentally, who have no particular connexion; others meet for social purposes, in various forms; and that there is a large proportion who know, of each other, very little beyond the fact, that they are of the same country; and perhaps, not even that. There must be a *best rule* of deportment for all these classes; and no one will deny, that if this rule were defined, and faithfully applied, there would be much more of every day comfort, and complacency in the world, than there is well known to be. If we rightly understand the meaning of civility, it is the manifestation of kind feelings, and of a desire to do all things which are to be done, under the influence of such feelings, in a becoming and agreeable manner.

213. If every person understood the true foundation of society, the common origin of all its members, their

natural and necessary sympathies, their community of interests, their necessary action upon, and with each other, it might be supposed, that all who are reasonable, would be civil. They would be so, because they would promote their own good, because they would be doing what it is proper to do, to promote the good of others; and because they would know, that in so doing, they would conform to the design of their creation. We do not include under the term *civility*, the great duties of justice, acts of munificence, important personal services. These arise out of some special relation, which an individual bears to one or more other individuals. It seems to be limited to the manner in which the common, or accidental intercourse of the members of society, in general, should be carried on. This matter may be better understood by some examples. Thus, if one comes into the presence of another, as a beggar, servant, laborer, mechanic, trader, merchant, farmer, lawyer, physician, clergyman, or public officer; or if it be a female, or child of either sex; there may be very various modes of receiving these different persons. Yet, certainly, by every one of the laws, which we are endeavoring to illustrate, these several persons are entitled to civility. Even the beggar, perhaps one should rather say the beggar in particular, if not deformed by voluntary transgression, should be received with civility. That is, gentleness, kindness, decorum are to be observed relatively to each one. Why? because no man can afford to be deemed insensible to the calls of reasonable humanity; nor a stranger to the decencies of life; nor ignorant of what is due from him, nor to him, in any of his proper relations. *Politeness* may be quite another thing, in some of the supposed cases. One interchanges politeness with those who happen to know what politeness is; *civility, with every body.* A king would be polite to the ladies of his court, to his prime minister, to the members of his council, to foreign ministers, &c., and civil to his coachman, and to the humblest of his subjects.

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214. We may find many illustrations, and fill ever so

many pages with them. Let us take one which will concern the greatest number. In this country a stage-coach, and a steamboat, bring many persons into a small space, who may be utterly ignorant of each others existence, until they meet. They have a common object, that is, to be transported in the same vehicle, from the point of departure, to that of destination. Circumstances compel them to be very close to each other, and each one has the power of being very disagreeable to each one of the others, in a variety of well known modes. Let us suppose that each one consults merely his own interest, including in that, his own self-respect. the reasonable good will, which each man desires from all others, and the ever present principle of doing as he would be done by. He shows that he is sensible of the presence of his fellow men; that he thinks them of sufficient consequence to wish to have their good opinion; that he is attentive to their comfort, or convenience; that he is disposed to learn something from them, or communicate something; or to join with them in disposing of the time in which one has nothing to do, but to be carried. Take the other side of the picture;—he puts himself in the best place; takes out his cigar, lights it from a pocket apparatus, and goes to smoking; he sees no one, speaks to no one, and endeavors to hear no one; if spoken to, he answers in a coarse monosyllable, and in a tone which prevents all further attempt at intercourse with him. If he make his presence known at all, beyond his sullen sitting there, it is by some selfish exclamation; or contemptuous ejaculation, on what is passing within his notice. Which of these two persons is *civil;* which of them is making the most of human life; which of them is attracting good will; which of them ought to like himself the best; which of them will have the most to look back upon, with pleasure? Which of them is a rational, sensible, well disposed human being, and which of them is a selfish brute?

215. There is one other consideration which operates on all men, who have had much experience in the

world. Men and things change, and take new and unexpected relations. Persons who have been long, and even intimately connected, suddenly, or gradually, sever; persons who have known little of each other, and that little uninteresting or unfavorable, are brought in contact, by some unexpected turn of affairs. Sometimes one needs favors, or at least good will, from those, whom he never thought to be of the least importance to him. In such, and in a multitude of other circumstances, one may find the advantages of having been acquainted with the virtue of civility; which implies, that one has given no unnecessary offence. There are other cases, in which one is called on by duty to do things disagreeable to himself, and exceedingly so to others. But there is no good sense in performing such duty morosely, and with inhumanity. As the laws now are, one may be authorized and required to put another to death. It would not be expected that such a duty should be performed *politely;* but there is the strongest reason why it should be done *civilly.*

CHAPTER XXV.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

216. *Anger.* This word is derived from a Latin word, which means to choke, or strangle. In several other languages its root is found, and in all it has the signification of strangling, choking, constraining, or narrowing. In common understanding of its meaning, which is the true one, it is a violent passion of the mind, arising from some real or supposed injury; and its natural tendency is to do two things, first to take satisfaction for the injury; second, to make the offender suffer. This passion does not appear to be wrong in itself. Like many other excitements, which are common to our nature,

it was given to us for useful purposes; and is only wrong, when its dominion is injuriously submitted to, and unjustifiably obeyed. There is a principle of general operation among all animated beings, which reconciles the existence of anger with the wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. All animals are entrusted by nature, with the preservation of their own rights, and the promotion of their own welfare. But all animals are liable to have their rights infringed, and their welfare disturbed by others. If there were no sensibility to wrongs, the cunning and the strong would make all others obedient to their will. Anger is justifiable in self-defence, and in exacting justice, and in making an offender suffer, within the limits of reason. It is only in the misdirection, and irrational use of anger, that men make this principle of their nature a cause of affliction to themselves. Certainly the indulgence of an irritable angry temperament, is one of the sorest troubles experienced in human life.

217. Anger has its seat in the mind. It is a passion which literally means an excitement of the human system, by the action of some external cause perceived by the mind. It is that passion which has the most immediate, and the closest connexion, with the material system. Every one who has experienced a violent fit of anger, knows, that the natural action of the heart is quickened, and that his blood courses through his veins with a feverish rapidity; he feels that his face reddens with this action of his blood; that his eyes are full and distended; that he has a sense of choking in the throat: these emotions will gradually subside, as the fit goes off, and the blood will resume its accustomed flow. So far, this may be only a temporary physical evil. This, however, is not all the evil. Such an excitement can never occur without affecting other parts of the system. The interior organs of the system, which minister to the digestive process, partake in the evil effects of this violent action of the blood. These also are choked, and constrained, in their natural and necessary action. Physicians and naturalists tell us, that the frequent action of anger generates stones

in the gall bladder makes the liver schirrous, (become hard) and deranging the indispensable flow of the bile, brings on jaundice and other diseases. (Such afflictions arise from various other causes also.) It is well known that there are instances of sudden death from violent anger. This is accounted for by the sudden rushing of the blood through delicate vessels, which are not strong enough to hold it. They give way, the human machine is ruined, and death follows. It is said that the theories, as to long life, are contradictory. By some, it is referred to temperance. But some persons have lived long, who were not remarkable for this virtue. It is rational to suppose that a naturally good constitution will endure long, if the rules of temperance are respected, and if the system is never subjected to violent passions. It is probable that those persons live longest, who are not only temperate in quantity, and quality, but who are also good natured, and cheerful.

218. Supposing the foregoing suggestions, as to the nature of anger, to be well founded, they are to be applied, by persons who are entrusted with their own rights and welfare, and whose great purpose is to obtain the greatest good from life, *as a whole*. It is admitted, that all persons may, and perhaps must be, sometimes angry, until all persons attain to a much higher state of moral perfection than has hitherto been known. But it seems to be of great importance to one's self to learn, in what way he can govern the propensity to anger, so as to make it what it was meant to be; that is, means to his safety and welfare, and not, as too often it is, a cause of suffering and humiliation.

219. The causes of anger are supposed to be these; first, by the law of nature, and of society, every one has rights in what he regards as his own property; second, one has a right to hold unimpaired, whatsoever he can justly acquire in reputation, and character; third, he has a right to have his feelings respected by others, if he do no wrong to their feelings; fourth, he has a right to have the like rights respected in those with whom he is necessarily connected, by family and social ties;

fifth, he has a right to be treated with justice, and according to established laws, by those who are entrusted with power; sixth, he has a right to have those who are bound with him, in a common subjection to such laws, treated with justice. Whenever any one is offended by the violation of any of these rights, he may be justifiably angry. But in what manner, and to what end, he shall express his anger, so as to do himself the greatest justifiable good, is the thing to be known.

220. Every one who has had a violent fit of anger upon him, knows, that it was to himself, (independently of the cause, and object of his anger,) a painful, and even a very distressing sensation. No one ever looked back upon such a state of things, as to himself, with satisfaction; but generally with regret, and sometimes with remorse. He feels humbled, and grieved, in his own estimation of himself. He may too well remember that he used expressions, and did acts, which he is grieved to have resting in the memory of others, or in his own. It is probable, also, that no one ever saw another in a violent passion, without feeling that this angry person was degrading himself, and acting more like a brute, than a rational being. Whatever be the cause of such anger in another, cool spectators always regard the angry person, as under a temporary loss of reason, and in danger of doing some serious mischief, and are prompted to restrain him. Every one feels, in such a case, that the least that can happen to one so acted upon, and so acting, is, that he is preparing for himself hours of self-reproach, and of bitterness. If no one likes to remember that he was violently angry himself, and if he is offended in seeing others so, it must be admitted, that violent anger is contrary to natural law, as it most certainly is to divine law. It is an abuse of the trust confided to us to promote our own welfare.

221. As to the cause and object of anger, there are certain cases in which sudden and violent anger is justifiable. The law of society permits the expression of it by violence, even to the destruction of human life. Thus, he who in violation of all law, human and di-

vine, is attempting to take the life of a fellow being, may be justifiably slain by him who is in such peril. The same law justifies the like act in attempts to commit some grievous crime in relation to persons, or property. This justification occurs only when the offence is in the course of being perpetrated. These are extreme and rare cases, and more properly to be considered in another place. In most cases in life, where anger is felt, the causes are of far inferior grade to those which the law of the land notices. It is to those of common occurrence to which our attention is now directed.

222. The cause of anger is some real or supposed wrong done, which prompts us to obtain reparation, and to punish the offender. It is consistent with reason for any one, who is under the influence of anger, to be prepared to ask, and answer, the question, whether the wrong is real, or only supposed; and whether he is himself free from the first imputation of having occasioned, by his own error, that which he regards as a wrong. If the offence is real, other questions arise, of this nature: What real good shall I secure to myself, by attempting to get a reparation; and in what respect shall I advance my own welfare by attempting to punish the offender? May I not, in either of these attempts, involve myself, by words, or acts, in some wrong; and give my adversary the advantage of finding me an offender, in trying to vindicate myself? If I could succeed in my attempt, what will it come to? Shall I not make the wrong done to me more notorious, and subject myself to the pity, and compassion of others? Is it not better to be silent, and quiet, and leave the offender to time, and his own conscience, than to engage myself in a controversy, which is sure to be vexatious, and in which I shall run the risk of doing wrong, and in which I shall not be likely to get any good? If I succeed in humbling my adversary, I shall surely make him my enemy forever; for, in the nature of man, he is slow to forgive the wounds inflicted on his own self-love. When this matter is over, and time has dissipated the mists which now prevent a clear view of it, and when other feelings and sentiments have arisen, shall I like

myself the better for having been silent and quiet, than if I shall have attempted to command justice, and to inflict punishment? It is probable, that young and ardent minds, and those who are looking back by the light of experience, will answer such questions very differently. But the experienced can tell the young, with sorrowful truth, that among the most painful sufferings of life, are to be numbered, those which have arisen from sudden impulses of anger, expressed in words, or acts. The experienced can also tell, with like truth, that in the common occurrences of life, angry words and acts, have seldom, if ever, accomplished the purpose for which they were intended; they have neither obtained justice, nor punished the offender; but, on the contrary, they have often converted the injured party into an offender himself, and involved him in bitter recriminations, keeping up an irreconcilable aversion, and even enmity, through life. We have, so far, supposed there to be a real, and justifiable cause of anger. But the case is very much stronger against the indulgence of angry feelings, when the cause is only imaginary. It is in many cases imaginary, especially among young persons. They take up sudden impressions concerning the supposed conduct, and words of their associates, and acquaintances, when no such conduct or words, have occurred; or, if any did, none with intention to wound, or offend. If there be one case in which one feels himself peculiarly humbled, it is when he has manifested anger towards one, who has committed no offence, or who is entirely unconscious of having done so.

223. It sometimes happens, that an offended person can restrain himself from expressions, and words, when he has been seriously offended. But he cherishes a malicious sort of feeling against the offender, broods over the wrong done, and permits his imagination to inflame the sense of wrong, until he makes himself too unhappy under this excitement, not to express it in some mode, which will occasion pain or affliction to the offender. If there be any one who has fallen into such a condition, he may be asked, whether he

knows of anything, in the nature of regret, or remorse for his own follies, and sins, which is so exceedingly buthensome as to carry about with him the feeling of aversion, ill-will, and malice, towards one who has offended? What, then, is to be done? angry words and acts are forbidden by the law of nature, by self-respect and by convenience; the memory of an unavenged wrong is intolerable. Is there no remedy? We think there is one, in every person's power. If the individual with whom one is at variance, can, by calm expostulation, or by mutual friends, be brought to a just perception of the case, that is the remedy. If that fails, there is another, it is of high authority: If thine eye offend thee pluck it out. Blot such a person from the memory; never permit him to come into your thoughts. Will you pass your life, in humiliating bondage to such a one? We say, *Blot such an one out of your memory.* You do him no wrong by that. You do yourself a just and great good; you cut a moral cancer out of your heart.

224. Among the sources of affliction in human life, is the uncalled for interference of third persons, in the angry collisions of others. It may sometimes be an unavoidable duty to take a part in an angry quarrel. When this duty is to be performed, it concerns every one who is mindful of the trust confided to him of taking care of himself, not to engage in the controversy in such a manner, as to become a principal party in it. As a general rule, it is the safe course to let angry persons settle their own concerns as they can. Certainly, no one who claims to be regarded as having a discreet sense of his own welfare, plunges himself into a quarrel. Yet this is a very common thing. It is often seen in schools. Parties and divisions grow up, extend and become more and more bitter, from the most trifling causes; and are often carried out into manhood, and show their evil consequences through life. This is so, because impressions made in that season, are very vivid, and durable. It is a duty, sometimes, to take a part in controversies. It must

be remembered, when one engages in such quarrel, that one is dealing with persons who are under a sort of derangement, and who are most exceedingly sensitive, and perhaps mutually vindictive. Those who interpose are bound by the law of self-regard, to interfere with calmness, and sound discretion, and so to conduct themselves, in word and deed, as to do no evil to themselves, while they attempt to do all the good possible, to the angry parties. On the whole, mismanaged anger, is a prolific source of suffering. Yet when calmly looked back upon, in a great majority of cases, the cause was some insignificant trifle, magnified into serious importance by angry words, and pitiful acts. Such is the propensity of persons to busy themselves in the quarrels of others, that there is little reason to hope, that a preventative can be successfully offered to any but to those, who have studied out, and who reverence, the will of the Deity, as disclosed in the nature of things, and in his own positive law.

225. *Self-respect.* Every one has some sort of opinion, more or less distinct, of all persons with whom he is acquainted. This opinion may embrace intellect, disposition, virtues, vices, personal appearance, deportment, condition in life. So also every one has some opinion of himself on the same, and on many other subjects, best known to himself. When one examine shis own opinion of himself, he seems to do it as though he were another person. He uses the eyes of others. He turns aside as it were, by the way, to see himself pass by. The judgment which one forms of himself is often much more unsound than that which he forms of others. The eye cannot see itself; so neither can any one see himself. He must use a mirror. There are many of these. History, books, daily example, every person he comes in contact with, his own experience, are mirrors. If he sees himself in these, and thereby corrects his own errors and follies, and gives himself reasonable and just credit for his attainments, he may come, at length, to be entitled to entertain a respect for himself. There is a certain best thing to be done, and a certain best man-

ner of doing it, in all possible circumstances in which one may find himself. Nothing is entitled to be considered *best* which does not conform to natural law, the law of God, the positive law of the land, the conventional laws of society, (so far as they are founded in reason and good sense,) and to the decencies of life. To that best thing, and to that best manner, no one, perhaps, ever perfectly attains; but it cannot be doubted that there is some such standard. He who comes the nearest to it, is he who is best entitled to entertain a respect for himself. This respect, it is apparent, comprehends many motives, and most of human actions. There are some men, who seem to have had this standard in view throughout their lives. It is probable that *George Washington* stood high in this class, perhaps as high as any man that ever lived. His countrymen do not know as much of his private life as it might be good for them to know; but as to his public life, he seems always to have done the best thing, in the right time, and in the best manner; he was entitled to have and it must be supposed that he had, in fact, the high reward of self-respect.

226. *Pride.* There is a kind of pride which is often mistaken for *self-respect.* We hear of honorable, and of laudable pride. We take pride to be that self-esteem, in which a man holds himself. It may be founded in his estimation of the qualities of his mind, in his attainments, in his possessions, in his strength, his beauty, his parentage and descent. It may also be founded in a consciousness of virtue, and of having faithfully done one's duty in all the relations of life. It seems to arise necessarily, from comparing one's self with other persons. If this be the right meaning of pride, it is very clear that it is not always a sentiment which entitles one to respect himself. A man would be thought to be very unwise, who should openly declare that he valued himself, in comparison with other men, on account of his wealth, his beauty, or his family connexion; equally unwise, if he should declare his opinion of himself to be, that he was superior to other men

in the gift of natural intellect, in the cultivation of it, or in the practice of the various virtues. The common sense of mankind, founded in natural reason, does not approve of that self-gratulation which rests on the accident of birth, of inheritance, nor even on the acquisition of fortune by one's own industry; nor does it approve of that feeling, when founded on qualities which belong to the mind, nor even in the practice of the virtues, unless, when manifested in a certain manner. There must be, in the very nature of things, some persons in every community, large or small, who are superior to others in these sources of self-esteem. In every city, town and village in this nation, there are some persons who are in possession of some of these causes of self-esteem in some comparative degree, and other persons who have the fewest, or the least of them. Those who so use their advantages as to entitle themselves to the esteem of others, and who are acknowledged to be respectable for that use, may well be entitled to respect themselves from such causes. Those who use them in such a manner as to announce the feeling of superiority over others, and habitually to offend the watchful feeling of self-love, are properly called *the proud*. It is believed that these views conform to natural law, and to the necessary constitution of human society.

227. *Vanity*. A still greater mistake is made in substituting vanity for self-respect. The word vanity is made out of two Latin words which signify *exceeding emptiness*. It is commonly understood to mean a strong desire to be noticed, considered, and esteemed by others, but on account of things rarely worthy of a rational mind. Vain persons covet praise. They thrust themselves, and all on which they value themselves, upon the notice of others. They delight in recounting their achievements, and sometimes make the sad blunder of speaking to those who know they are mistaken. They touch adroitly on their own excellencies, and provoke others to descant upon them. They have such delightful visions of self-complacency, that

it seems cruel to disturb them. Such persons are always tools in the hands of the *knowing ones*, and most extensive use is made of them in the political machinery of this country. In general, the display of this poor passion, is made by persons of very light and frivolous minds. It is seen at all ages, but strikingly in youth. To see a young person strutting, or mincing along, in a new garment, or in some personal ornament, and watching to see if he is noticed, and by whom, excites a feeling of pity and contempt. The same feeling arises when young persons are seen who say, in their movements, as intelligibly as though they spoke in plain English, 'Do they not think me very handsome; elegantly dressed; a charming figure; most exceedingly graceful?' In some instances, lookers on do think so, and smile contemptuously at the same time. But in general, lookers on see no such thing as the vain imagine; they do see that which it would be shocking to those votaries of vanity to know *is* seen. They do see 'talents wasted, time mispent; foolish hopes, and vain desires.' They do see that the purposes of life are misunderstood, or perverted. Is there any remedy for these follies? None, probably, unless one would bring home to the minds of the vain, that they violate the strongest precept laid down in the code of natural law for the government of persons individually and socially. That precept commands them, so to conduct themselves in all things, as to entitle themselves to self-respect, and consequently to the respect of others. If the vain could conceive how small a portion they make of created being; how insignificant a part they make of civilized society; how many there are, in that society, whose pretensions, if asserted, would be transcendently superior to their own, they might, perhaps, dismiss their little vanities, and devote themselves to gratifications worthy of their intended nature.

228. *Gratitude and Ingratitude.* If a destitute young person should attract the notice of a wealthy man, and should be by him supported, educated and established in the world, so as to be able to live, to be-

come independent, and respectable, every one would say, that this is a case for the feeling, and the expression, of fervent gratitude. Let us suppose, that the patron of this young man, frequently reminds him of his former condition, and by what means he finds himself where he is. Suppose the patron exacts a frequent acknowledgement of his bounty, and takes to himself unqualified praise for his goodness. Let us suppose, that the obliged party finds his condition very irksome; and almost wishes that he had never been the subject of such burthensome favor; and is, at length, provoked to say so; *Is he ungrateful?* It would seem, then, that gratitude had two sides to it, as well as two parties. He who has conferred a favor, has not done all which it concerns him to do; and he who receives a favor may have a difficult task to perform. A bargain is an exchange of one thing for another, and the parties are even. The conferring of favors, whether asked for or not, seem to stand on very different grounds. Many elements make up that compound from which gratitude is said to arise. The parties may understand the nature of the favor very differently at the time when it is conferred; and more differently, afterwards. He who confers, has a retentive memory; he who receives, a fading one; time engraves the favor deeper and deeper, in the former; and wears it out, more and more, in the latter; —in the former, it often preserves the freshness of a new occurrence; in the latter, the sense of favor often goes, and the weight of obligation alone remains. It may be that the complaints made against ungrateful persons are not always well founded; and that the expectations of those who confer favors are as little so. Some poet has written,

> He that 's ungrateful has an only fault,—
> All other crimes may pass for virtues in him.

The meaning of this couplet must be, that the members of society are under no obligations to confer favors; and that if they do confer them, the party obliged is a monster, if he do not, *what?* we know not what is intended, nor that there is any rule by which gratitude is to

be manifested. We think that every member of society is to do what of good he can, and to whomsoever stands in need of it. He is not to stop to measure, and calculate, how he is to be paid for it. He may not be paid by the party benefitted directly, but by some other, and in some other and unexpected way. Whosoever confers favors opens an account with the changes, and chances, and accidents of life. His credit side will look well in the close. If he confer a favor, he does it because he thinks he can, and ought to. He has the *pleasure* of doing it. If he wishes to avoid the affliction of ingratitude, he can easily do it, by not letting the party obliged, know, unnecessarily, whence the benefit comes. When a favor is done, the party conferring it takes on himself the duty of respecting that feeling of the human heart which is founded in reasonable self-love, and which is entitled to respect, that is, *not to ask one who has had the misfortune to be bound in chains, to clank them for the gratification of him who put them on.* There are cases of extreme ingratitude. They may have been occasioned by the irritating or indiscreet conduct of the party who was entitled to a different return. They are not of common occurrence. When they do occur, uncaused, the disappointed party may hope to find a better subject in his next essay.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

229. *Promises.* A most prolific mother of trouble, and vexation in the world, is the making of promises. Every one who has something to do in the present moment, may judge whether it be best to do it, or not. He who promises, takes on himself to do something in

a *future* time. Where, and what will he be, and what will be his condition, at a future time? A promise is not only a solemn engagement to do an act, at a future time, but it is an engagement, that all things shall be so, that he can do it. This is undertaking a great deal. How much needless suffering is there, from this thoughtless, and almost wanton undertaking! All moralists agree in this, that every promise is to be performed in that sense in which the promisor understood it, and in which he authorized him, to whom the promise was made, to understand it. A promisor voluntarily puts on fetters; he agrees to wear them until a certain day. It behoves him to weigh well, before he puts them on, whether he can *then* take them off. Young persons are very ready to make promises. The kind feelings, and the sincerity, and the inexperience of early age, prompt them to promise. They know not, at that time of life, with what facility, present scenes disappear, and new ones take their places. Nor is it much otherwise, when other stages of life have come on. The evil of promising is, that when the day of performance arrives, either the inclination to perform is annihilated, or the ability to perform, if it ever existed, has been lost. The promisor must excuse, and exonerate himself as he can, or take the consequences. He runs the risk of losing his own self-respect, and of destroying his peace of mind. He runs still other risks; he may draw on himself future and ruinous evil, in attempting to escape from a present and inconsiderable one.

230. There are promises, of less serious cast, into which many persons enter, from unpardonable weakness. They are solicited to make promises; or some desire to be agreeable, or amiable to others, leads them to enter into engagements, which they find it disagreeable, or inconvenient to comply with. It would help such persons very much to know, that there is a monosyllable in the English language, very easily written, and more easily spoken, which would relieve them from all but a momentary inconvenience. When one who solicits has, in answer, a firm and decided NO, the bur-

then is on him, and the other party is entirely relieved. In some cases, this answer may be, and undoubtedly is, improperly given; but in a great majority of cases, it is the proper one. Suppose one asks you to solicit of another a favor for him. Either you ought to do this on the principle of benevolence and duty, or not. Of this you are the judge; the proposition is made to you, and you are to decide on it. It happens, that in your opinion, there is an objection to your making the promise; and it is weighty enough, if you had the firmness to do what you know you ought to do, to call forth a decisive no. Which is best for you, to say no at once; or to make a shuffling and evasive answer, leaving the applicant in doubt; or a promise which you do not mean to perform? One thing may decide this; the applicant will never tell that you refused him, if he had no right to your services, or you were justified in refusing them. Those who apply for favors never tell by whom they have been refused. It is immoral to promise anything which you know you cannot perform; far more so, to make a promise, which at the very time of making it, you mean not to perform. What laws are broken by such acts, we need not stop to show, if former pages have been read, and understood.

231. *Slander.* This is a two-fold crime. 1. It is a breach of natural law, of divine law, and of the implied law of society, in relation to the party spoken of. 2. It is a breach of the same law, in relation to the party speaking. It has been commonly treated of in the first relation. It is now to be noticed in the second; and if it be shown why it is a breach in this, the other will take care of itself. We beg leave to ask a slanderer a few questions: Do you desire to be esteemed in society for your intelligence, your sense of justice, your knowledge of the decencies of life, and for the observance of them? If you happen to be ill-tempered, petulant, and disagreeable to your family connexions, and associates; if you make hasty and troublesome judgments, which you have to rescind or reform; if you happen to be ridiculous in your de-

portment, and remarkable for silly vanities; are you willing to have these things set forth in any, and every company, by any one who knows of them? Suppose there to be only some slight foundation for some one, or more of these things, which, if you could have an opportunity to explain, would be entirely cleared up; are you willing to have that slight foundation made the basis of a structure of reproach, which if true and real, ought to expel you from decent society? Suppose there to be no foundation at all, for any such accusation of yourself, and yet somehow, and unaccountably, it is afloat, and circulating; should you not think great injustice to be done to you? This is just what you do to others. You take away their good name, if they deserve to have one; you magnify their little faults and errors, and make them ridiculous or odious; you try them on indictments, for serious offences, on which they have no opportunity to defend themselves, and of which they are ignorant. Where did you get your information? What credit were they entitled to, from whom you had it? Did you understand them as they meant to be understood? Where, and how, did your informants learn what they communicated? Were they thoughtless, or malicious slanderers, like yourself? How much have you added to their slanders by way of recommending and making yourself agreeable? Have you broken any law by this conduct? We take the liberty to answer for you.

232. You have broken every law which an honest and honorable man, and a rational individual should respect. 1. You have made every person whom you have spoken to, fear you, and shun you. You have shown that you know not what the value of a good name is, and have forfeited your own, if you ever had any. You have shown, that you are a stranger to self-respect; that you have, probably, every one of the faults, follies, and errors, which you impute to others; and desire to bring them down to your own level. Thus you have broken that law which commands you to do no evil to yourself. 2. You have vi-

olated that principle of natural law, which commands you to do no injustice to your fellow-men. You know not what opinions you may entertain of the party you have slandered, if circumstances, (as they may,) should bring you into connexion with him. You may find him to be, on a better knowledge of him, an amiable and worthy person. You may find all that you have said, and helped to circulate, utterly groundless. If he be one whom you occasionally meet, and even ask to partake of your hospitality, how can you meet him, and manifest towards him, every sentiment of respect and esteem, when you have so spoken of him? One of two things must be true, either you *act a lie*, when you meet him in such a manner, or you *spoke a lie*, when you represented him as you did, to others. 3. You have broken the law of God. To this law, perhaps, you are a stranger, and know not what wrong you have done. If so, the kindest thing that any one can do you, is, to urge you to find out what it is, and to learn there, the sentence of the slanderer.

233. It may be asked, whether one is to be entirely silent at all times, and on all occasions, as to the character and conduct of others? Certainly not. There are many occasions for speaking of others, and for speaking the *truth* of them, whatever that may be. All the members of any community are interested in knowing the true character of each other. The knowledge that this character may be known, is one of the most salutary correctives of erroneous conduct, and one of the strongest inducements to pursue that which is commendable. It is probably the case, that the members of every community are pretty well understood by all who have an interest in knowing them. We know not of any law, which holds it to be immoral *to speak the truth of any one, from good motives, and for justifiable ends.* It is all important that this principle should prevail in our country, where so much depends on public opinion. Surely one's arms are not to be folded, and his lips closed, when he sees one bent on mischief, public, or private. It may be

one of the highest moral duties, to declare what men are, and what they are aiming at, in many supposable cases. There can be no surer guide, than the *motive*, and the *end*. Inquiries are sometimes made, in matters of greater or less interest concerning others, confidentially, and where the inquirer needs to be truly informed. The party inquired of, has a right to be silent, if he thinks he has good reason to be so; but if he answer, he is bound to state the truth. If he choose to speak, and wilfully conceal the truth, so that the inquirer is deceived, he subjects himself to the imputation of an intentional deceiver.

234. There may be also, and there frequently are, confidential discussions of character, especially concerning public men, and where, perhaps, there is no particular end in view. This does not seem to be wrong; such intercourse is not founded in malicious, nor unworthy motives. It is even, sometimes, instructive and philosophical. This, perhaps, is the extreme limit. In all other imaginable cases, it is, probably, most consistent with one's own self-respect, and all truly respectable motives, to let other persons alone, and leave to them the care of their own characters.

235. *Profanity.* Excepting the high crimes, which are punishable by the public laws, there is no one so shocking as *profanity*, nor any one which there is so little inducement to commit. Profane swearing is of two kinds. 1. That in which the Deity is called on, to do the pleasure of a sinning mortal. 2. That in which the Deity is called on, to witness the truth of such a being's thoughtless, or wicked declarations. This common practice can be accounted for only on two grounds; 1. Pitiable ignorance. 2. Abominable wickedness. On the first ground, surely the profane swearer must be ignorant of the import of the terms which he uses. It is impossible to believe that he can realize *who* speaks, to *whom*, and for *what*. If he did understand his own words, he would be struck with horror. When one hears such words, he can hardly

restrain himself from saying, 'You contemptible worm of this little earth. Do *you* call upon the *Universal* God to execute the sentence of *your* wrath, and of *your* folly? Do *you* call on Him to witness your disgraceful assertions, and your low-born thoughts? Ought *you* not rather to tremble lest His awful justice should instantaneously wither *your* prostituted tongue!'

Surely, if there be any escape for the profane, from that condemnation which they imprecate on others, it must be, that mercy will be extended to them in compassion for their ignorance. If they are not ignorant, but do knowingly and wilfully so misuse the gift of an immortal mind, and that unquestionable proof of Divine power and goodness, *the ability to speak*, they cannot be subjects of moral instruction. They should be left, like the consumers of rum, and tobacco, to shock, and to warn others.

236. To those who aspire to the dignity of being regarded as rational persons, and sensible of the capacity of improving and exalting their condition, there is something to be said. Swearing, is, by some persons, held to be a genteel, and manly accomplishment. To swear with a good grace, is a proof that one is a gentleman! But all persons who are really gentlemen, consider this practice to be a decisive proof of a low and vulgar mind. We lay aside now, the breach of divine law, and that accountability which we have endeavored to show to be inevitable. We consider this only on the principle of pure self-interest, which every one must admit to be the proper governing principle. Does not one who is habitually profane, necessarily entertain a low opinion of himself? Would any respectable merchant, or mechanic, or farmer, receive into his service, a youth whom he knew to be a profane swearer? Could any one who is known to be such, find admission into any school, academy, seminary, or college? Would any respectable parent admit such a one to be a companion of his children, or a visitant in his family? Would not every reasoning person say, that a youth who is so ignorant as not to know, that swearing is a vi-

olation of natural and divine law, must be ignorant enough not to know, that there are many other laws for the proper government of society, and consequently that he is an unsafe person to be trusted? If the profanity be the consequence of voluntary wickedness, then surely all reflecting persons would say, that he who is wicked in this respect, is indeed wicked; but then he will be wicked in others, also. For, as there is one chain which runs through all the virtues, and binds them in a sympathetic union; so also is there a chain which unites all the vices. He who swears may be justly suspected of drinking; he who swears and drinks, may be justly suspected of gaming; he who swears, and drinks, and games, must keep very bad company, by day, and by night. He who keeps such company from such motives, must squander his own property, or steal that of somebody else to expend. He who robs another, will commit forgery; and he who is so desperate as to commit these two latter crimes, will not hesitate long, to put a human being out of the way of his pressing wants, if he is tempted to do it. It is probable, that habitual lying, and swearing, are the first steps in that mournful series of crimes, and the first beginnings in the course of deplorable wretchedness, which deform and disgrace human society. Will any one maintain that these are necessary evils; and that God has so made man, that they cannot be prevented? Surely, these are evils wholly of human origin; and where they begin, there lies the power to extirpate them.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

237. *Envy.* It is to be kept in view, that the main object is to show, that this is a good sort of existence, if man knew how to use it; and that is the author of

his own afflictions. This is remarkably illustrated in the matter of *envy*. It is probable that a large proportion of mankind, in all classes, suffer from the dominion of this passion. It can be shown, that it is peculiarly the passion which man has made for himself, out of emulation, which latter is the Creator's work. In this instance, man has been exceedingly ingenious, and successful, in making himself miserable. He has done worse, he has provided for himself, in creating envy, a fountain which sends forth, not one water, but many, and each one foul and poisonous. He who has submitted himself to envy, has bound himself to think, to feel, and to act, as envy prompts. It would be most shocking to know, what agency this monster has had in human affairs. If any one should read history, and watch the movements of his fellow men, merely to learn the operation of this principle of action, he would see, probably, the most operative cause of the misery which men inflict upon themselves, and on each other. If one has not time to read history, and watch his fellow men, he may, perhaps, learn much of what he would find in these authorities, by *reading his own heart.*

238. The word envy comes from two Latin words, *in* and *vidio*, and signifies looking *against.* It arises from perceiving in other persons, qualities which one's own self-love leads him to wish to have; as beauty, strength, grace, learning, eloquence, power, &c. It extends to riches, to office, to distinction; to the respect and esteem in which one is held by his fellow men, and even to birth and ancestry. It makes one *sorry* that he has not these good things; and makes him *angry*, that others have them. One easily persuades himself that great injustice is done to him, in that *he* has them not. The next step is to *hate* him who has them. Then comes the desire, to deprive the supposed fortunate possessor of the benefit of them. But to admit that one has these malignant promptings, is contrary to another principle of self-love, and, therefore, no man tells another of his own envy; and he tries to wrap it up from his own view. As he cannot, and dare not

openly manifest that he is envious, he must obey the suggestions of malice in the dark. He, therefore, intrigues, insinuates, and becomes adroit, in putting one thing for another; he secretly, and by covert means, undermines the object of his hatred. He whispers his doubts, suspicions, opinions, and belief. If the tenure of the hated object is too strong to be shaken, then the bad use which he makes of his advantages, are sought out. The base accompaniments of his fine qualities are brought forth, and placed in the strongest lights. 'She is beautiful; *but* she is vain, haughty, and silly. He is rich, *but* he got his wealth by frauds, and hoards it like a miser. He is able, eloquent, and popular; *but* he is selfish, and insincere, and would put a yoke on every neck in the republic, if he could. He is making a great flourish in the world, *but* it is all false and hollow; he came from nothing, and will go back to nothing.' It may be easily inferred, that one who has surrendered himself to the dominion of envy, not only deprives himself of the profitable use of what he has, or might have, but makes himself wretched in contemplating what he must know he cannot have; he is so wrought upon, that whatsoever seeds of crime he may have in his heart, are sure to start into luxuriant growth.

239. Can any rational being doubt, that this sort of suffering, and crime, are entirely of man's making? Can it be doubted that he can prevent them? These are violations of natural law, and divine law; and no law comes from this source which cannot be understood and obeyed. Let us take an example and seek out the unreasonableness and immorality of envy, and to do this effectually we must take a strong case, and in some degree, a fanciful one. Let us suppose that in a seminary of females there is one who is very beautiful; her parents are very rich, and are highly respectable; and that this young lady is distinguished by her genius, and her diligence, and good conduct, and is obviously in the receipt of the preceptor's unqualified approbation. Let us further suppose, that there are some

of her school fellows who *envy* her. Their countenances show what they feel. Every mark of favor manifested to this fortunate person, is a blow on every envious heart. Discontent, distress, and malignity, take up their abodes in these hearts, and enter into thriving partnership. But, the beauty, the genius, the diligence, the wealth, the parentage, the applause, are not among the dividends which these partners make; these remain where they were; and what dividends do they make? Let us suppose that the envious would do what they would;—that is, annihilate the envied qualities, and make the possessor too low, and contemptible, to be more thought of; and let us suppose too, that the successful adventurers succeed to what is now the first eminence; is there no one below to pull them down? —They are soon down, and by like means, and thus the demolition would descend, until the seminary became too low a place for even envy to find something to live on.

240. Is not this a fair example of what we continually see in all grades, and classes, of social life? and is not this passion of envy, earthborn, mischievous, and odious? What is the remedy? Common sense, and plain reason, point out the remedy. Generally speaking, every member in society is just as much in his own place, as he is in his own skin. No one can be in another's place. Every one has his place orignially assigned to him, and his natural condition in it, by means, over which he had no control, and in making which he had no agency. What he will make out of himself, and of the circumstances in which he finds himself, must depend, (after the irresponsible state of infancy is passed) on his own thoughts, motives, and acts. He will find his greatest good, not in repining at the good of others (which he can never make to be his own, and which he cannot destroy without expecting retributive justice as to himself,) but in making his own condition as good as he can, consistently with self-respect, and peace of mind. That which is given to others, and all that they can lawfully acquire, is righteously their own,

All that is given to one's self, and all that he so acquires is, in like manner, his own. If he would have no injustice done to him, by those who are below him, he must do no injustice to those who are above him. We entertain no doubt that the day will come when youth will be so instructed, and men so self-disciplined, as to know, that the laws of nature, and the laws of society, when conformable to these, permit to every person a proper place; enjoin duties in that place; and ensure happiness from the performance of those duties. When that day comes, envy will die.

241. *Emulation.* This has been sometimes classed with envy; but they have nothing in common. One would feel like a culprit in being known to be envious, but would rightly take praise to himself in being emulous. This motive to action was given to man for the best possible purposes; and upon the application of it, with justifiable views, and to commendable ends, the advancement of human welfare mainly depends. We understand it to mean, the desire to obtain excellence, in laudable pursuits. An envious man may be supposed to say, 'Your eminence distresses me; I cannot bear to see you sitting up there; and though I have not the shadow of hope that I can ascend to your place, if you were out of it, nevertheless, I must pull you down, if I can; and then we shall stand on the same level.' An emulous man may be supposed to say, 'I admit that you are where you should be. You have raised yourself by fair and just means. I have no desire to disturb you, nor to impede your further progress. You have done me no injustice; on the contrary, you have rendered me the important service of showing me how one may honorably rise. I shall follow your example, and endeavor to place myself by your side. If I can get there, we shall have a fair, good-tempered rivalry, and we may animate, and quicken each other's efforts. If you are able to keep always in advance of me, you will make me diligent, and enable me to excel others, if I cannot equal you.' There seems to be nothing immoral in this. In this view emulation is presented

in its true and amiable character. Like everything else entrusted to man's use, it may be, and often is, perverted. It frequently excites very unworthy feelings. Hence it has been confounded with envy. It is upon the principle of emulation, that diligence in schools is commonly founded; and it is in schools, that the perversion alluded to, is frequently noticed. When several children are required to get, and recite, the same lesson, there must be a best, and worst among them. That they are such, respectively, may depend on natural talent, and upon industry, or on both. It deserves great consideration, whether rewards, and punishments, are generally understood in their true philosophy. There must be emulation in schools, because there is, and ought to be, that stimulant every where, in all the vocations of life. If men had not the advantage of comparing themselves with each other, and the promptings to exertion which arise from that comparison, this life would be very still and stupid. But what use is to be made of this principle in schools, is a question of exceeding interest. We express no opinion on this point, because we might not express a sound one, and might thereby do some injury, and, very possibly, no good in any case. Add to this, that such an inquiry does not come within our general object.

242. *Imitation.* It is doubtful, whether this principle of action, has received all the consideration, and respect, to which it is entitled. It is supposed to be applicable to physical, intellectual, and moral being. In the first sense, it is supposed to apply to all animals. The word, imitation, is derived from the Latin, *imito*. A word is found in the Greek, which is compounded of two words, one of which signifies to *mimic;* and the other signifies, *alike;* and so compounded, they are said to mean, *to do*, or *to make alike*. There is something, like education, among the animals who are inferior to man. A bird may be naturally disposed to fly, when it is fit to leave the nest; but it may depend on *imitation*, to carry the disposition into effect. The young of animals have an instinctive direction to

the objects proper for them to pursue; but they pursue these objects the more promptly, it may be presumed, on the principle of imitation. It seems reasonable to suppose, that the natural instinct is not so strong, and directory, of itself, as to put every animal inferior to man, in the proper pursuit, independently of this principle. However this may be, it is quite certain, that among human beings, this principle has so powerful an influence, that the character of society is determined by it. Man was characterized, by an eminent Greek philosopher, as the '*imitative*' animal.

243. The very first teachings addressed to the infant mind, are invitations to imitate. The first responses to these invitations, are attempts to do what the teacher proposes. If a child were left alone, from an early age, until advanced towards manhood, he would be destitute of language. This is proved by certain accounts of persons, who happened to be so placed, if these accounts are credible. It is also supposed, that the dumb are not defective in the organs of speech, but in the power of imitation. The acquirement of language is undoubtedly dependent on this faculty, as is clearly proved by those who attempt to learn, and to speak, another language, after attaining an adult age. It is probable, that the loss of a language, learned in one country, by going to another, in which it is not spoken, is not to be referred to the absence of habit, and the defect of memory only, but to the ceasing to imitate those who speak that language. Whether we are right or wrong in this, is not very material to the main object, which is to show, the nature and consequences of imitation, in a moral view.

244. We have endeavored to prove, that every person has a natural propensity to action. In what manner, and to what end, he shall act, is suggested by nature. Seeing, as he necessarily does, other persons like himself, acting in pursuance of these natural suggestions, he obeys the impulse to act, by doing or attempting to do, as they do. It seems to us, that the operation of this principle is seen in every relation,

from the cradle to the grave. It appears in matters of business, and amusement, in things serious, and in things trifling; in armies, in schools, in work-shops, in legislative assemblies, in domestic life; in short, in virtue and in vice, and in all that pertains to good or ill, in which man is an agent. This principle of action is frequently *involuntary*. It is a common observation that a person who yawns, (or, as it is commonly called, *gapes*) will occasion a similar action in those who see and hear him. It is well known, that disagreeable muscular contortions, more particularly of the face, are frequently taken by one child from another, especially in schools; so, also, are disagreeable tones of voice, and peculiarities of articulation. One may, sometimes, pronounce with certainty that a person who is heard to speak, for the first time, was educated at a certain college; or that he has been brought up in a certain part of the country. One may pronounce, also, with certainty, that entire strangers to him belong to a fraternity, who entertain peculiar sentiments, on certain subjects; they acquire a distinguishing mode of speaking; especially when the dominant sentiment is of a serious character. There are abundant opportunities, open to every intelligent observer, in this country, to prove that these things are so. All this is the consequence of imitation, though the persons who prove that it is so, may be, and probably are, entirely ignorant of it.

245. There are instances of physical imitation which depend on some mental delusion. These, also, are *involuntary*. As when one of a number is so powerfully acted upon by the imagination, as to fall into some muscular convulsion, and others present, are affected in like manner. It is well authenticated, that females in the Royal Infirmary at Edinburgh, who were affected by *hysteric* fits, occasioned the same infirmity in others. It is well known too that in the poor house at Haerlem, in Holland, some years ago, a girl, under some impression of terror, fell into a convulsive disease, which extended, on the mere principle of imitation, to

nearly all the boys and girls in the house. The celebrated Dr Boerhaave put a stop to it, by preparing certain irons, and having them made red hot in the presence of the children. He pronounced, with great solemnity, that every child who manifested any symptom of the disease, must be burnt to the bone, with one of these irons. There was no occasion to use them; and the disease was no more known. In the year 1803, a species of St Vitus's dance became epidemic, in one of the United States, on the same principle. About the year 1784, a commission was instituted at Paris, to test a new sort of philosophy, then introduced, under the name of *animal magnetism*. It was traced to imitative sympathy, and exploded; and has not been known, (we believe) within the present century. There are many well authenticated instances of involuntary imitation, extending through parishes, villages, and districts of country. They have been uniformly traced to some imaginary terror. There was an instance in the island of Anglesey, in 1796; and many in Scotland, towards the close of the last century. In general, this sort of imitative malady occurred among persons who had not received the benefit of any education; it occurs *only* to such unfortunate persons. It was never known to have happened among the instructed, and well informed. Such occurrences are now properly ranked among judicial astrology, trials by combat, and the delusions of witchcraft. They are marks standing forth in time gone-by, to show how reason, and good sense, have raised mankind above them.

246. Manners, and fashions, are to be referred entirely to the principle of imitation; in some instances, it is involuntary, but most frequently, intended, and sometimes with diligent effort. All persons, in small, closely connected communities, have manners, opinions, and modes, peculiar to themselves. Every village, school, factory, college, and town, has its own manners, and fashions. Wherever there is a collection of persons, in habitual intercourse, there must be imitation. If the qualities which are respectable in human society are derived

from this principle, of which there can be no doubt, so, also, are the follies and vices of society. If a child had never heard any one swear profanely, it is incredible that he should *invent* profanity. If one had never seen others take spirituous liquors, it is not to be supposed that he would do it. If one had never heard of others' wasting time, health, and character, in places of low and infamous resort, it cannot be admitted, that the inclination to do such things, would naturally spring up in an uncontaminated mind. Thus it seems to us, that the sins, follies, and depravities of the world, are rightly chargeable on those who are *imitated*, rather than on those who are imitators. This should be so, because the *experienced* have attained to a certain maturity of age, and have arrived at some knowledge of the evil consequences of their deeds, and ought rather to warn the pure to shun their paths, than invite them to enter upon the like course.

247. This notice of the principle of imitation has been thought expedient, as introductory to further notice of it, in its good and evil effects, in domestic life, and in the congregations of the young, for education, and otherwise. The effect of imitation is very striking in families. Taking each individual of a family connexion by himself, great differences may be discerned between him, and all others. Taking the whole together, traits are found to be common to all; looks, muscular motion, expressions under strong excitement, and marked peculiarities, run through whole families. Though such things may be accounted for by laws belonging to physical being, in some measure, yet the most important part of them, viz. *the moral part*, depends on the imitation. What can be more natural than that this should be so? From the earliset age, after the senses are brought into use, all children are pushed onward by the impulse to act. They do as they see their seniors, and each other, do; they speak as others speak; they copy all that comes within their notice, good and bad; they adopt the opinions, feelings, and thoughts of others, and modify these accord-

ing to their own sphere of action. They must so conduct themselves, or do nothing, for they cannot have a stock of motives growing up spontaneously, in their own minds. This providential order to imitate, is like all others which come from the same authority; most useful, wise, and benevolent; and like all others, liable to mournful perversion. If we are right in these views, then it follows, that those who constitute a family, are under great responsibilities. The affection of parents for children, the dependence of the latter on the former, their daily and increasing intercourse, place children where they must be imitators. As parents are, (in their view,) superior to all other earthly beings, they are the proper persons to look up to, and to be copied; and, in general, (right or wrong,) the attachment of fathers and mothers is, undoubtedly, increased, by seeing themselves *repeated* in their offspring.

248. The inferences to be drawn from these positions are very obvious. If a parent would possess his child of a natural, comely and graceful bodily action, he must, at least, not show, by his own action, that such things are of no consequence. If a parent would teach his child that he is to eat, to live; and that he is not to live, to eat, he must demonstrate, by his own mode of life, what the true purpose of eating is. If he would teach his child that the digestive organs are given to perform a very necessary, and sober sort of *business*, at proper times, and in a proper manner, he must not show, by his manner of using his own, that he regards them as a mere place of deposit, for whatsoever it may give him pleasure to pass into them. If a parent thinks that patience, and tranquillity, under disappointments; gentleness of voice, and kindness of manner; truth and fair dealing; early rising and industry; cheerfulness and thankfulness; and doing as one would have others do to him, are qualities which he would like to see in his children, he must not show, by the tenor of his own life, that he thinks them of no value. It is very easy to see, from observing the children of a family, what sort of parents they have, and what is the common

course of conduct within their walls, although one never saw the interior, nor the parents. There are exceptions which prove the rule. Sometimes, children perceive and are shocked, at errors and follies in their parents. Thus one is not to suppose, that because a mother is a silly, gossiping female, intermeddling with her neighbors' concerns, and is fruitful in malicious or pitiful commentaries, that her children will all be of the same cast. On the contrary, the children, from seeing such an evil example before them, may go to the extreme of prudence, and propriety, in managing the tongue. So, also, if a child have an intemperate parent, he may not become so himself, but may acquire a horror of the use of ardent spirits.

249. It is almost too obvious, that the principle of imitation is a tyrannical one, in places of education, to require any remark upon it. It is very natural that instructers, who stand in a high relation to pupils, should be objects of imitation. If they happen to have bad, as well as good qualities, it is to be expected that they will be imitated, in both. If the personal deportment, if the tones of voice, if the expressions of countenance, if the sentiments which are occasionally expressed, are of a dignified and estimable order, there will be some pupils who will be diligent imitators; and those who cannot, or will not imitate, cannot withhold respect.

250. The qualities which are strongly contrasted with such as have been mentioned, will certainly find imitators; or they will engender feelings and opinions, which disqualify the youthful heart, and mind, for moral improvement. In all schools and colleges, there are, as there are in adult society, some individuals, who are *the* objects of imitation. How these persons act, and in what manner they act, are very interesting inquiries. Curiosity is insatiable on such points. Whatsoever such prototypes do, is fit to be done by others, *as they think.*

251. In almost every school, college, community, or association, there are some persons who are looked

up to. These persons determine, (by what rule cannot be stated, certainly not by that of common sense,) what shall be done, and how it shall be done. These persons, from impudent assumption, or by pretension, founded on accidental circumstances, or from some humiliating concession, are admitted to know what the *fashion* is; and such persons are, consequently, to be imitated. No matter how absurd, or ridiculous, their course of conduct may be; nor what violence they do to the laws of nature, or good sense, they, nevertheless, establish *the law*, and no one may dare to depart from it, without subjecting himself to the charge of vulgarity; or what is worse, to that of being *unfashionable*. With imitators, the question is not, what is becoming, proper, and really useful; but, how does such a one, and such a one, do, in the proposed case. Now, it is most certain, that all persons who have this exaltation, whether assumed or conceded, are under a grave moral responsibility. They are bound, by the solemn laws, which it it the object of this volume to illustrate, so to conduct themselves, as to set no example of a degrading, and ruinous character to their imitators. Such persons are invested with an honorable *trust*. If they are important enough to make laws for others, they should make good ones; they should make good ones for the highest and the strongest reasons: their laws are like those made in a republic; they are for the government, not only of those who are to obey them, but, *for those who make them*.

252. *Peace of Mind.* It is believed that most persons pass a large portion of their lives in a state of inquietude and uneasiness. Persons who have no bodily disease, are anxious and disturbed. They have some urgent want which cannot be gratified, or which cannot be so, without incurring some evil, which would be worse than the unsatisfied want. They have the dread of some probable or possible evil, to come, and which is the more terrible because of the uncertainty of the manner, and of the time, in which it may come. Others are

uneasy from remembering the past, in which some benefit was not secured, some blunder made, some wrong done to themselves, some vain gratification not obtained. There are many persons who are habitually discontented. They find every thing goes wrong. The weather is bad; their food is not as they would have it; no one does anything in the right time, or right manner; or that is done which should not be, or that is omitted, which should be done. Such persons are always groaning, sighing, or grumbling. They dislike every body, and every body dislikes them; and particularly, their abundant *advice* is disliked, and their manner of giving it. There are other persons, who are of unquiet mind for more serious causes. They have recollections which distress or torment them. They are transgressors, perhaps, criminally so. They have been able to conceal this, but they live in the fear of disclosure; at any rate, the fact cannot be hidden from themselves. They forgot when they sinned, that there is one person in whose society they must ever be, and who will sometimes announce his presence, even when they would hide themselves in sleep.

253. These are frightful instances of the agency of this companion which every man has in his own bosom. There are hours in every one's life, when he must compare the condition in which he is, with that in which he thinks he might have been. To some persons, these are hours of dread and terror. It is believed that this cause of suffering is purely of human origin; and that prevention must be found where the error began. It is the law of the Deity, that there shall be such suffering, when the guilty mortal makes it necessary to apply that law. There are great differences in the temperament, and natural dispositions of persons. It is incredible that the worst tempered person would not make a better whole of life, by suppressing their natural propensities, and acquiring a control over themselves; and teaching themselves to look out for what may be pleasant and agreeable, (passing by that which seems ill to them,) instead of doing exactly the reverse.

254. There are cases in life, in which, it is said there must be anxiety, and inquietude, from the very condition in which men are placed. Persons who sustain public offices; persons who are placed in important trusts; persons whose vocations are perilous; those who are pricked by the thorn of political ambition. It is probable, that such persons do experience many painful and distressing emotions; and that they sometimes pay dearly for their distinction. But it is demonstrable that even such persons, might have tranquillity, if they had a right frame of mind. There are persons who substitute an aching solicitude, for the reasonable discretion and care, which is all that is required in the performance of duty. There are others who greatly overvalue the distinctions to which they attain, or aspire; and very few of them realize, that when they do succeed, they must take success, especially in popular governments, with the accompaniments of having their worthy acts misunderstood, and reproached; and their mistaken ones magnified, and distorted, to suit the occasions of adversaries.

255. The remedy for this sort of suffering is within every one's power. Those who are poor, and in humble life, if not in extreme poverty, may possess peace of mind; and it is of easier acquisition by these, than by those who are involved in the duties of office, and the responsibility of trust, and the embarrassment of wealth. Certainly, without this treasure, no earthly grandeur, no promise of posthumous glory, is worth having, or seeking for. If the laws of nature, and the teaching of revelation were properly known, respected, and obeyed, the common causes of inquietude would hardly be known. For example, what is more common than complaints of the weather?—It is too hot, or cold, wet or dry. It is not nature that mistakes about the weather, but ourselves. The movements of the winds, and the waters, and the temperament of both, proceed on some great and universal laws, far beyond human perception. That which is exacted of us to believe is, that it is so; and to adapt ourselves to it, by our experience and in-

genuity. What sort of effect would it produce in the earth, if such things were regulated by human perception of what is best? When one has occasion to put to use, a board, or stick of timber, which has been in contact with the ground for a certain length of time, he disturbs, and puts to flight, families, communities, and whole nations of living beings. Man may be much in the same relation, as to general laws, (not meant for him to comprehend,) in which these insects are, on the removal of their covering.

256. As to all causes of inquietude arising from the operation of nature's laws, in which human agency has no concern, they must be right, although they occasion inconvenience to individuals. As to the acts and omissions of others which affect us, some questions are to be asked and answered, before one can rightly judge of these ;—viz. what is the real cause of our complaint? did not the first fault arise from some act, or omission of our own? Do we judge reasonably of the supposed wrong? Do we make charitable allowance for the misapprehension, which may affect the party complained of? When the inquietude arises from our own wayward and peevish disposition, from our own misconduct, negligence, or breach of laws, which we could know if we would, the remedy lies in becoming wiser and better; and more reasonable in learning how we may make of life, that which it was intended to be, when we use it as we should. Let any reasonable being look back on his own life, and calmly consider the causes of his own contentions, ill-will, and sufferings, in body and mind; how many of these can he fairly lay to the blame of the Creator's laws, of Nature's laws, or those of society, whether positive or implied? If to these he can charge but very few, who but himself is there, to take the residue?

257. We have been trying to show what peace of mind is not. We have to show what it is, or rather in what it is founded. It comes from sober conviction, that the Creator has made his own laws, for his own universe; that he requires conformity to these laws, that

he permits, and enjoins, the use of what is good and right; that he punishes all that is wrong and disobedient. He has trusted every mortal with his own welfare, but has associated him with others, who live in the same trust, each one for his own, but yet for mutual welfare. All are to contribute their common efforts to the common good. Those who have the means, are to aid others in acquiring a knowledge of the laws which are common to all. If these laws were understood and applied, how abundantly would peace of mind increase in the world. The school boy would get his lessons and obey his preceptor; laboring classes would labor diligently, live temperately, and find a greater pleasure in their frugal food, than the luxurious in their festivals; for the former live as nature orders, the latter as fashion dictates. The opulent and luxurious would learn, that the incidents of their fortune, do not exempt them from the laws of nature. That if they have affluence beyond their reasonable and commendable wants, they are blessed with the means of purchasing a precious name; they would learn that no wealth will exempt any man from earning an appetite for his pleasures, by physical motion; that if he is tired of being rich and happy, *that he must work* to accomplish some reasonable purpose. His distinction is, that he may choose the means in which he will expend, *to be busy*, while others can only work in some prescribed mode, *to live*.

258. The middle classes, and all who are not dependently poor, have as many, and as valuable sources of enjoyment as those have, whom they think to be better off than themselves. They can love and be loved. They can be respected and esteemed. They can have the consciousness of behaving well, where their lot has been cast. They have a far keener zest for natural and reasonable pleasure, than those who misuse the bounties of accidental condition. They can have peace of mind, when it is denied to those, whom they deem more fortunate. If these natural laws, which seem to be so plain and obvious, were understood and respected, the laborers *in mind* in all their varied employments,

would do diligently, and in the best manner in their power, that which they have undertaken. Men of public trust would do honestly, and with a single view to their trust, that which they have undertaken. Suppose it were all so, and yet troubles and disappointments come. This may be, and yet there would be peace of mind. If every one were assured that no act, no omission of his own, makes him suffer, that he has acted faithfully and honestly, and to the best of his ability, in the circumstances in which he was placed; he would be entitled to have, and by the law of immutable Justice, he would have, *peace of mind.*

259. *Happiness.* There is no word in our language more commonly used; nor any one less defined, or less understood. It is sometimes taken to mean pleasurable sensations derived through the senses; sometimes it means a peculiar state of mind. It may be said that a pirate, who has been brought to the most perfect penitence, and who is sensible that he has forfeited his life to the demands of justice, and that he is about to be transferred from the perplexities and sufferings of this state of being, to endless felicity, is *happy* that he is going to be *hanged.* Perhaps it is easier to tell what happiness is not, than what it is. The most perfect *health* is not happiness, unless one has something to do. Health, and *riches*, do not make one happy. These accidents of being, rather excite cravings for enjoyment. They are means, not ends. A rich man can ride but one horse, or sit but in one coach, or eat but one dinner, or wear but one suit of garments, or live but in one house, at a time. Persons in moderate circumstances can do the same.

260. Health, riches, *power* and *distinction* do not make happiness. Distinction is troublesome; it has more pains than pleasures. It is jealous, envious, and distrustful. Power does not make one happy. It demands the most busy watchfulness to keep it. If lost, its absence is often followed by painful suffering; and the possession of it, is always accompanied with the fear of losing it. Riches are sometimes regarded as

means of enabling one to live in elegant luxury, and even in voluptuous enjoyment. This is no way to be happy. The appetites soon become satiated. The stomach wears out. The senses are palled. Diseases come. The body may be racked on a velvet couch, as well as on a straw bed. Is there, then, any such thing as happiness? There must be such a thing, or the laws of nature, which provide for physical, intellectual, and moral being, are false and deceitful; and the gift of revelation is a fable. If there be such a thing as happiness, it will be found in that knowledge of, and obedience to, the laws of nature, which make health. It will be found in obeying the propensity to action, to some continuous, useful end: that is, in pursuing reasonably, some one of the many vocations in society, which tend to secure one's own self-respect, and peace of mind; and which tend also, to the common good. But, there may be disappointments, ill luck, and causes of mortification and sorrow. These, we apprehend, do not seriously disturb any well regulated mind, when there is a consciousness, that no reasonable foresight, or prudence, would have discerned, and prevented the cause. Finally, one may feel assured, that if he so live as to be healthy; so use his time as to be reasonably busy, to some good purpose; and so conduct himself as to be justly entitled to his own approbation; and if he live in the habitual assurance, that there is an omnipresent, omniscient, and merciful Judge of moral, accountable, and immortal man, he will certainly be happy. Are such things impossible, or impracticable? Who has tried them, and found them so?

CHAPTER XXIX.

Domestic Duties.

261. *Living and Dying; or Terrestrial Succession.* There are some persons who see, in the order of succession, inherent in animal and vegetable creation, that the system is irreconcileable to Divine power and benevolence. They complain of the principle of decay; of the yellow leaf of autumn; of the dreariness of winter. They complain more of the uncertainty, and, (sometimes) sudden termination of human life; that the young and the serviceable die; that death, at any age, is a mournful and afflictive event. They say that the world is 'a vale of tears;' that 'man is born to trouble, as the sparks fly upward;' that our 'days are few, and full of trouble.' This is not what the Deity has said; it is not what nature says. This is the language of ignorant, erring, ungrateful man. There is no one thing which declares the wisdom, and the goodness of God, more convincingly, than the provision for the commencement, the duration, and the end of life. Whatsoever there may seem to be of evil in it, is either of man's own creating; or it is because he does not, or will not exercise his reason. If it were left to man to regulate this matter, what would he please to do? Would he make every thing that comes into being, as vegetable, continue in it, and for how long a time? What would become of the succession of blossoms and fruits? Would he make his own race immortal on the earth? What would he do with the pleasures, and duties of youth, manhood, decline, and old age? Would he continue all in life, who come into it, indefinitely? How would, or could, any being come into life, if the Creator's order were deranged? If it were possible to suppose that all to whom life is given, were to remain on earth and continue to multiply, what would life come to be? It better becomes audacious mortals, to be assured, that all is right. It is their proper duty to exercise the be-

neficent gift of reason, to learn that it is so; that *death* proceeds no less from the goodness of God, than *birth;* that man abuses and perverts the beautiful order of succession, as he does every thing else, when ignorant, and disobedient. If he used his faculties as he is commanded to do, he would know, that from this order arise, all the relations which call forth the highest moral perfection to which he can aspire; all excitements to virtue; all the promptings to self-satisfying action; all the delights which are worthy of a mind destined to immortality.

262. *Marriage.* This is the ordinance of the Creator. It began when man began. It is ordered to perpetuate the succession of the human family. It is ordered for the whole duration of adult age. It is man's peculiar privilege in this: it connects him with generations which are gone; with that which is passing away; and with those which are to come. The memory, and the ashes of the dead are precious to him, and no other animal has that sentiment. He alone, contemplates that his own memory will be held in honor; and that the place of his earthly quiet will be sacred. He only is enabled to conceive, that moral and physical wrong, will bear his own stamp, in the character, and in the frame, of those that follow him; he only knows that a *good name* may be an honorable inheritance. These are the sentiments which spring from the beneficent gift of marriage. However much one may misunderstand, or abuse this gift, nature, ever faithful to her trust, forces these sentiments on the heart. The bitterest agony that a worthless father, or mother can endure, is the consciousness, that their own vice, and folly, will be visited on their offspring. In this sense, there is nothing more true than that the sins of the father shall be visited on the children. Marriage is held to be, in all Christian countries, a *contract.* The very term, contract, implies an understanding of the nature of the subject on which the contract is made, and that the parties are capable of performing it; and also, that they will respectively perform the obligations which the

contract clearly indicates. It is that contract which is so solemn and serious, that all others, when compared with it, sink into insignificance. It is for this reason, that those who are called to minister in holy things, are empowered, by the laws of the land, and the usages of Christians, to declare in the presence of witnesses, that this contract is made; and to ask the blessing of heaven on its purposes. The laws of the land, those of nature, and the divine law, disclose the sentiments, the feelings, and the awful sense of duty, with which this undertaking should be regarded. Yet, it is frequently entered into, from motives highly reprehensible; and sometimes with shocking thoughtlessness. It is from such causes, that we see, that this sacred union, which should be the true source of the highest human happiness, becomes that inexhaustible fountain, from which both parties are daily and hourly compelled to drink, and from the same cup, the bitterest waters. One hardly knows in what language to speak to the young, on this all important subject. Can one speak to them in any language which they will heed? Involved in mournful delusions, and imagining every thing to be what fancy whispers it to be, they entangle themselves in a web of their own creating; and when they find their freedom bound in cords, which nothing but the scythe of death can cut, they cry out, 'What a miserable world is this!' 'What malignant power invented this detestable state of being!'

263. If one could penetrate the ear of enamored youth, what good would come from such suggestions as these? Have you considered what that measure is which you are about to take? Do you know that there is a Lawgiver above you, who is just and inexorable? That he has trusted you with the responsibility of your own welfare? That he has submitted to your perusal the volume from which that responsibility is to be drawn? Do you know what will come of that engagement which you are about to make? Are you about to tie yourself by bands, absolutely indissoluble, while you live, to a mortal who has feelings, wishes, wants,

hopes, and fears, which must become your's, and a part of your very self; or which you must resist, control, or war with? Do you know that pain, suffering, and sorrow, originating in either, must be borne by both? Do you realize that whatsoever of error, folly, or crime, may be chargeable to either of you, or, to any who may spring from your contract, will be your common burthen, and shame; and that from these you can relieve yourself no where but in the grave? Or, do you know, that this attractive being will be your kind friend; your counsellor; the welcome soother of your cares and anxieties; the generous and charitable judge of your infirmities; the inspirer of honorable ambition; your fellow laborer in joint interests; the ornament of your life; the gracious, considerate, faithful, gentle companion who will make your own virtuous home, the place to which you refer all earthly happiness? Who that is '*in love*' has leisure, or inclination to think of such *trifles* as these?

264. There is no reason why the passion of love should be wrapped up in mystery, nor any why the mind should be stained, in considering its nature. It would prevent much, and complicated misery in the world, if all young persons understood it truly. There are in every human being, seeds, each one of which may be made to germinate, and may be so cultivated, as to produce the most odious vices, or the most serene and heavenly virtues. Or, to take another illustration, every propensity of the heart is like a drop of water, which rises on the very summit of the highest land; it may flow to the East, and find itself, (with all that joins it on the way,) in the Gulf of St Lawrence, or to the West, and find itself in the Gulf of Mexico. The propensity to love, is one of the best in our nature; but, it may run into the worst of afflictions. It seems to be a principle of nature, that the ruin of the highest and best, is the deepest and worst of ruins. The human mind in its greatest natural force, and best and purest cultivation, brings its possessor into an affinity with angels. The same mind, gradually de-

praved and debased, and driven to raving and malicious madness, is a horrible example of what is fancied to be diabolical. So is it with love. In its true use, it is, what is thought to be the happiness of heaven; in its perversions, who can find words to tell what it is? Ask the physician whose vocation it is, not to heal the wounds which nature makes, but to find remedies for the punishments which she inflicts. Look into the public hospitals, and mad-houses. Nay, look within the curtains, whose outside emblems of grandeur and dignity tell for whose use they were intended, and see, who and what inhabit there!

265. There is in every human heart a fund of kindness, tenderness, and affection, which makes itself known to be there in due time. It demands to be applied. This is the trying and perilous moment in youthful life. There is some one, somewhere, who will take that fund, and give its full equivalent. The external senses, and the heart, are in search of that one. Happy will it be for the searcher, if he will take reason as a monitor to keep the senses, and heart in order. But reason is commonly regarded, not as a kind and faithful friend whose duty it is to whisper, 'begin nothing, of which you have not well considered the end,' but as a withered scowling matron, who, being utterly dead to the impulses of youth, denies that there ought to be any. If there has been no preparation for this eventful period, if the mind has not been enriched with the teachings of rational prudence; if the eye has not been taught to distinguish between the real and the seeming; if the ear has not learned to discriminate the meaning of sounds; *if life as a whole, if the consequences of irrevocable deeds* be not thought of, there is peril; and the pure drop from the fountain may flow into any sea, but that of happiness. Surely, when one is subjected to the force of any passion, there is peril. He is like one descending an inclined plane of ice on the Alps; the further he goes, the faster he goes, and the nearer is he to the abyss below. Such an one cannot (as an amiable and eminent statesman of our country

said on another occasion) drop so much fire into a barrel of gunpowder, as will inflame an ounce or two ounces, at his pleasure, *and no more*. He should know that one spark, however small, will inflame the whole. We pray leave to remind the amiable and virtuous young, of one very curious principle of our nature, which comes into effective action at this sensitive moment. The imagination asserts its dangerous empire; it throws a misty medium before the eyes; it steals away the common prudence of the ear; it disorders the natural sensibility of the touch. It takes its seduced subject into lonely contemplations; and there it dresses out the common qualities of the beloved object, with unreal, and unnatural beauty. One begins then, to hear of angels, divinities, and loveliness that are not, and never were of this earth. Who, and what, is the object of this adoration? No one, and nothing that really exists, but a fascinating creature of the brain. That creature is what is married. The realities of married life soon show, under what a sad delusion the parties have acted. The disappointment is proportioned to the extravagance of fancy.

266. In whatever variety of modes, the purposes of life may have been mistaken, or perverted, it is probable that it has been so, in no one thing so much as in marriage. There are fewer marriages than there might be, and ought to be, to say nothing of the motives on which some are contracted. This may be referred, it is believed, to the mistaken estimate which is made of riches, and modes of living. The sacrifice which is made to fashionable opinion, is a very costly one. It would be unjustifiable to attempt to maintain, that the elegant products of art, are not to be esteemed and used, and the production of them encouraged; and equally so to decry, the luxurious products of the land, or the sea. All are proper in their respective places. All are to be consumed by those who can buy them, and who desire to reward directly, or indirectly (provided always that they duly reverence nature in the use) the labor that brings them forth. We venture to assert

this; that such things are unduly valued. They are made to be the first objects in life, when in fact they hardly deserve to be called secondary. The married must have a place to live in; it must be convenient and comfortable; they must have garments and food; and they must have the means of supplying certain necessary and pleasurable wants. There must be ease, and independence, within their walls. Independence does not mean *wealth;* but that magnanimity which produces cheerful, thankful satisfaction, for having, and having the right to have, *a home*, in which one finds full exercise for all the kind affections of the heart, with the means of gratifying them. All beyond these things are sought, and obtained, and used, for whom? To conform to opinions which have very small claim to be rational, but which have a powerful influence in general. There must be a certain state of things, because, 'every body does so.' There must be one or more apartments furnished in the proper style, to be opened and used some two or three times in a year, to please persons with whom one has slight connexion. It may be erroneous to say to *please* such persons, for it is far from being certain that this effect is produced; it is to please one's-self, in doing what fashion dictates, whether that be convenient or inconvenient, wise or foolish.

267. Will it be doubted that a young, well-educated, industrious couple, who are sincerely and affectionately attached, on a sober examination, and conviction of each other's worth, and suitability to each other, may be happy, with means far short of the fashionable standard? Presuming that such a couple are wise enough to take life for the real and substantial good that it can produce, and as a whole, it would do them great injustice to suppose that they could not find that good in a small, simple, cheerful, tranquil mansion. It would be doing the friends of such a couple the like injustice to suppose, that they could not visit them, and be satisfied to see them happy, through such means. We may add, that such a state of things conforms to the laws of nature. If such a couple desire a more enlarged state

of things, they will *earn* it by frugality, and industry. What one has earned is sweet to him ; and he who sees something before him which he may strive for, and attain to, is impelled, by the same laws, to honorable exertion. But he who has no more to aspire to, must like 'Macedonia's madman' weep that there is no more. We believe that these are very *homely* but very healthy truths ; yet, we have not the shadow of hope that they will change the thoughts of one *belle* or *beau*, in the whole United States. So far, therefore, as depends on these unpretending efforts to improve the world, it will continue to be, in the opinion of very many, 'a detestable state of being.'

268. In whatsoever circumstances, and with whatever motives marriages occur, the parties *are married ;* and the question which they have to propose, and solve is, in what way they can secure to themselves the greatest good during their union? In general, the duties of married life are very well understood, and observed in this country. We do not assume to teach on this subject. We venture no more than to mention some causes of unhappiness, taking the risk, whether they are worth notice or not. They will be arranged under such heads as may arise, without any solicitude as to particular order.

269. *Gentleness.* It is believed that the absence of this christian virtue is a common cause of unhappiness in families. The members of a family, who think civility or politeness due to every one out of it, sometimes think neither of them necessary in their own intercourse with each other. It would be much better for them to reverse this opinion. If family connexions are bound together by the strongest ties of common interest ; if they are, as they may be, dear to each other ; if politeness and civility are good things for any body, they must be good things among such persons.

270. Gentleness is manifested in many ways : by making no unnecessary and troublesome noises ; by kind looks ; by being mindful of each other's accommodation and convenience ; by avoiding the expression

of harsh contradictory opinions; by forbearing to wound self-love even in trifles; by avoiding loud and irritating tones of voice. The tongue is a great mischief-maker in families; and when it makes itself known by an harassing voice, it is a constant disturber of domestic peace. A strong-toned, harsh, disrespectful remark or reply, will produce its fellow from its auditor. Petty, hourly bickerings, are, to the wearing of the temper, what corns are, in a tight shoe, to one who *must* walk. Certainly there is nothing which sweetens domestic intercourse more than a kind, gentle, and affectionate tone of voice. Let any one test the worth of this virtue, (for it deserves to be called such) by examining who among his friends and acquaintance have it, or have it not. Let him inquire into the pleasure or displeasure which he has from their presence, and satisfy himself how much depends on mere tone of voice. This is a sort of index, which shows to an habitual observer, in what manner a stranger, who is seen for the first time, has been educated. It frequently discloses to what purpose he has been educated; and is, like the eye, a window in the heart.

271. *Trifles.* There are a great many trifles in this life, when considered as a whole. It is a common failing to magnify them into serious matters. It would be perhaps, descending, rather too much, to particularize them. They may relate to dress, food, visitings, insignificant purchases, management of children, treatment of, and remarks upon domestics; and a multitude of little matters on which difference of opinion arises. Now, it is not of the least possible consequence, in the long run, whether the matter be disposed of in one way or another, if no moral duty be broken. Tomorrow, or soon, it will be so thought of. Yet a sudden observation, in an ungentle voice, will produce an irritating reply, and this a severe rejoinder, and presently, the affair

> 'Resembles ocean, into tempest wrought,
> To waft a feather, or to drown a fly.'

This ungentleness has a mournful effect on the character of children, when exhibited in parents. It deprives brothers and sisters of a happiness, which kind nature intended for them. It is wholly useless, and worse than useless in asserting authority. It can only be classed among those sad mistakes which tend to make this a miserable world. How can any two rational beings, who must live in familiar intercourse, while they do live, so misapprehend the purposes of life, as habitually to torment each other on insignificant trifles! If any one of the household should be unhappily betrayed into an unbecoming expression, silence best becomes those who hear it. If the case is of importance enough to need authorities, some may easily be found by all who can read.*

CHAPTER XXX.

Domestic Duties, continued.

272. *Husband.* It must be assumed, that the parties to a marriage act according to their own will and pleasure, in entering into it; and that they expect to promote their own welfare by such measure. They were, or might have been informed, of each others suitability. Both knew, or might have known, that new circumstances, and unexpected events, might change or destroy qualities, and bring dormant, or newly acquired ones, into operation. Both agreed, each with

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* Ecclesiastes x. 12, 13. Proverbs iv. 24.—xii. 18.—xiv. 29.—xv. 1.—xvi. 32.—xviii. 19.—xxi. 19, 23. Romans xii. 10, 18, 21.—xvi. 13.—xv. 1.

the other, to bear, and forbear, and to make the best of the matter, however it might prove to be. Each one solemnly promised, that the contract should be kept, if it reasonably could be, although the other might fail to perform. Let us suppose, then, that there were no mistakes in the beginning, as to the qualities, and conduct of the wife; and that she is, in all respects, and under all circumstances, such an one as has been before suggested. Can it be reconciled to the law which commands one to promote his own good, to perform the duties voluntarily assumed, to exercise a power over this dependent female, which not only deprives her of the expected benefits of connubial life, but which makes her a daily, and hourly sufferer? How can any one who calls himself a man, and who claims to be considered and treated as such, by other men, habitually prove himself not to be a man, but a brute, towards a defenceless, unoffending woman? If one could look into all the families of the United States, how many *voluntary* scenes of misery would be disclosed! We assume now, that the woman is in no fault; and that she strives continually, to accommodate herself to her condition; and to bear in silence; and to do her best to console and soothe, and make of home what it should be. Might not one, in such case, say to the husband, are not you, your own cruel enemy? Do you not make to yourself the misery which you complain of, as being incident to this state of being? If you have troubles, and vindictive feelings towards any who have wronged, or oppressed you, abroad, have you any sense of right and justice, or any conformity to the law which commands you to do as you would be done by, in making your innocent wife the victim of your morose and angry feelings? Did you not solemnly promise her, that if she would devote her life to you, that you would support, cherish, and faithfully reward her affection? Do you avail yourself of the secrecy of domestic life, and of the certainty that prudence, and regard for you, and for your offspring, will keep all *causes* of complaint within your own walls, to play the tyrant towards one whose tongue

must be silent, until she charges you as a criminal in a court of justice? Has she done you any wrong? Has she upbraided you that your social hours are spent away from her; and that your earnings are not brought home to be used for the common comfort, but dissipated in follies? When you have come into her presence, from she knows not what company, with an unsteady step, a giddy and throbbing head, and a bewildered brain, has she not sought to hide your, and her own shame? Has she reproached you for these breaches of your solemn promises, in any way, but with tears?—Tears, not shed for herself, but for you, and for your children!

Are these, and similar scenes, *natural*, or *moral*, evil? Did the Deity, or his order of providence, command them, or are they wilful, wicked breaches of plain obvious duty? Surely, it is not right for such husbands to say that this is a bad world; and that man is *born* to trouble? It would rather conform to the principles of inflexible justice, that such husbands should find, in this world, the thorough contempt of all good men; and, somewhere, such punishment as such voluntary breach of one of the most important of all laws, ought to meet with.

273. *Wife.* It must depend in this case, as in that of a husband, whether a contract shall be made. As it is the proper course for the other sex to propose, and for this to accept or reject, a female should have opportunity to know the character and temper of a suitor, before she consents to make him master of her welfare for life.

If this serious negotiation were treated with the sincerity and frankness, which it so much better deserves than any other that can be named, the proper knowledge would be had. The true state of the case is this: A man proposes to a woman to surrender herself and her expectations of happiness to him, as long as she lives. The decorum enjoined upon her sex, has shut her out from the inquiries, and knowledge, on which, if she have any pretension to prudence, and good sense, her answer must depend. It may be very

unfortunate for both parties, whether her answer be yes, or no, under such circumstances. It would better conform to reason, for the female to reply, that she cannot answer; and that it will be wiser for both of them to consider the matter, and to take time to form a candid and just opinion. Any sensible man would feel a respect for such a woman; and if the final answer did not accord with his wishes, still the female has done him no wrong. As the fashion of the day is understood to be, a proposition is made, often unexpectedly and without consideration; a 'refusal' follows; and the applicant considers himself aggrieved, and is ever afterwards disposed to feel, that if it were not a lady, he would demand satisfaction. This want of frankness, and good sense, and the ridiculous sort of mystery, and sensitiveness, (which have no better origin, in many instances, than the learning derived from novels,) are among the causes which have brought the sacred institution of marriage into disrepute. If it were conducted with calm good sense; or even with as much prudence as worldly men use in buying a ship, a farm, or a bag of cotton, the number of unhappy marriages would be diminished. If rightly conducted, unobtrusive, unpretending, real merit, would find its proper place in the social ranks; and the light and airy phantoms that flit on the breath of fashion, would find their proper places. And if the latter should never happen to be wives, and mothers, the true interests of society, might not be essentially impaired.

274. Those who are wives and mothers, have taken on themselves a very serious responsibility. That kind providence, which never sleeps, and never errs, has enabled unperverted woman, to feel her connubial, and maternal duties; and if she have good sense enough to know how that feeling should be directed, and used, she will not err. Her condition is often a trying one; but happily, in general, in this country, though pains-taking and busy, it is not an unhappy one, and frequently far otherwise. When it is a trying one,

her task is to find out, how she can do herself, and those connected with her, the greatest good. It may depend on many circumstances how she is to effect that object, of which she must judge. It is easy to show how she will not effect it. No husband who errs, is ever corrected by the sharp and upbraiding tongue of a wife. *She may make him hate her, without making him any better.* She is the last person in the world, from whom he will endure, unretorted, the language of reproach. She bound herself, by her original contract, to hold and bind him, by gentleness, kindness, and forbearance. These are her armour. They are the only one which she can ever use, with any hope of victory. This may be proved by a short illustration. A couple had lived long in happy alliance. The husband, misled by evil associates, yet fully sensible of domestic duties, spent his afternoons at a gaming table. It was his custom to return to his family at a certain hour in the evening, and to find his wife at the table, awaiting his coming. Divided between the duty which he owed to her, and the habit of gaming, the time of his return, grew later and later; he always found her at the tea table, clad in smiles, and welcoming his return. The hour was more and more prolonged into night, till it became midnight; but she was still at the table, ready to receive him. No word of complaint escaped her. Subdued, at length, he burst into tears, declared his follies, and renounced them. The next day, and always after, he joined his family circle at the accustomed hour. Let us suppose, that this wife, had addressed to her husband that language which came, at last, through her kindness and good sense, from his own heart, what would have been her condition, his own, and that of their children?

There is one in the world, who feels for him who is sad, a keener pang than he feels for himself; there is one, to whom reflected joy, is better than that which comes direct; there is one who rejoices in another's honor, more than in any which is one's own;

there is one on whom another's trancendent excellence, sheds no beam but that of delight; there is one who hides another's infirmities, more faithfully than one's own; there is one who loses all sense of *self*, in the sentiment of kindness, tenderness, and devotion to another. That one is HER whom the christian religion has given to the lord of the earth, to be his *companion*.

275. *Children.* The place which children may hold in society, depends essentially, on the character and conduct of the mother. In this busy nation, a husband is commonly too much occupied in his own concerns, to devote his thoughts, and time, to any systematic course of discipline. The sum of duty, comprising manners, cleanliness, associates, time out of school, amusements, morals, religious impressions, example, precept, temper, gentleness, depends mainly, on the mother. She commonly feels the weight of her responsibility, and is willing faithfully to acquit herself of it. But, she deserves every possible encouragement from her husband. The husband, too often thwarts her purposes, by interposing his own contradictory views. If he think he can do any good, by his better knowledge, the medium of influence is *through* the mother. If he can kindly convince her of some better mode, he will best promote the common welfare by that course; and can do no greater mischief than by laying down rules that imply, the insignificance of her judgment. It should be remembered, that the prominent blessing of the Christian dispensation as to human life, is, that it has made woman the joint and equal partner in domestic interests. If parents desire to make their children feel contempt for the authority of both of them, the readiest way to do it, is to dispute in their presence. Which of them is a child to obey? The bringing up of children is a fearful responsibility. So great is it, that many parents feel, that if they were not involved in it, and could have foreknown what it is, they never would have assumed it. But this distrust and dissatisfaction

is, in part, from their own errors. Have they ever seriously thought how this duty should be performed? What books have they read? With whom have they conversed? What have they learned as to the best means of promoting the true interests of their offspring? If they have done nothing to inform themselves, how can they be instructers to others? Not only are parents bound to know what is right, but they are bound to know how to use knowledge in a right manner. One rule to day, and a discordant one to-morrow; harshness and severity at one time, and the most weak and injurious indulgence at another, are poor qualities for instructers. There must be, in these matters, as in every thing else, a best way. It may be found somewhere in, or extracted from, these principles. Children have as good a right to be happy as their seniors. Their happiness consists, in having, and doing, what will make them intellectually capable; morally correct and amiable; and physically pure, and strong. These ends will be obtained by a systematic regularity, mildly, and kindly, but certainly, enforced. Love, respect, and obedience, are its consequences. A child will soon learn, what it can have, and do, and what it cannot; and it will soon know that it cannot ask again, for what has been, on due consideration, refused. The excellence of society has its root in infancy; and that excellence is confided to the care of mothers. Its seeds are planted in the cradle.

276. *Disappointments and Sorrows of Parents.* It is not to be wondered at, that parents, who have, as they think, done all that parents should do, to make their children worthy, are afflicted, when their labor and exertion do not produce the intended effect. Their reasonable hopes are disappointed; their best feelings are tortured. An idle, ungrateful, dissolute son, is such a complicated cause of suffering, as may, if anything may, lead one to murmur at the order of Providence. It may be admitted, that such a parent is very likely to break out with complaints against the world. This suf-

fering, however keen and biting it may be, is not a natural, but a moral evil. There is a moral wrong somewhere *at the root*. Is it in the parent himself? Has he rightly understood the trust confided to him, in the true relation of a parent? Has he been austere, and uncompromising? Has he thrown his child off from him, by severity? Has he considered the nature of the human heart? Has he given *to that* of his son, the support of good principles, and sound reason, to aid him to stand up against the temptations that assail youth? Temptations which he ought to know to be inevitable. Has he watched the beginning of error, and drawn his child off from the descending plane? But, perhaps the downward course has been long begun upon, and that art and deceit have made such progress, that the child has been able to elude parental inquiry. This can hardly happen with a watchful parent, while his child is under his own roof. Perhaps the downward course has been begun upon, when a child is at a distant school, college, or in a place of business, preparing for manhood. If a parent has placed a child where he cannot superintend him, or with those who do not undertake to do this, or who will not, if they do, the parent is not excused, because others are in fault. A child who is sent away from home, is, as the world now is, always sent into some hazard. The hazard is, when least, that the preceptor, guardian, and master, may be deceived. The seductions may be such as to plunge a boy into ruin, even before those who see him daily, and who mean to do their duty, have the least intimation of it. There must be error, then, somewhere. *It is believed to be in society itself.* If those who can order what society shall be, permit the means of moral ruin to grow up, and flourish among them, they may mourn, and call it a bad world, if they please, but they ought not to charge Providence with their sufferings.

277. In all large cities, towns and even in villages, there are some persons, who live and thrive in whole, or in part, by aiding young persons to ruin themselves,

and to make life itself a burthen to parents. These persons are well skilled in the arts of seduction. They cannot go, and put their hands into a father's, or a master's pocket, and take thence what they covet. *But they know how to put other hands there.* They know what appetites to awaken, what desires to create; and how to cultivate them, and make them deep rooted, and firm, so that no wind of conscience, can blow them over. They know what the fruits will be to them. Those who have been, by such means, withdrawn from the paths of innocence and virtue, and who have succeeded in stifling the cries of conscience, strive to add to their degraded number. They place temptations before the unsuspecting, and lead them on; and thus one plausible young villian is enough to seduce, and to poison a whole generation.

278. This mournful course of seduction, profligacy, and crime, is called by some persons, the natural evils of society. Such persons are poorly instructed. They are as clearly mere moral evils, as murder is a crime. These are to be charged upon the parents themselves. Who are they who vote, and legislate in a free country? Do not they make the laws, which send the accused to prison, and felons to the gallows? Cannot these persons declare, by their laws, that their children shall not be seduced, and physically, intellectually, and morally ruined before their eyes? Are not social communities instituted to declare and to enforce, obedience to the laws of nature, and of the Deity? Have they not the *power* to do, what this high Authority commands to be done? This power does exist, and is exercised on many subjects of insignificant character, compared with these. Suppose the legislative authority should declare it to be an infamous crime, to receive a minor into certain places; and to take his money, or give him credit, for horses and carriages on the Sabbath, what social right would be thereby violated? Has any member of society a *right*, by any law divine, natural, or human, to help an ignorant, or perverse child, to ruin himself, for the reason that one can get a

living by such means? If these contemners of parental hope and right, were to rob a parent, even to his last shilling, this could be endured. They would have taken that which came from the earth; and something of like value, can, by industry, be drawn from the earth again. But who can purify a corrupted heart; restore to sanity, a perverted and bewildered mind; or, cleanse the body from the leprosy of vicious decrepitude! It cannot be doubted, that every civil community, has the power, and the right, to take all such measures as will best secure the ends, and purposes, for which it was instituted. If, then, the trustees of this power, pervert and abuse it; if they ignorantly, or wilfully neglect, and refuse to take the good which is allowed to them, they ought, at least, not to add impiety to their transgressions, and charge the Creator, with their own follies and sins.

279. *Maternal Intemperance.* It seems unkind to connect the word *intemperance* with the honest performance of a mother's duty; but it would be unkinder not to do it. The desire to do the most, and best, for children, often leads mothers into a course of slavery, anxiety, and exhaustion. It undermines their physical strength; it narrows the intellectual circle in which they move; and that circle becomes so contracted, at length, that it excludes all but children, unless the husband can find a place in it. This is, undoubtedly, a mistake. This world was made to live in. Children must learn *that truth*, at some time. The sooner they learn it the better. They have to learn also, that they must depend on themselves; and take care of themselves. If a child finds that its parents always *think* for it, and that it need not have any thoughts of its own, it will not have any. If parents would do justice to children, they must take care of their own health, and mind, and keep the run of the world; and keep in view, that they can best fit their own children for social duties, by availing themselves of all reasonable opportunities to know how those duties are generally understood, and performed; or disregarded, or unknown. Children should be push-

ed forward, and made to try their strength with their equals, and not kept in seclusion. They need, as their seniors do, objects, with which to compare themselves. The mother's duty is to see, that these objects are proper ones. She needs to see those objects herself, to enable her to make her own comparisons, and thereby to repress errors, and advance the commendable qualities.

280. *Brothers and Sisters.* These relations make a very great mistake, as to the real good of life, in not cultivating a cordial and affectionate friendship with each other. In early life, they are apt to be in each others way; and to have irreconcilable wants; thus, they very soon fall into alienations. They cannot, however, shake off the laws of nature. They must have an interest in each other, whether they will, or not; and it will essentially promote their mutual welfare, to have a kind and gracious one. The common causes of their differences are exceedingly insignificant, and often are contemptible. They will see the day when they will so think of them. The time presses hard upon them, when they will need counsel, support, and some one to care for them in a manner, which none but brothers and sisters, can do. When all has gone on well, from the cradle upwards, among such relatives, they become to each other, not only the most useful friends, but the most agreeable companions. They are the natural confidants, when it would be folly to trust any one whose sympathy, and solicitude, may change. Brothers and sisters who are thus bound together by affection, sometimes hazard the connexion, by volunteering friendly, but very unwelcome commentaries, and advice. This is a very delicate matter. Giving unasked advice, on any occasion, requires very great discretion. If one sees that his brother is blundering, there are many modes of so approaching him, as to lead him to find that he needs advice, and of putting him in search of it. If there be a right understanding, he will go where he is sure of having the best and sincerest. To assume a dictatorial authority over a brother, is to inflict a wound on self-love which can-

not be forgiven. We have already noticed the value of civility, and politeness, between such near connexions. And we add, that sincerity and truth are no where more profitable and necessary. 'Familiarity breeds contempt,' is a true old saying, and is very apt to find an application of its truth, in the intercourse of brothers and sisters. If it do so, it must be because they are very ignorant of the precious privilege which the laws of nature have given them. Though they do dwell together, in the closest intimacy, each one has his, and her, own 'individual circle,' into which no one should come uninvited. Within that, is the very marrow of self-love, which is never touched, offensively, without exciting enmity.

281. *Domestics.* From the earliest ages down to the present day, there have been different classes in society. This necessarily arises from the very order of society. The well established, and very proper right of inheritance, and the ability which some members of society have to acquire, and which others have not, the difference of education, and other obvious causes, necessarily produce these distinctions. Who among the various classes, is the most contented and happy, is quite another matter. There must be some to serve, and some to be served. They are mutually dependent. We refer, at present, to domestics, by which we mean those who constitute a part of a family for wages, or otherwise. We hear great complaints, sometimes, of these persons, and sometimes great complaints from them. This connexion is regarded as one of the miseries of life. It is not necessarily so, and is usually, the fault of those who command, rather than of those who serve.

282. Servants, masters, and mistresses, have the same sort of bones, muscles, heads, and hearts; the same self-love, and the same sensibilities. All rational and well instructed persons, consider that servants are entitled to be esteemed and respected, according to their merits. That they have, as well as every body above them has, a right to be happy. They are entitled to be spared when sick; advised and relieved when

in trouble; and to be made as comfortable as the circumstances of the parties permit. If they are persons of religious impressions, their accommodation is to be consulted. They are to be counselled as to saving the fruits of their labors. The commands given to them should be plain, clear, uniform, and not contradictory, and capricious. They are not to be commanded with virulence, and reproach, but gently, and rather by request. Children who are permitted to be insolent to the dependent, are permitted to do unchristian, and highly reprehensible acts. Servants, in common with all who wear the human form, are entitled to civility. We know not, in this changing world, whose turn it may be, in a very few generations, if not in the passing one, to be masters or servants. To fret and be ill tempered about one's servants, ill becomes the dignity of any one. If they are troublesome, unworthy or ungrateful, the remedy is to dismiss them, and find others. It may be assumed that all persons who are served, may be well served if they choose to be so; when they are not, it is their own fault. If there were no just cause of complaint against masters and mistresses, there would be much less against servants. If all persons understood and practised on these truths, the good qualities of servants would be more common, and thus, one more cause of human misery would be diminished.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Misfortunes, Sickness, and Death.

283. We have, at length, found, if they are to be found, the causes of natural evil. There can be, it is said, no ignorant or voluntary immorality, in misfortunes, sickness, or death. It is as easy,

'To vindicate the ways of God to man,'

on these subjects as on any others. What are misfortunes? They are said to be the happening of some unex-

pected event, which could not be foreseen or prevented. How many of those events which do happen, could be foreseen, and prevented? In alluding to a recent calamity to explain this, we do not mean any reproach or unkindness, but to place a plain principle in a clear light. The inhabitants of a closely settled town, are engaged in rendering their due homage to the Creator. A single spark emitted from a chimney, or the taking fire in the soot of a chimney, or the using of light combustibles for a lawful and commendable purpose, begins a conflagration, which reduces that town to ashes. The most complicated suffering and distress, accompany, and follow in the train of this evil. Fire will undoubtedly consume. This is a law of nature. That law has shown its application in this case. Is this, therefore, a natural evil? We think not. This is a moral evil. It is one, however, so entirely free from all intentional wrong, as to command the most sincere sympathy, and charity. Yet it is a moral evil. Fire was given to serve; not to tyrannize, and ruin. It can be commanded. The very giving it an opportunity to tyrannize, and destroy, is a moral evil. There might have been, by human agency, such a course of conduct as would have prevented the original cause of the evil. We are capable of this kind of care and foresight. We think it is exacted of us, for our own good, and for the good of others. But would such extreme caution make life a slavery? We think not. Life was given to us for action, and for use, and to preserve all things necessary for use. Is it best to observe this law, or to have one's town made a desolate ruin?

284. A ship is struck by lightning at sea, and set on fire. The ship's company do every thing that courage, strength, and intelligence can do, to extinguish the fire, and save the ship. They find it impossible; they then obey another law, which commands to do the greatest good to themselves which is possible. They escape from their burning ship in their boats. They are overwhelmed by the sea, or starved to death. No human exertion could prevent this mournful catastrophe. Is

not this a *natural* evil? This is the operation of a general law, which happened to occasion loss of property, and of life. Suppose the ship to have been where she should be; and that all wise precautions had been taken to prevent the injurious action of the electric fluid on her; still the destruction is not a natural evil, unless one be prepared to say, that the Deity erred, in providing in his creation, for the action of this fluid. Surely this fluid never acts but for purposes consistent with infinite wisdom, and divine benevolence. It may be a far more efficient agent in the material world, than human research has yet been able to disclose. The ship owner, and the navigators, may have been unfortunate, that the ship, and its company, were at that spot, at that time. But no one will contend that the electric fluid must not act, because it sometimes destroys property, and life.

285. A child falls, and its limbs are thereby broken; its spine is deranged, and it becomes a hump-backed cripple for life. This is very far from being a natural evil. Some one was greatly to blame in permitting a child to be in such a situation, that such an accident could happen to it. But because this, and similar sorrowful misfortunes may happen, are we to suspend the laws of gravitation? Let one imagine, if he can, what would be the effect of such suspension. Our duty is to know what these general laws are, and to provide, as in most cases we may, against their injurious effect. It is not an uncommon occurrence in this country, that the passengers in a stage coach, are terrified, maimed, or killed. It has become almost fashionable to scatter the limbs, take off the skins, and take away the lives of passengers in steam boats. Such things are not only not natural evils; they are moral evils that are clearly *crimes*. Suppose the immediate agents in such scenes, were indicted, when death happens, for *manslaughter*, ought they not to be convicted? Suppose proprietors were sued for damages, in cases where death does not follow, ought they not to be held to pay them? The ground on which such evils are crimes, is this:—rea-

sonable precaution, and care, would certainly prevent these evils. The neglect of such precaution and care, whereby persons, who are lawfully engaged, are deprived of life, or otherwise seriously injured, ought to be regarded as *malicious intent*.*

286. Sickness and disease are commonly regarded as natural evils. Some persons die from original feebleness of constitution. This may, perhaps, arise from some moral wrong, if it were traced back to its origin. It probably did so arise. The power of connecting cause and effect, does not permit such matters, in the present state of information, to be clearly understood. It is well known that many inherited evils flow from immorality. It is much more rational to suppose, that this is frequently so, from some error, or short sightedness, which further progress in science may prevent, than that the Deity errs in the formation of man, since no such mistakes are discerned elsewhere in his works.

287. If all cases of sickness could be examined and compared, it would surprise one to find, how large a proportion of them arise from ignorance, indiscretion, folly, and crime. It might be useful to show what these are; but this would require, not one, but many volumes. We select one or two prominent instances, because they relate especially to the young. An accomplished well educated female, knows how to clothe herself to meet the severity of our winter climate. She conforms to her knowledge, and keeps herself well. She is bidden to a fashionable party. She throws off her warm garments, dresses herself in thin apparel, so far as this extends, leaving parts of her person, not only without dress, but *indecently* naked. She proceeds to a crowded apartment, and soon breathes an atmosphere fit only

* It was the pleasure of the great Frederick of Prussia, to make his soldiers wear immense cocked hats on parade; these were often blown off by the wind. He ordered that hats should not be blown off; but the *wind* did not regard this order. He then ordered, that every soldier who lost his hat, should immediately receive forty lashes in front of his regiment. After that order, the wind lost its power, and no hat was blown off.

for vermin. She engages in the dance, and under the joint effects of artificial, and animal heat, and her own action, the veins, arteries, and minutest vessels of her frame, are expanded, to the utmost. In this state, and without any protection but a shawl, she goes forth into the cold midnight air. Her lungs must breathe this air; and her whole system undergoes a violent contraction. She returns shivering to her apartment. The next day she has 'a cold;' the next week a cough; the lungs cannot endure the shock they have received; they yield to natural law, and become the seat of disease. This is the common case of consumption, and in a 'little month' this blooming, happy child of fashion, is gone from the earth. Is this a natural or a moral evil? The world says it is a natural evil; and bereaved parents call on their friends for tears of sympathy.

288. A young lady thinks that she must make herself look as pretty, and attractive, as she can; and so it is her duty to do, provided she knows what is the true meaning of pretty, and attractive. Her hair must be formed, and adorned, and so it should be; for it is woman's natural and most beautiful ornament; the more tastefully, and elegantly, it is disposed of, the better; but craping, tangling, and hot irons, are out of place in this matter. It is a reasonable pride to have a well proportioned foot. Such a foot is not made by crowding a quantity of foot into a shoe which can but just contain it without bursting. This is so unnatural a disposal of the foot, that the mistaken beauty must make her compensation to the law she has broken. It is a costly one. She finds, that from her womanhood to her old age, she must walk on feet disproportionably large in consequence of bony protuberances, and some others more sensitive than bone. She learns, at last, that to have a smooth, handsome, useful foot, it must never be put into a shoe which will not easily and pleasantly contain it; and this is a sort of foot which she has put it out of her power to have. Another article in the list of attractions, and prettinesses, is a very *slender waist*. It is very difficult to discern the principle to which this sen-

timent, as to beauty, is to be referred. Beauty among the negroes of Tombuctoo, in Africa, is measured by the degree of fatness. A woman who is too fat to walk, is supremely beautiful. Certain of the barbarous nations have fashions which outrage nature; among them are, compressing the head in infancy, until it takes a pyramidical form; also, such compression as will prevent an upward growth, and occasion a deformed extension at the sides. So, the well known fact of the compression of the foot among the Chinese ladies, that motion on the feet becomes impracticable. We '*enlightened*' Americans regard such perversions with pity. Yet no one of them is so unnatural, and ruinous, as the *slender waist*.

289. First, *this is not beauty*. If the ancient Greeks in their best days of splendor, refinement, and glory, were admirable for anything, it was for the knowledge of natural and elegant proportions. In this respect they have been regarded, for more than twenty centuries, as unimitated and inimitable. They understood, eminently, the natural symmetry of the human form. They gave, what they deemed, to be the most perfect, to their marble representations of their Deities. They did not give to Venus, to Diana, and her handmaids, waists resembling an inverted sugar loaf; but gathered the flowing robes around the firm bony structure of the breast, with a cestus or girdle. This is real, natural beauty, and will so continue to be forever, although every young female in the United States should continue to demonstrate, that they believe the figure of a *wasp* to be the truly beautiful.

290. *Second*. The slender waist is not beautiful, but the destroyer of beauty. The compression which makes slenderness, is applied in the yielding part of the system, where the ribs begin to shorten, and is continued down to the hips. This happens to be, precisely, that part of the system, on which compression is, by the law of nature, absolutely forbidden. Within this little circle, made as small as it can be by force, the great action of the system, on which life de-

pends, must be carried on, or stop entirely. The heart, the lungs, the great veins, and arteries, the stomach, the liver and the spine, are all forced into a space which is hardly large enough for any one of them to act in, naturally, alone. The functions of each one is impaired; the action is perverted, or prevented. The blood cannot flow; it stagnates, and being deprived of motion it becomes impure. Nature shows her displeasure in '*beauty spots*' on the skin, in a red raw looking complexion, occasioned by the loitering of the blood in the small vessels; or if not so, then by a sense of heaviness and giddiness in the brain, blood-shot eyes, swollen feet and ankles; swelling of the throat; and pains in the region of the girdle. We hear, sometimes, of a young lady dropping dead in a dancing room. It is wonderful, that such accidents do not happen in every dressed dancing party. That it does not, can only be accounted for on the supposition, that the united strength of the lady, and her assistant, cannot girt her quite tight enough to produce this mournful catastrophe.

292. *Third.* This *slender* standard of beauty in point of reason, and good sense, is as much below that of Tombuctoo, as the former is physically smaller than the latter. The Tombuctoo beauty has, at least, something pleasurable in the process of her training, while the American beauty has only present inquietude consequent pain, disease, and unfitness to perform the duties for which she was made; and meets, at last, an untimely, voluntary, suicidal death. It is a most astonishing delusion, this! It is one of the most direct, complicated, inexcusable violations of all law, that can be conceived of. If one remonstrates with a young lady on this subject, she firmly denies that she is laced tight; that she cannot be *comfortable* if she were not tight enough to feel that she is laced; that none of her sufferings are occasioned by her girdle. Nothing can convince her of her error. When, at last, she ceases to be a light, airy, happy, pleasure-giving, pleasure-taking product of the bounty of nature;

and is exiled to her chamber, and forced to busy herself with medicinal prescriptions, and is cut off from all visits but those which are made to feel her pulse, and look at her tongue, still she persists that her sufferings have nothing to do with *tight lacing*. Perhaps, we have found at last, *one natural* evil. If it be true, that the rational beings who are to be, (if they do not disqualify themselves to be) the wives, and mothers of American citizens, cannot be made to see and feel, that they are doing all they can to make themselves unfit to be wives and mothers, then, certainly this is a *natural* evil; nor only so, it is a most serious *national* evil.

293. There is a kind of bodily pain and suffering, which is universally considered to be natural evil. This arises from rheumatism, gout, fevers, wens, cancers, and the formation of substances in the cavities of the body, &c. In such, and similar cases, when they are irremediable, there must be a life of wretchedness while it lasts, and a distressing close of it. It is said that such evils cannot be foreseen nor prevented, but are inevitable, and prove the misery to which human nature is sometimes subjected. It is assuming a great deal to say, that the causes of such evils will never be so far understood, as that they can be prevented. If we contrast the science of physics, at this day, with what it was in former times such assertions are not rational. What has become of leprosy, of many horrible cutaneous diseases, of the small pox? What have the discoveries, and inventions in chemistry, and of the action of matter upon matter, already made known? How much have art and science accomplished? Is all done, that ever can be done? Comparative tabular records demonstrate, that human life is more enduring, at this day, than it has been, in any modern age of the world. As science, morality, and virtue diffuse their beneficial influence, this will, undoubtedly, become more and more so, unless nature be capable of fraud and deceit. It is at least probable, that most of the class of diseases alluded to, if not all of them, arise from some moral

wrong; that is, from some ignorance, or disregard of rules prescribed to our order of being. Where there is not some physical, and incurable defect, as old as the subject in which it appears, disease must be generated by some neglect, misuse, or abuse, known, or unknown to the sufferer. A cancer may arise from diseased circulation of the blood. That may be caused by making bad blood from unsuitable food; or from local injury, perhaps, by which proper circulation is impeded. It is incredible, if this be so, that there can be no prevention. A cancer resembles vegetable production. Will not science, at some time, detect the seed, and be able to extract it? That agonizing disease 'the stone,' is, undoubtedly, a concretion of substances, which being brought to act on each other, obey the laws of nature, and form a body in a place in which human nerves are necessarily acted upon. Will not science find out how these substances acquire their qualities, and how to keep them apart, or neutralize them? But a much more interesting question is, whether it will not, at some time be demonstrated, that such evils spring from some violation of the laws of nature.

294. There are very numerous class of persons, who suffer severely from what are considered to be natural evils. The employments of these persons require them to *sit* while they work. They are of both sexes. It includes students as well as those who labor with the hands. They *bend* over their work, and continue, a long time together, in an unnatural position. The action of the vital organs is impeded. Their powers are gradually impaired. By some sort of consequent illness, the lives of such persons are shortened. Long before their departure, life becomes almost worthless to themselves, and themselves a burthen to others. Until it be proved that it is impracticable, by very simple contrivances, to bring one's work *up* to the eyes, instead of taking the eyes *down* to one's work; and until it can be shown, that occasional counteracting motion, in an upright and natural position, cannot be had, such kinds of evils, are not to be charged upon nature.

295. There is one evil which falls as heavy, and is as distressing, as any that can be named, and which is regarded as one in which religious resignation, and the balm of time, afford the only consolation and relief. It is the loss of innocent and virtuous children. When no parental ignorance or error, occasions this affliction, and when art and science are baffled, it is not proved, nor to be assumed, that the system of being is wrong. It is true that the affections, implanted in the human heart, for the wisest and kindest of purposes, receive an insupportable shock. The great object of parental life seems to be defeated. The staff and comfort of old age, are broken, and destroyed. Yet, what has happened? Death is to come to everything that lives. It may come sooner or later. If every one knew the moment in which he is to die, he would live under the sentence of death, however long he might live. In itself, death, is no evil. Yet, there could be no living if there were no dying. These truths furnish no consolation to a bereaved parent. There must be a certain number of deaths; and when, and how they shall occur, (when ignorance and folly do not increase the number,) is in wiser government, than human sensibility can suggest.

296. The deportment of the living, when distressing bereavements happen, and the manner in which the dead shall be disposed of, is to be governed by reason. A departure from what reason suggests, is a cause of common suffering. The remains of the dead belong to the earth. A very touching, long continued sympathy from the world, in general, is not to be expected on such occasions; if it exists at all it is slight, and transient. Nor is this to be complained of; if all must mourn when one mourns, it would be truly a mournful world. By a natural, but irrational association, feeling and sensibility are still imagined to reside in the dead. There is no longer anything in them, and they should be respectfully, but tranquilly, consigned to the bosom from which they came. But, vanity, and a mistaken estimate of duty and propriety, make, of what

should be a simple and natural accordance with the order of nature, and the will of its author, either an absurd ostentation, or a grievous and unnecessary affliction to the living, or both together. It is not a religious duty to assemble a mourning family, and its immediate connexions, and in the solemnity of prayer, to harrow up their souls, as is sometimes done. If life be a blessing, if the gift of children is of the Deity, it would better become us, when a glad mother has first beheld the new subject of her cares, and affections, then to address the Benefactor whom we reverence, in the language of gratitude and praise. Why should sobbing, and heart broken relatives follow the deceased to the grave? Is not this adding something, unnecessarily, to the griefs of life? There are always near and dear friends who can perform these duties. But, we apprehend that widows, and female children derive no consolation from this ceremony, which is to be measured against the agony which it occasions. Is it not irrational to regard death as is commnoly done? are not the fine feelings of our nature called into service to make of death, that which it is not? The innocent, the virtuous, and the pious, have no fear to die. Why, then, should it be dressed up in terrors, shrouded in mysteries, and made to be frightful, any more than other events, in the common order of the natural world? It is to the wicked and impious only, that death should be terrible.*

297. We know not who the author of the following remarks, on mourning apparel, is. But as his thoughts are such as are entitled to the most entire approbation; as they are expressed so much better than we can pre-

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* In one of the accounts of *George Washington's* last moments, the scene is represented thus: Every thing that professional skill could do having failed to relieve Washington, his attendants remained silent spectators at his bedside. Perceiving that they were painfully affected at his situation, and could not suppress their tears, he said, with a complacent smile, '*I am dying, gentlemen; but, thank God! I am not afraid to die.*'

tend to express any thoughts, we take the liberty to quote them at length.

'Mourning Apparel. A sensible writer in the Connecticut Observer states the following objections to the foolish fashion, which has so long prevailed in relation to mourning apparel:

'1. As a general practice it is no real expression of grief for the loss of our friends, nor is it so considered. It is adopted by all classes; by the covetous heir, whose heart beats with joy at any event which puts him in possession of his idol, as well as by those who are affected with the purest emotions of genuine sorrow. An English writer has remarked that "the very time that a man shall mourn, and the very time that he shall half mourn, and the very time he shall cease to mourn, are fixed for him by the world, whatever may be the duration of his own sorrow!"

'2. It is no mark of respect for departed relatives. The dark habiliments are assumed, whether the deceased was virtuous or vicious, honest or fraudulent, sober or intemperate; whether he was a man or a fool, a Christian or an infidel, a blessing or a curse to society.

'3. It imports no consolation to the bosom of sorrow. It alleviates not the wo which flows from a bereaved heart. It offers no balm to its wounds. It equally fails to assuage excessive grief, and to excite that which is proper.

'4. As a memento of departed worth it is superfluous. The heart of true friendship needs it not; the object of its affection is engraven there too deeply to be effaced. The mock mourner is unaffected by its sable hue.

'5. It conveys no moral or religious instruction to the mind. It excites no mourning for sin; no submission to God; no parting with the world; no desires for heaven. Neither the solemn realities of the scene of death, nor the affecting and admonitory truths of the word of God, can be enforced by it.

'Our objections to the custom are founded principally on its positive evils:

'1. It is extravagant, and absorbs a large amount of

funds which might be appropriated to far more useful purposes.

'2. It presents strong temptation to pride and dishonesty, and has often robbed the widow and fatherless of their bread, and the creditor of his due.

'3 It is a violation of the command, "Be ye not conformed to this world."

'4. It diverts the attention from the voice of the Almighty in his instructive Providence. It occupies the mind, as well as the hands in that solemn period, which is so peculiarly favorable for the soul to retire within itself and contemplate its character and destiny.'

If such changes should be made as the good sense of these remarks calls for, those who make the law of *fashion*, and who can decide as to what shall be *imitated*, must begin.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Recreations and Amusements.

298. We have had occasion to show repeatedly, in preceding pages, that this state of being is one of alternate action, and repose. There must be serious action, and there must be amusements. It was intended that mortals should be pleased, and happy, if they deserve to be so. Those who maintain that life is to be an interrupted scene of labor, and gravity, are we hope, and believe, entirely mistaken. We discern nothing in the natural world, nor in man's peculiar constitution, nor relations, which gives the least countenance to such an opinion. Amusement, like everything else, in which free agency is concerned, may be innocent, and grateful; or improper, pernicious, and introductory of the worst of evils. Young persons must have the former, or they will seek out the latter.

It is the duty, and the interest of parents, to lead children to take pleasure in such things as can be approved of; and to divert children from such as must be injurious to them, and afflictive to those who are deeply interested in them. We apprehend that there may be persons, and classes of persons, who will disagree with us, on this subject, as they may have done on some, which have been already touched upon. We should deeply regret to displease any one; but, on a matter so important as the making good citizens, and good moral agents out of children, one should not hesitate to speak frankly, and sincerely. If wrong, persons better able to judge, will take care that no evil visit them, in consequence of such error.

299. Amusements are physical, or mental. It may be more proper to say that there may be, first: amusements which are intellectual; and second: such as consist of some bodily motion, in which the mind is, more or less, interested. If there be such distinctions, athletic sports may be of the second sort. The simple use of the eye, of the ear, and of the imagination, may be of the first sort. It is believed, that all amusements must have some contemplated end, or result, whether that be defined and certain, or contingent. We believe so, because everything in this world seems to be moving on, to some purpose. One who is acting without knowing for what, is neither laboring, nor amusing himself, but is trying to get rid of himself, and of time. The most captivating sports are those which are contingent: that is, sports or occupations, wherein the result may be highly favorable, or otherwise. No one engages in them without expecting to come out on the successful side. Hence hunting, fishing, winning or losing sports, horse racing, and gaming, are of this order. The hope of success is a very high excitement. But, the mortification and distress of failure, ever far exceed the pleasures of success. It must be obvious, that we are merely attempting to find a principle, and by no means approving of some things which have been named; that principle we take to be, *action to some end, or purpose.*

300. Every one admits that the mind, and moral faculties, are to be developed, and strengthened, and made to do the best, by exercise. This is equally true of physical power. Every action, which it can be proper to do at all, ought to be done in the best way; otherwise we do not answer the end of our being. In the vegetable, and animal departments, all proper care, and cultivation, tend to use, and beauty. Is there any reason why the physical powers of man, should not have care, and cultivation, to the same ends? Those who prefer a stooping, lounging, awkward, graceless, figure and motion, may be on one side of the question; those who think that it was intended that man should be an upright, easy, frank, comely, and convenient being to himself, and pleasant to all within whose observation he may come, will be on the other. As we most decidedly agree with the latter class, we shall try to show in what ways we think their object may be effected.

301. There are many persons who think it is unlawful to bear arms. It is very much to be desired that all the world were of their opinion. But since that opinion is not likely soon to become the general one, we may borrow, from the profession of arms, an illustration much to the purpose. The object of disciplining men with arms, is to make them, individually, and collectively, as powerful, and effective, as possible. There has been but one opinion among military men, from earliest ages to the present; that soldiers must be straight, easy and graceful. The first thing to be done with a recruit, is to break him of his ungainly habits of body, and limbs; and to bring him into an upright position. The next is to give him the free use of all his muscles. The last, is to make his movements easy, and graceful, so that one part of himself, shall not be a burthen to another. A man can protect himself, and be most effective against others, in proportion to his excellence in these qualities. Warriors must be supposed to have discovered, and to have practised the best modes of making out of man, the best ma-

chine for disabling and putting his fellow men to death. In the use of arms, not only the musket, but the sword, the lance, and pike, are to be handled. The person must be capable of carrying a heavy burthen, and moving over a long space, in a short time. The drilling which a soldier gets, qualifies him to effect all these objects, in the best manner. It may be concluded, therefore, that military discipline, (if it were not for the purposes for which it is given) is consistent with the principles of nature, in giving the bones a proper position, and in giving the muscles their proper use, and power. If strength, facility and beauty of motion, are good qualities for soldiers, in the use of human muscles for their purposes; they are good qualities of every person *who moves*, for any and every purpose, for which motion is lawful.

302. Although the frame of man is so made as to permit him to assume an endless variety of positions, and to apply his strength in all of them, he does, or should, return always, to an upright position. No essential deviation from this position, can possibly be a natural one, but for a temporary purpose. This is proved by the framing of the human bones. This framing shows, that when one walks, it was intended that he should be perpendicular; if he walk in an inclined position, he has not only to move himself, but to resist the power of gravitation, at the same time. The muscles, in such case, have a strained and unnatural duty to perform. It seems to have been intended, by the same sort of proof, that human beings should walk with the lower limbs, that is, from the hips downward, and not with an unmeaning and ungraceful action of the whole person, as is often seen to be done.

303. As to the best modes of acquiring strength, ease, and grace, there may be very different opinions. There are many persons who think the discipline of *dancing*, a proper mode; and others who think this highly improper. We would not run against any opinions whether they be well, or ill founded. But as to dancing, just like every thing else, it may be misused

and perverted; or be made to be an innocent, healthy, and commendable accomplishment. There is no mode so much within the reach of the community, in general, as this. Properly taught it brings out the power of the muscles, and gives them their natural action; all natural motion is graceful. The motion of birds is exceedingly beautiful; that of animals is generally so; that of young children is always so, until they acquire something unnatural; the flowing of waters, and the action of the winds, (in most cases,) are graceful; the latter is proved by the waving of the trees, of the grainfields, the floating of the flag, &c. The most graceful object in nature is tranquil smoke. Why should not man conform to this general law of nature? Dancing well, is one mode of conforming. Possibly, it is considered frivolous and corrupting. Nothing is frivolous in this system of being, which is innocent, pleasing, and adapted to promote healthy action. Persons who are capable of being corrupted by dancing, will certainly find some much more effective mode to become so, if this be denied to them. Dancing among the very young, is usually conducted under the eye of discreet seniors; and well educated adults need no supervision in dancing, but that of good sense, and their own self-respect. But suppose dancing could in any case be perverted, so may every thing else be. If we are to do nothing till it is impossible to err in doing it, what will there be for any one to do?

304. As to dancing, we shall speak from long continued observation, and sum up the judgment formed of it, thus: 1. Dancing satisfies the demand of nature for action. 2. It is action for both mind and body. 3. It is action, which begins, goes on, and ends, with the attainment of an object. 4. It brings the human figure into its proper position, and developes the power and uses of the muscles. 5. It is a social, and not a solitary pleasure. 6. It is an innocent and refining pleasure, because it brings both sexes to be acquainted with each other, and improves the manners of both. 7. It is accompanied by music, which is one of the most elevating and grateful pleasures known to man.

8. Dancing is a dictate of nature. It has been made solemn among savage warriors; a mode of exalted worship among the pious; one manner of showing social gratification, among dignitaries. It has found its proper place at last, in being a social, rational, elegant amusement; which delights those who engage in it, and those who are spectators.

305. *Music.* It is one of the most convincing proofs of the benevolence of the Deity, that he has so formed the human ear, as to make it capable of finding a rational, and elevated pleasure, from the action of sound. There might have been organs of speech, and ears to hear, without imparting to the ear, the power of knowing and delighting in music. It must have been intended that this gracious gift should be used, and (most probably) as one mode of praise, and thanksgiving, as well as for innocent pleasure. Christians, in general, understand this gift to be properly applied in worship; and it may be, and often is found to be, one of the most impressive and affecting parts of it. It may be that this page will fall under the eye of some one, who knows, what may be felt from hearing sacred music in St Peter's Cathedral in Rome; or St Paul's church in London; or from hearing the grand organ at Haerlem in Holland. Music may be perverted, and may be the vehicle of defiling thoughts; it may be seductive, and help onward to folly, and crime. If, however, we were to strike out of use, all from which partial evil may arise, or which may be perverted, we must blow up the world. Music is action; it is action to some end; the end is innocent, and delightful. The enjoyment has the double advantage of being solitary and social. Music may be made to produce a sense of high moral feeling; and it may be made to produce a feeling of very opposite character. The same rules must be applied to this subject, as to all others; that every thing was created, and for some good and wise purpose; and that every thing must act, and will act, to some useful end, if human ignorance, or error, do not interfere. *Nothing goes wrong, if man goes right.* We, therefore, contend that

the power to make music is to be cultivated, and its benefits to be thankfully enjoyed. That music was intended for man, may be seen in this: Let one consider what a variety of sounds, are continually made on, or near the earth's surface, and within human hearing; what a large proportion of them are pleasant sounds, either in fact, or from association with useful ends. Then consider the sounds made by the wind in passing through trees, and the flowing of water; next, those made by insects, quadrupeds, and the feathered tribes. Whenever one meets a painful natural sound, it is from an association of it, with pain, or terror. Many of these natural sounds are directly, or from association, exceedingly interesting and pleasing; the music of birds is so, in a high degree, from both these causes. Was not this music introduced as a part of the system, quite as much because man belongs to it, as that birds do? It cannot be known, what pleasure the mocking bird, for example, takes in his own astonishingly varied notes. But a human being who attends to this, and many other songsters, if he have any ear to hear, any sensibility to be touched, and any thoughtfulness as to the *why*, and *wherefore*, of all things, feels, that these musicians were made for him, as well as for themselves. He feels too that they do not pin him to the earth, but send his thoughts upwards. For such, and many other reasons, which naturally suggest themselves, it must be, that pleasurable sound is a beneficent gift, and was meant, as all others were, to be used, cultivated, and applied to promote human happiness.

306. It is consistent, that man, as he is so superior to all other animals, should be alike superior in the making and enjoying of musical sounds. He undoubtedly is so. His voice (it would be more proper to say woman's voice) includes all the sweet sounds which can be made, by all other animals. He has by cultivating this power, by applying the atmosphere through the human lungs, and by delicacy of touch, and by bringing substances in contact with each other, and, by sending the wind through that wonderful work of his

own hands, the organ, found the means of rendering just tribute to the Most High, and of softening and purifying his own heart. No doubt music was given to mortals for their *amusement;* and that it is their duty to take it so, and be thankful for it. Whether thankful, or not, they have so taken it. Music is as old as man is. It is seen wherever man is seen. The wilderness of the savage, echoes with it, and so does the splendid palace of the king. It goes with the solitary laborer; it is the friend and comforter of the oppressed, and sorrowful, when they can find none other. It is the poor man's friend, the rich man's luxury; it is the lens of the imagination, through which are seen one's native home, one's early days. The philosophical value of music is, its conformity to the system of which it is found to be a part; that is, making music is doing something, which has a beginning, progression, and end, to a pleasing and useful purpose. Why is history interesting? Because it carries the reader along, and awakens curiosity, and proposes to him a solution, when he comes to the end. When the products of imagination, (which to be of any value must conform to the same rule) are aided by harmony, they are captivating. There were, before the art of printing (as we suppose) made them less valuable, persons, whose business for life it was, to *sing history;* such were the minstrels, and trobadours, of former days.

307. We have ventured to say so much on the subject of music, because it may be an employment which will do two things, first, furnish children something to do; and secondly, to make the something done, morally useful and pleasing to themselves, and to parents, friends, and associates. And, finally, because proper poetry, sweetly sung, never yet made any mortal less worthy; but has touched, stayed, and, perhaps, reformed, many a backsliding heart. The American people have few amusements. Some, which they have, they would be better without. They take amusement by violence, and often go far for it, and buy it dear. Amusement should be one of

the inmates of every family. A kind friend who is ever ready to take care that one does not abuse the trust of existence by idleness, nor obey the impulse to be busy, in doing that which should not be done. As such a friend, we venture to give music a cordial recommendation.

308. *Games at cards*, are a very common amusement. They may be innocent, but there is nothing to recommend them. They give no action to the body; they are a very humble occupation for an intelligent mind. Whether the chances in distributing fifty-two pieces of spotted pasteboard, fifty successive times, in three or four hours, shall possess some of the engaged with fortunate pieces, and others with unfortunate ones, can hardly be said to be doing anything, to any useful end. When the sport is over, the thing proved, or arrived at, is that in this use of four hours of a short life, A counted so much, and B so much. This, however, is not the end usually proposed in playing cards. The cards are only the machinery, which, with more or less skill, submits to the laws of chance, the result of emptying one man's pocket, and filling another's.

Gaming divested of its delusions, and fascinations, is a contract of this nature. A says to B, 'I have a $1,000 which I came honestly by. I owe nothing. I have no wife, no children, for whose benefit I ought to expend this money. I am under no moral obligation which requires the expenditure of the whole, or any part of it; nor under any such to myself, which requires of me to keep this money, and supply the reasonable, and necessary wants, now unforeseen, but which may arise. I propose to you to place another $1000 with my $1000, and draw lots, which shall have both.' B replies, I am willing to take this risk. But drawing lots is soon done. When it is over, the winner will feel an emotion of mingled pain, and pleasure; the loser will feel an emotion of clear sorrow, chagrin and disappointment. We can prolong the interest, and increase the pleasure, by going, not

for the whole; but by units and tens. Let us put winning or losing, not on lots, but on the chance distribution of cards which, when turned up, and compared, shall decide who loses, and who wins. This will engage us for some hours, and all night, and all the next day, if so much time be necessary, to accomplish our object.' Now it is very plain, that the purpose here is to get money, on a contingency, but with the risk of losing, by the same. This is *gaming*, in whatsoever form the means of carrying it on may appear. It is a complicated violation of all law. 1. It is action; but it is wrong, and perverted action. 2. It is disposing of time, but it is among the very worst modes of disposing of it. 3. It is an impulse of the commendable desire of obtaining property; but this is a mode condemned by every sense of duty. 4. It is so condemned because, all notions of order demand, that acquirements shall be attempted, and pursued, by means which make one satisfied with himself, and which occasion no suffering, or sorrow, to others. 5. It is untrue, that any human being ever has $1000 or any sum, which he has a right to dispose of in gaming. 6. A passion for gaming extinguishes, or converts into a withering curse, every fine feeling of the human heart. Time, health, property; the profane use of the tongue; character, self-respect and peace of mind, are the sacrifices made at the gaming table. Unnoticed by the miserable victim, the shackles of habit are put on, which no earthly power can unrivet. When the gambler's last shilling is gone, he starts, as from a dream, into a full sense of the complicated misery, and ruin, in which he has involved himself. He must then devote himself to infamy; and submit himself to the power of a gravitation, which will bring him, inevitably, to the bottom of its abyss. The evils of gaming may be judged of by the number of suicidal deaths which it occasions, especially, in the great cities of Europe.

309. All gaming for property leads, in proportion to its character, to such results. The means of gam-

ing, and especially with cards, (as they are the easy and most common implements in use) are regarded with the abhorrence which is associated with them, by all persons who feel an interest in the young. The young, and the middle-aged, have no need of cards for amusement. They may have many amusing occupations which are innocent and improving. There may be persons in an advanced time of life, who are beyond the seduction of gaming, to whom the interest of a game of cards, may be an innocent and welcome amusement. Undoubtedly, friends who are met for social purposes, and who have nothing better to do with their time, hands, and minds, may play cards, in a manner to give no offence to themselves, or others. But it is pleasing to know, that the state of improvement is such, that in most social meetings, there are higher entertainments than that which cards afford, and which are justly in higher esteem. We allude, among other things, to *conversation*, of which something is to be said in a future page.

310. *Chequers, or Drafts* are an innocent, but unprofitable amusement. They take time which might be much better spent. *Chess* is a game generally known throughout the world. It is probably the most engrossing of any, in which property is not depending on the result. It is a game for the mind only, and keeps the body long inactive. It has all the philosophical recommendations of interest. It is a trial of masterly skill against an adversary, in which a series of causes and effects are involved, leading to the result of victory. It is said to strengthen the mind. It certainly does so, as to chess playing ; but it remains to be proved that it does so, as to any other intellectual effort. There are many cases in life, where the playing of this game, is a grateful relief. It is a pleasant resort in advanced life ; but as a love of it is easily acquired, and as it is a time-stealer, the young can do better, at something else.

311. *Chess* is said to be the favorite game of the Turks, and Chinese. This seems to be as it should

be. These nations are destitute of intellectual pleasures, and it is fortunate for them that there is such a game, to supply the demand for action. If one could clearly see how this demand affects different nations, and the same, in different stages, it would furnish a key to the necessary condition of nations. For example; if the climate, the religion, the neighborhood, and the degree of cultivation of any people be known, it might, perhaps, be deduced, (like a sum in the rule of proportions) how a nation, so circumstanced, must act. Act in some way, it certainly will. In this way, possibly, some ingenious person, might account for the habits of Pagan oriental nations; and show that the narrative tact, and their amusing products of fancy, arise, naturally, out of their condition. And so, also, of the superstitious, and terrific cast of fancy's works, among other people. If there be anything in such suggestions, it affords this inference, that the sum of moral duty includes the direction and government of the desire for amusement, no less than for the serious occupations of life.

312. There might be games, one would think, adapted to amuse children, and to be at the same time, innocent, and useful ones. Whatever they are, they must be consistent with the principle which requires a beginning, an interesting succession of circumstances, and a result, worth attaining. This is proved by what every one may have observed in the estimate which children make of toys, and playthings. The charm soon vanishes, because, as soon as curiosity is satisfied, and it is known what the pleasure which the thing can impart, is, there is an end of it. Nothing is more natural than that a child should break its rattle. The noise it makes has become familiar, but what it is that rattles, must be known. Children must be busy. To require of them to be still, is to require what nature has forbidden. To place a child on a hard bench, and tell him to sit still there, two or three hours, without any employment for his hands, or mind, is as great a violation of natural law, as to require of him to stand on his head, for the same

length of time. There is an obvious want in the means of amusing children; and we apprehend that it arises from disregarding the principles on which the construction of physical, and intellectual being rests. If there were an extensive workshop, provided with every variety of tools, with a proper superintendent, to which boys might resort on some proper arrangement; and where they could make articles for themselves, there can be little doubt that it would be diligently frequented. The reason is, that their little efforts, would be to some end; and by natural means.* On the other hand, the gymnastic machinery is fallen into disrepute. These exercises are uninteresting repetitions to no end, except with those who realize that bodily motion must be had, to secure health. In such case, they endure the labor for the end in view. But the amusements of the young must be of a nature, to secure action to an innocent and useful end; and health will take care of itself. Perhaps there may be some persons who can follow out this matter, and invent rational amusements. They would deserve to be regarded as benefactors, and would, probably, find a substantial reward. We cannot but remark, that there is one game, which is not known among us, and which is one of the most interesting, and healthful that can be played; that of *tennis*. There are many things to recommend it, and among others, it is one sufficiently interesting to be played for itself, without adding to it, the zest, of winning or losing anything but the game. We incline to think that it is the game, of all others, which deserves the patronage of colleges, and seminaries; and is best adapted to develope the physical force.

313. *Conversation.* The principal amusement of the American people (except eating and drinking,) is the interchange of thoughts by speech, or conversation,

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* Since this page was written, the writer has been informed that there is such an establishment at the Theological Institution, at Andover, (Mass.) and that it has afforded all the interest and utility which is naturally to be expected.

which word is made out of the Latin words *con* and *versor*, and means literally, *to be turned to* or *with* The principle of this amusement is found in the law of association of thought. To show this, let it be supposed that half a dozen persons assemble for a social purpose. As we cannot follow out a supposed conversation, as this would require time, labor, and space, it will be sufficient to show the main topics which might arise. One of the persons, asks 'What is the news?' 'The Russians are said to have retreated over the Vistula.' Then might follow, the state of the Russian empire, the character of the Poles;—their means; their perseverance; Kosciasko; Washington; the American revolution; its effect on Europeans; its consequences to Americans; past experience; present state of things; probable events, &c. &c. From such a simple illustration, it is apparent, that one thought brings up another. Sometimes a conversation seems to take a very erratic course, and the end seems to have no connexion with the beginning—but if it were carefully traced back, the chain would be discovered. It is with conversation, much as it is with the action of the mind when one is alone, and is meditating on things done, or to be done; and on persons, characters, and events. Now, the use to be made of these suggestions is this; that conversation is a matter which is subjected to control, and to rules. Intelligent persons can always make a conversation. The only difficult step is the first; that ought not to be so considered. Persons who are skilled in the art of talking, can always give it a direction. The purposes of conversation are, to put one's-self in the way of learning something; to impart something that others want to hear; to form opinions on interesting subjects; to settle the merits or demerits of public action; to recount amusing, or extraordinary facts, &c. &c. Every human being knows something, which he is willing to tell, and which any other, that he is in company with, wishes to know; or which, if known to him, would be amusing or useful. To be a skilful conversationist, one's eyes and ears should be busy; nothing should escape his

observation. His memory should be a good one, and he should have a good-natured willingness to please, and to be pleased. It follows, that all matter of offence in conversation should be avoided. The self-love of others is to be respected. Therefore, no one is tolerated who makes himself the subject of his own commendation, nor who disregards the feelings of those whom he addresses. There is as much demand for politeness, and civility, in conversation, as in any other department of social intercourse. One who rudely interrupts another, does much the same thing as though he should, when walking with another, impertinently thrust himself before his companion, and stop his progress. But then, *one's companion should not take up the whole path.* These, it is acknowledged, are only intimations. The importance of conversation better deserves a volume, (if one were capable of making it,) than a short section. But if there be any weight in what has been intimated, those who take an interest in the matter, will be able to improve upon it. It may be added, that, in general, it is supposed that persons do not want to talk, unless on particular calls to do so. On the contrary, it is believed, that all persons like conversation, when properly invited to engage in it. Under favorable circumstances, and among persons who know how to train a conversation, there are few, if any amusements, more grateful, to the human mind.

314. *Reading*, is another of the standard amusements of persons of all ages. How truly astonishing would it be to an Egyptian, Grecian, or Roman, if he could be told, that a speech delivered in a legislative assembly in one evening, is read by thousands, before ten o'clock next morning, who are scattered throughout a circle of an hundred miles in diameter. The influence of the press on the character of a country is not to be measured, or calculated. It is strikingly true of this admirable invention, as it is of so many other things in natural and moral agency, that, *well used*, it is an inestimable blessing; ill used, the corrupting demon of social

life. The press resembles natural and moral agents, in another respect; it is, what they who use it, choose to make of it. In a wise, discreet, and virtuous community, the press must conform to this character. In a turbulent, ignorant, and low community, the press will conform itself to the demand. It is commonly said, that the press makes the character of the people who read. *Is it not equally true, that the people make the character of the press?* They probably have a reciprocal influence. As the people become wise and intelligent, the press must become so. It may be that the press itself has aided them, in forming a chastened demand.

315. Happily, attention to the proper wants of the young, has required of the press, its action for their benefit; not as to books of study only, but books of amusement. It is delightful to hear children, in their conversations, quote their authorities, from books so attractively prepared for them, as to have rivetted attention, and to have loaded memory. They are books sent forth by beneficent, and intelligent minds. Their narrations are exceedingly interesting, while they lead to sincere and respectful assent to the virtues, and moral beauties, which they teach. They are *lessons* for parents, while they are amusement, of the best order, for children. But children cannot devote all their playful hours to reading. It is not desirable that they should. They are liable to sit in postures, while intent upon their books, which are unfriendly to form, and to health. However commendable this sort of occupation may be, still we venture to maintain that, *there is a space to be filled in finding amusements for children*, which comprise such physical action, and such mental interest, as will expand and strengthen the frame, while they keep the heart pure, and amiable. There is rarely a known want in this land, which no one is ingenious enough to supply. This want may be carried further. It is very possible, that the gathering of great numbers, on public days, might be made interesting by manly, and amusing sports. They might, it is believed, be

such, as would interest, and command the approbation of those who could not engage them, and even of the most venerable.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Social Duties and Relative Rights.

316. We have gone upon the theory, that there are laws prescribed to the human family, as there certainly are, to other parts of created being. In attempting to show man's relation to the material world, and his duty to himself, in rendering obedience to the will of the Creator, as it is disclosed in nature, and confirmed by revelation, we have necessarily anticipated *social duty* to some extent. All those qualities which enable an individual *to comprehend life as a whole, and to obtain for himself the greatest good throughout its duration*, enable him, also, to perform social duty. It remains, therefore, only to show how intelligence, and moral excellence, may be applied in the connexion which binds man to man, in virtue of laws instituted for his good, and from which he cannot depart with impunity.

317. It is apparent to every observer that the members of society, are variously employed, and that they have, respectively, more or less of *property*. It is maintained, by some persons, that the inequality among men, is an injustice, and that society is, therefore, wrong in its most important concerns. If this sort of complaint were heard in a country, where certain individuals are immensely rich, raised above their fellow men, in general, by titles and constituted law-makers, and judges, and even ecclesiastical dignitaries, *by the single accident of birth*, it would seem to have much of reason to support it. It is believed, that there is not any reason in it, among a people, where all such distinctions are

unknown; and where every one may, if he can, and will, raise himself to any reasonable distinction, which he may deserve. We see not how this complaint is properly raised in a community, which has the unquestionable privilege of choosing, as it may see fit, its public agents, of every description, and even its religious teachers, from among its own members. If there be errors, as undoubtedly there may be, in the public policy, the members of this community, have an easy and peaceable remedy, in their own hands. If they are sufficiently intelligent, and well informed to know that a case has arisen in which the remedy is called for, it is their own fault if it be not applied.

318. The complaint is more commonly limited to the *inequality of condition as to property*. Let us try to see calmly, and reasonably, on what this complaint rests. *Riches* consist of that part of the surface of the earth, which can be used for human habitations and their appendages; of that part which can be used to produce vegetation; of that part over which, and near which, there are flowing waters capable of imparting motion; they consist of all personal estate, and of the agreed representative of all property, which is, at the same time, property in itself. Possessions, of these various kinds, are acquired by inheritance, or by industry. Right by inheritance, is not wrong. Would any rational mind maintain, that when the father of a family, or any one who has no family, has acquired property, and dies, that it shall belong, of right, to any, and to all, who can get possession, by fraud, force, or whatsoever other means they may? Society could not be held together, if such were the rule of right. It is, at once, apparent, that if such were the rule, there would be nothing to contend for; because all inducement to acquire for the benefit of one's family, and connexions, would be annihilated. Society would be forthwith reduced to barbarism. The right to acquire, and the right of inheritance, are wisely ordained to be a necessary consequence of society, and one of its strongest motives *to act to useful ends*.

319. If it be irreconcilable to justice, to convenience,

and to the common good, to take by fraud, or violence, that which the *dead* must have left behind them; much more so is it, to take from the *living*, by like means, that which they can honestly acquire, by the exercise of their own industry. If a member of a community were always liable to be despoiled of the fruits of his labor, the great principle of the system of being to which man belongs, would have been misplaced; there would have been no sufficient motive to *action*. If one would know what society would be, if such were the law, and the practice, as to property inherited, or acquired, he must visit the northern coast of Africa; the imperial city of Constantinople; in short, almost any country on which the light of Christianity does not shine.

320. It is contended by some persons, that there should be a periodical division of land, and property, and that every member of the community shall have an equal share. How often should this division be made? Shall it be made once a year, once in ten years, once in fifty years? Why should it be made at one time, rather than at another? Suppose it could be made, and were made, it must be but a very short time, before it ought to be made again, if the reason for making it be, that some have more and some less; and that some are rich, and some poor. One must be wilfully blind not to see, that either the whole action of society must stop, or that inequality of condition would arise, in a single year, perhaps, in a single month; and even such inequality as would call for a new division. In a country where the statute law makes an equal distribution, among heirs; and where the spirit of enterprize and speculation has an unrestrained agency, the causes of regret are, that sad reverses occur, and that property changes hands too often, rather than that it is unreasonably held in the hands of a few and of their successors. A small number of generations is sure to bring equality, considering our community as a continuing one. Thus, property comes and goes, in this country, as fast as any one can reasonably desire to have it. The changes

which are seen, as to the ownership of it, are regulated by authority far wiser than any of man's institution. Is it not enough that a *gracious Benefactor*, has made us free to act according to his laws; has given us the power to comprehend, and obey these laws; has taught us, that labor, and action, to useful ends, shall be a pleasure in themselves, and worthily rewarded; and that if one would be comfortable in his circumstances, (and even rich, if he desire to be so,) he must study out, and apply, honorable, and virtuous means of becoming so? It is exceedingly difficult, (we believe, impossible) to discern, how the social condition of the people of this country, or of any country, could be placed on a foundation, better adapted to promote human happiness than it is. If it were rightly understood, and availed of, it would be among the most fervent motives to gratitude. For, we cannot but insist, that honest labor, whether with the head, or the hands, or both, is alike honorable in all classes; and constitutes the most enduring pleasure, which is known in this life.

321. Every person belongs to a *neighborhood*, which is both local, and social. Even those who have removed into new countries, and who dwell in solitary abodes, do not lose the sentiment of neighborhood. The nearest person to them is a *neighbor*, though separated by long distance. And when this sentiment cannot be preserved in fact, it may be in thought, and by that means it usually is so. Perhaps the last impressions that leave the heart of one who has wandered into far distant regions, are those made in his early days, in his native home. In general, as every one lives in a neighborhood, more or less dense, he can promote his own happiness, and that of those around him, by observing a becoming moral conduct. He has a right to enjoy life, and to use all things which he has, to that end; but he has not a right to any employment which necessarily disturbs that of others. Peace, tranquillity, and security within one's own walls, is the main purpose of life. No one has a right to interfere in these things, but by

order of the public law. A neighbor, therefore, who so conducts himself, and those means of pleasure which he commands, as to vex, harass, and disturb those who are necessarily within sight, hearing, &c., commits an offence, against morality. It often happens to be the *pleasure* of one who dwells in a dense neighborhood, to keep one or more animals whose habitual noises disturb those who necessarily dwell within hearing, in the hours allotted to repose; and frequently when persons are visited by sickness, and when any noise is distressing. Now, whatever the rigid law of the land may say in such cases, the law of morality says, that the suffering party has an unquestionable right to remove his trouble, if the proprietor of the cause of such nuisance will not, on request, remove it himself. A more peaceable way would be, to have it removed by order of the public magistrate. Many of such petty nuisances, ought to be removeable on summary verbal application, and not in the slow, written, and printed process, in which the movements of ordinary law are commonly made.*

322. The moral duties of neighborhood extend to all things which minister to the common comfort, convenience, and security. Each one of a neighborhood is bound to make his own dwelling place, as agreeable, and pleasant to those around him as he reasonably can. Each one is morally held to uphold, and sustain, a good name for his own little community. He is, therefore, to join, with a liberal and manly feeling, in all the improvements which tend to please, and adorn. Such things, even if they occasion some expenditure, are sources of self satisfaction; and one comes, at last, to take an honorable pride in hearing his street, his village, his town, or city, commended by observers.

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* When it is considered, what a horrible death that by *hydrophobia* is, and how suddenly and unexpectedly the cause of it may be communicated, it is surprising that any respectable, well disposed, moral person, will, for any good a dog can do, and much more so through whim, or mere pleasure, keep such an animal about him; and, especially, in populous places. The public law ought to hold a dog-owner to be guilty of *manslaughter*, if his dog occasion the death of any person.

323. There is another sort of neighborhood which is founded in social intercourse, and in the interchange of visiting, and hospitality. As the world now is, this is commonly regulated by artificial, and somewhat, unnatural rules. It is often ostentatious, luxurious, and destitute of all feelings, and thoughts, in which well trained moral minds can take pleasure. A profuse and voluptuous entertainment, comprising food little adapted to promote health, and vigor, and in quantity sufficient for ten times the number, that rather look at, than consume it, is an unsatisfying way of being happy, in social intercourse. There are modes of maintaining such intercourse, which are innocent, pleasing, and dutiful. Mankind are fitted for such. The interchange of friendly visits, for conversation, music, and rational amusement, with such thingsas may be used without suffering or impairing health, is that kind of neighborhood, (in such relations,) which is permitted, and enjoined. We have, however, little reason to think that intimations of this sort are likely to meet with such consideration, as would induce the further extension of them.

324. Every person, in general, is a member of some kind of society or association. Some persons belong to many. These are intended for some useful purpose. Every one who is such member has some duties to perform. He owes some proper part of his time, some proper contributions to the common object, and has an interest in the prosperity of the design. All these institutions do some good, and some of them eminent good, in helping on the great purpose of social life, which is general improvement. Of this nature, are public charities, lyceums, libraries, agricultural societies, those for suppressing intemperance and immorality, and sunday schools. No well disposed citizen can conscientiously abstain from giving his aid, and support, to such objects. It is each one's duty to try to leave the world a little better than he found it. No one can say these are matters which do not concern him. Suppose every one should say so, and had said so, from the beginning, society would still be

made up of barbarians. Every good that is done in any community, affects directly, or indirectly, every member of it. The law of example, of imitation, of doing as others do, has a most pervading, and astonishing influence. Every community is like a full vessel of water; no one drop in it can be moved without affecting every other drop.

325. There are duties of another nature, which are deemed to be of sufficient dignity to be noticed by the laws of the land. These laws are, on such subjects either prohibitory, mandatory, remedial, or punitory. These laws are not within the present purpose, further than to remark, that every good citizen owes to himself, and to his fellow citizens, to know, *at least*, so much of these laws as will enable him to do what is commanded, and to abstain from what is forbidden. These laws, and an authority infinitely transcending any by which these laws are formed, exact of every moral man, to know, and to perform his *political* duties. *The people of the United States are invested with the high, and solemn trust of governing themselves.* They are enabled by a gracious and benevolent Providence, to do this in a manner, more consistent with the laws of nature, and the will of God, than any people ever were before, since the beams of the sun fell upon the earth. Is it, or not, the proper way for every one, who is worthy of this trust, calmly, deliberately, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, to do those acts which will best preserve for his own use, the beautiful fabric of his political institutions? If he perceives, and rejoices, in the good which he derives from it, will he not best perform his duties to those who come after him, *to use it, and not abuse it*, that they may have the like good? Little suggestions of selfishness, rivalry, and petty local interests; and, *most of all*, perverted and mischievous ambition, are the blocks over which citizens stumble and fall, in the otherwise luminous and clear path, in which they are permitted to move. Every one who has been for a long series of years, politically busy, will acknowledge, that though he thinks he was right

in the main, (in which opinion he may be right or wrong) yet, that he has spent many busy hours, and anxious thoughts, on subjects, which, *looked back upon*, are seen to have been profitless, and insignificant.

326. The theory of government in this fortunate country is, that the people govern themselves. They do this by agents constitutionally chosen, and appointed. As the people are the sovereign, it is said *they can do no wrong*. The people are many individuals. One person may do wrong, so also may many. Many are more likely to do wrong than one ; for they are subject to strong, and sudden impulses. They act without the responsibility which attaches to one. If many take an erroneous impulse, they encourage each other in the common error. One man alone, thinks of consequences ; the many do not. Their object is to carry their point ; and consequences may take care of themselves. History abounds in examples. But, as the people of any country cannot intend to do any wrong *to themselves* ; and as our whole country, and all its institutions, belong to the people, and as they must all suffer from their own erroneous acts if any body suffers, how can they do wrong ? It is believed, that the whole people of this country, or those of any one of its many sovereignties, or of the subdivisions of these, never intend to do any wrong. They may, nevertheless, err. This arises from the want of true and just information in the matter on which they act ; and that arises from the personal interest, which certain persons among them have, to mislead them. It is incredible that any number of citizens should not desire to do right, in any affairs which materially concern them ; equally incredible, that they should not do so, in fact, if their own honesty, and good sense, had their true and just influence among them. But there are, and there ever have been, in all communities, certain individuals who suppose, that their own good lies, in having certain acts done, which are not consistent with the good of those, who are alone capable of doing them. Certainly there may be among these individuals, many who from various causes are

deceived themselves, and who think that the objects which they pursue, are proper to be pursued; or they may think the objects proper, and that *any means* to obtain them, are proper; or, they may well know, that both the objects, and the means, are improper. This country is peculiarly adapted, from the nature of its institutions, to bring such individuals into action. It is believed, that all these errors, and wrongs, may be referred to the two common causes, ignorance of what is right, and wilful departure from right, when known. For the former there is no excuse, because one *can* know what is right, so far as to excuse him from an intentional moral wrong; for the latter, there is no excuse, because there is an intentional perversion of proper principles of action.

327. It is not blameable to desire to have power in popular governments, that it may be usefully applied; it may be one's duty, under proper circumstances, to entertain this desire. For power must be exercised by some members of the community, for the common good. The error seems to lie in ignorance of what is really good, and in dishonest means; and in pursuing unworthy purposes, by base means. Such persons, by modes well understood by them, direct, wherever they can, the thoughts, and the actions of their respective circles, and unite with their fellow laborers of other districts, to produce the desired result. They control the press, they descant on the public good, they inspire distrust, jealousy, and ill will, towards opponents. Those who mean right, and take proper measures to effect their object, must also use the press, and discuss the motives, and the measures, of their adversaries. The result is a very natural one, which is, that the majority is sometimes misled, or deceived. There is, undoubtedly, a gross immorality somewhere, in these transactions. It is unjust to say that the evil done, is a mere consequence of social connexion, and inseparable from it. On the contrary, it is as clear and certain a violation of moral law, as it would be for one citizen to deprive another of reputation, or property, by fraud. There is retribu-

tive justice even in this kind of wrong. It may be slow in coming, but it is pretty sure to come. The community find out at, last, who are wise and honest, and who have only *pretended* to be so. They learn that the latter have practised upon the maxim, '*All is right in politics;*' a maxim fit only for the moral perceptions of Constantinople and Pekin. The public, at length, reject, with the decision which becomes them, the maxim, and those who maintain it.

328. If two persons engage in any unlawful transaction, each of them puts it in the power of the other, to disclose their common secret; and either of them may, in some cases, make a merit of doing so. The danger that this will be done, increases in proportion to the numbers who are involved. This well known principle may be applied as truly in political life, as in ordinary criminalities. Suppose any unprincipled party should, at any time, happen to get the power of government into their hands; and suppose they should misuse this power; and should attempt to fortify themselves in the possession of it, by dishonorable and fraudulent means: In such case, there must be a great number of persons in the secret; there must be some presses under their control; there must be many things, said and done, which it would be ruinous to their purposes to have disclosed. But, as the motive to the union, was, in this, as in all other wrong doing, self-interest in each; the same motive may, and commonly does, introduce disunion. If their purposes are detected, or suspected, they endeavour to cast the blame on each other. Some of their number will court the approbation of an opposing party, by making known the occurrences, opinions, and facts, which will disgrace and overthrow their late associates. The war which arises among such bands of friends, has elements of hate, and vengeance, which never mingle in natural, and honorable hostility. It is of little importance what becomes of such politicians, provided they cease to be public agents. It is of immeasurable importance to a self-governing community, not to elevate such politi-

cians to power. Even a short reign of such men, tends to shake the public confidence in the duration of republican forms; and even to cause doubts whether civil liberty was intended for man.

329. It is not surprising that the intelligent and upright men of a republic, who have such adversaries to contend with, are sometimes drawn into error. They have a difficult, and a responsible duty. They often see their useful and honorable purposes defeated by an influence, which it is as impossible to countervail, as to change the organs of human perception. They have other difficulties. When they are not disgusted by experience, and attracted to the quiet of private life, they must yield to the universal law of the system of being of which they are a part. They must move onward. There is no contentment in *having* acquired. They are sometimes blinded as to the character of the means, by which their own purposes are to be obtained. They come, at length, to place an inordinate value on what they have, and may have. They become anxious and agitated; they have distressing apprehensions. They see through distorting lenses. In the course of the onward action, they are, sometimes, cast out of the great stream, fall into eddies, and rest on the shore, and are compelled to see the stream run by, *which does not bear them.* They discern, at last, the worth, and the vanity, of political ambition. These things are evils. All together, they make up a very bad world; a world in which talent and integrity find no reward. But after all, they are mere moral evils. All of them are of man's own making. They are not to be charged to the system which he belongs to, but to his own misunderstanding, and perversion of it. It would be happy for our country, happier for its statesmen, if they could say with an eminent judge, who enlightened and adorned the country of our ancestors: "I wish *popularity;* but it is that popularity which *follows*, not that which is *run* after; it is *that* popularity which, sooner or later, never fails to do justice to the pursuit of *noble ends*, by *noble means.* I will not

do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, to gain the huzzas of thousands, nor the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press: I will not *avoid* doing what I think is *right*, though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels; all that malice and falsehood can invent, or the credulity of a deluded population can swallow. I can say with a great magistrate, upon an occasion, and under circumstances, not unlike, *Ego hoc animo semperfui, ut invidiam virtute partam, gloriam, non invidiam, putarem.*' (*The unpopularity which may flow from an honest discharge of duty, I have always considered an honor; not a disgrace.*)

330. There are other evils which deform and disgrace society, and which do their full part, in making this a world of evil. There is squalid, miserable poverty; there is disgusting lamentable vice; there is horrible crime, and public execution. All these things, it is said, are inevitable; they spring from the very nature of man, and from the laws which compel him to dwell in social connexion. It is questionable whether there must be poverty; surely there need not be vice and crime. The whole number of Quakers in the United States is many thousands. When did any one see a quaker begging in the streets; or an intoxicated quaker; or any one of this class of citizens, at the criminal bar? Are not this class engaged in the common affairs of the world; are not they merchants, mechanics, artificers, mariners, and otherwise employed in the ordinary business of life? They, like the rest of us, are subject to the temptations, and perversions, incident to our state of being. Here, then, is a clear demonstration, that even without the aid of civil power, but by the mere force of moral influence, there is a class of men, in the midst of society, who do escape disgraceful poverty, and who are free from vice, and crime.

331. Let us suppose that a ragged, squalid, bloated, decrepid beggar, stops a *lawmaker* in our social community, and solicits something to supply his pressing

wants. The sentiment that instantly springs up in the mind of the lawgiver, is of this nature: 'You odious, and shocking resemblance of a human being! How dare you to ask of me to minister to your depraved cravings?' This miserable object might reply to him: 'I am all that I seem to you to be. I was called into being by HIM who called you into it. I was formed as you were formed; and charged with the same trust, and duties. I became at the moment of my birth, a member of a community, sustained and directed by intelligence, by philanthropy; and enlightened by the Christian revelation. I was born among men, who are justly proud of their blessings, and who know what man is, and by what rules, and laws, error may be prevented, and happiness promoted. You are one of these. Have you no duties to perform, in the relation which you hold in the social union, to save such a wretch as you see me to be, from that complicated degradation in which I certainly am? If you had obeyed the laws which your superior knowledge enables you to comprehend, and enforce, would not you have been spared the painful duty of uttering, and I the humiliating one of hearing, your stinging reproaches?'

332. We are fearful that the opinions which we entertain of the dutiful advancement of society, are not in accordance with opinions, generally, prevalent. We know that we must be subjected to the charge of suggesting meliorations which are impracticable, and which if practicable, can only be effected by the violation of *natural rights*. It is maintained by some, that men have a right to be vicious; that they may dispose of time, property, and character, as they see fit, so that the public law be not violated; that if public opinion, and the fear of future condemnation, present no restraint, there can be none; that there is a limit to public law, which cannot be passed; that the cases alluded to lie beyond it. This, we respectfully deny. The public laws should be, and may be, such, as to *prevent evil to the erroneous themselves;* certainly such *as will prevent misery to innocent persons*, who are connected by

the very order of society, with the erroneous; persons who must suffer keenly, hopelessly, if the public law offer them no remedy, no relief. We believe that the great duties of legislation demand *prevention* much more than *punishment;* that hospitals may be used to save the *commencing* sinner, rather than to receive far gone, and perhaps, incurable ones. However shadowy such suggestions may seem to be, it is nevertheless believed, that in the progress of improvement the day will come, when thoughts of this cast, will occupy powerful and philanthropic minds, worthy to legislate for an enlightened people.

333. In the introductory chapter an allusion was made to *public executions* for crime. It is not deemed proper to enter into a discussion of this mode of punishment, as to its policy. We may be permitted to say, that as now conducted, it is truly shocking, among a christian, and moral people. The serious subject of public punishment, has attracted a benevolent, humane, and enlightened consideration. The American republics may honestly claim to be far in advance of the old world, in this respect. Jails are, *in some instances*, in this country, what jails should be, while there must be such places. Penitentiaries are, *in some cases*, what their name indicates. It is possible, nay probable, that a convict may be qualified, by his confinement, penitence and discipline, to return to society, prepared to be, what society demands that its members should be. All this is well, honorable, praise-worthy. But how much more so would it be, if the like cost, labor, thought, and benevolence, were devoted to *prevent* crimes, instead of punishing them, or to reform hardened transgressors.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Duties which the People of one Country owe to those of another.

334. It is seen that all the people of the earth belong to some one of the many nations; That each nation has a distinct language, with the few exceptions of those who have become nations after having been colonies, as is the case with our own country. It is also seen, that nations are separated from each other, not only by language, manners, customs, religion, and forms of civil government, but, also by geographical boundaries. The origin of language, and the transmission of it, the changes which it undergoes, the loss of some which have existed, and the languages formed out of several, are subjects of great curiosity and interest, but foreign to the present purpose. As no nation can be supposed to have chosen its own language, and as there are so many varieties; as the whole family of mankind could not form one people, since they would necessarily break into fragments, it cannot be doubted that the division into nations, conforms to the will of the Deity. There are obvious advantages in this division. There is probably, some natural, and necessary geographical limit to political power. Beyond this natural limit, power must be delegated; and those who are submitted to it, must suffer. The security, and prosperity of a nation may have been intended to result, from having a certain number of persons united in one territory, and bound by common interest; and also, that one nation should act on another, through the influence of emulation, as well regulated individuals act on each other. That by such means the common interests of nations, generally should be promoted. Whatever may be thought of such suggestions, (which are admitted to be merely speculative) it is very certain, that the people of the earth have always been divided into nations, and most distinctly marked from each other.

335. National intercourse is two-fold. 1. That

which is conducted by those public officers who represent the nation; (or who call themselves the nation.) 2. That which is carried on by the individuals of different nations, in commerce, hospitality, or in the interchange of thoughts. The common relations which any two nations sustain towards each other, is that of peace, or war. Under the former, there may be an unlimited, or a modified intercourse, according to the policy of each nation; under the latter, the relation is well known, as to character, and consequences. What changes are to occur in the belligerent acts of nations, is a matter of curious, and interesting speculation, but foreign to the present purpose. As nothing stands still in this system of being, there will be changes in the matter of war. They may be very slow, as much so as some kinds of formation, and decomposition, in the natural world; they are, nevertheless, it may be presumed, to come.

There are certain moral duties, it is believed, which the individuals of every enlightened, and christian nation owe, to those of every other, when the public relations permit the lawful performance of them. The commendable policy of one nation, may instruct another. If the arts, the sciences, and the social improvements of one, advance its welfare, others may take advantage of their enterprize, and success. If there be obvious errors, and consequent disadvantages, or sufferings, in one, another may so shape its policy, as to avoid the like evils. The benefits which arise from comparing books, with the actual state of things, by means of personal observation, cannot be too highly valued. Certainly, not by those who think, that the present is a progressive state of improvement, in which the whole family of mankind are alike interested. It seems consistent with such a view of things, that all strangers who visit any country, with commendable motives, and who are of worthy deportment, should be kindly received; that they should be made to feel that they are welcome; that they are secure, in property, and person. It is the common interest, to treat all such visitors, with courtesy, and ci-

vility. Sometimes the manifestation of such feelings is misplaced; but in general, in the course of natural justice, there is an ample return for it. It may never happen to one's-self, to be in the way of receiving a return; but it will come to some of one's countrymen, or be kindly remembered of the country, which is an abundant return. The day, happily, is gone, and it is to be hoped forever, when all who are not citizens, are to be regarded as barbarians, or enemies.

336. This division into nations, is thought to be favorable to the diffusion of Christian knowledge. If it be practicable to translate the Scriptures into the language of an heathen country, and through them to approach, teach, and convince, the persons who are in authority, and who exercise an influence over the mass of persons, it may be presumed, that the work of diffusing Christianity may be essentially promoted. But it has been found, that these are not the only modes; as is proved in some of the Pacific Isles. Instruction in reading, and writing, appear to have been among the earliest steps. The result of labor in this respect, has insured to many teachers, the highest consideration; and has proved that the barbarous ignorance of the pagan world will, at some time, be made to disappear. A kind and friendly international communion, is, on this account, as well as on all others, a high moral duty. If it be seen that Christians who visit heathen countries conduct themselves while there, according to the precepts of the religion which they profess, it must be a strong recommendation of that religion itself. It cannot be doubted, that such deportment must be *understood* every where, because it is natural to every heart that is not perverted. Although political duty certainly forbids the interference of individuals, in national affairs, which are necessarily confided to public agents; yet, duties, no less imperative, exact, that at all times, and under all circumstances, when countries are at peace, the command 'to do as you would have others do to you,' extends to the whole family of mankind, whenever, and wheresoever it can be applied.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Duties to the Creator.

337. If the preceding pages accomplish the purpose for which they were intended, the object of this concluding chapter will have been, in some measure, anticipated. There is yet, something remaining to be done, to carry out the plan proposed. In attempting to do this, we disclaim all sectarian purposes. On the contrary, we maintain, that conceptions of the character, and attributes of the Deity, the manner in which the Scriptures are to be read, and understood, and the forms of homage, which are to be observed towards the Most High, are matters which concern every one for himself. Each one is to be finally responsible for the manner in which he has performed his trust and duties. It would ill become us to dictate, or prescribe, to any one, what he may or may not believe, on disputed doctrines; in what terms he shall offer his supplications, express his penitence, or present his gratitude.

338. If we rightly comprehend what is meant by Religion, it arises from man's perception of his relation to the system of being of which he is a necessary part; and from each one's conception of the relation in which he stands to that power from whom this system proceeded. The presence and influence of Religion, is to be felt and manifested, throughout the duration of human life, in all that is thought, and done. Certainly, religion cannot be something which one is to feel, and show, at stated days and hours, and at no other times; though there may be times, and seasons, properly set apart, for that homage which is to be rendered, *as well for the gift of religion itself*, as for all other bounties which call for the gratitude of man. As to those duties which each individual may consider himself bound to perform, disconnected from all other individuals, in the form of worship, we leave each one to judge for himself. If he err, he is accountable, and not another.

339. From the earliest ages, Christians have been accustomed to assemble for the purpose of social worship. They have offered, *unitedly*, their prayers, their penitent supplications, their praise, and their adoration. They have been accustomed, with devout humility, to acknowledge the superintendence and government of the Deity, in all the serious events, and changing scenes of life; and to beseech his blessing in all acts worthy of the acknowledged relation of created, and dependent beings. Although these various duties arise, directly between every mortal, and the Author of his being, yet there have always been individuals, who were intended to be, in some degree, separated from the ordinary scenes of life, and whose days have been devoted to the study, the practice, and the teaching, of religious duty. It has been the usual course, especially in this country, to invite the presence of these teachers, in all solemn transactions, and when under visitations of Divine Providence; and, through them, to express the sentiments, and feelings, called for by the occasion. These teachers have properly acquired the name of *pastors*, and those who have gathered around them that of *their flock*.

340. As it has been usual for Christians to assemble periodically, and to unite in public worship, according to the various forms and rites, of which they have respectively approved; so they have devoted one day in a certain number of days, for this public service. This day they distinguish as their sabbath. The word *sabbath*, is said to be taken from the Hebrew, and to signify *to cease*, or *to rest*. The word *sunday* is in common use. It is said, that certain heathen nations in the north of Europe, dedicated their day of religious worship to the *Sun*. Whence, their Christian descendants called the Christian sabbath, Sunday.

341. We pass over the inquiry as to the time when, and the manner in which, the *Jewish sabbath* was instituted. This is, perhaps, still an open question among biblical critics, and one not involved in the present object. It may also be a question, whether the Saviour did, by precept, or example, set apart any day of the

week for social worship. It is said that no command, or recommendation of this nature, appears in the New Testament. Yet, it is believed, that there was some command to this effect, because in the life-time of the Apostles, it was usual for Christians to assemble on the first day of the week. This day was selected, it has been supposed, because it was the day of the resurrection, whence it has been called '*The Lord's day.*' However these things may be, it has been the practice of Christians, from the earliest time, to regard the first day of the week, as their Sabbath; and to keep it with more or less strictness. Among many classes of Christians it is kept with nearly the same strictness, which was habitual among the Jews. That people seem to have carried the observance of the day to the full extent of divine command. In the long continued siege of Jerusalem, which ended in its destruction, and in that of the Jews as a people, they are said to have so far overcome their scruples, as to defend their persons when attacked on the Sabbath; but not so far as to feel justified in resisting the enemy on that day, when they were filling up the trench before the wall, to facilitate the conquest of the city.

342. It is well known that great diversity of opinion exists among Christians, as to the manner in which the sabbath should be kept. In catholic countries the sabbath is observed, in a manner which *Protestants* have neither copied, or approved. Among the latter, there are various opinions as to the proper mode of keeping this day; and these opinions have been repeatedly expressed, and publicly discussed. This matter must be left, at least on the present occasion, to the proper influence of public opinion. There are some points in which it is to be hoped all Christians accord, and which are proper to be remarked upon. There are some others, on which it may not be deemed obtrusive to express an opinion, although all may not entertain the like view.

343. It is clearly settled from earliest usages in *this country*, and alike by all denominations, that the first

day of the week is their sabbath; and settled in like manner, that there shall be two meetings, the one before, and the other after the middle of the day. Besides these two meetings, some denominations do, and others do not, have a third meeting, at some hour of the evening. There are meetings, among some denominations, on other days of the week. The object in all these meetings is social worship, according to the religious sentiments which the assembled entertain. Thus one thing is clearly settled, that all Christians hold to social public worship, especially, on the first day of the week. It is reasonable to suppose, that a practice of such antiquity, and so universally observed, must be founded in some principle natural, or agreeable, to the human mind. There have been, also, modes of keeping the sabbath prescribed by political authority; and also many requisitions, as to forms and modes of worship, arising from ecclesiastical discipline; and these have been, in many ways, sanctioned and enforced by the same authority. The history of Christian nations, down to a late period, is made up mostly of wars, civil commotions, and controversies arising out of religion. During the last fifty years, in the United States, there has been a gradual separation of the ecclesiastical, from the political authority. The like change seems to be progressing in Europe, and it is not improbable that the present tendency is to dispose of religion, and of worship, as has been done among the people of the United States: That is, to leave these things to the care of conscientious duty. Supposing that there should be no requisition, on the part of public authority, to do anything concerning religious associations and establishments: that this authority only tolerates them, and affords them the like protection, which it extends to all the lawful, peaceable, and praiseworthy purposes of associated citizens, including contracts, and all other things, not repugnant to the constitution and established policy: then the question would be, *what is the obligation to maintain public worship, on the sabbath?*

344. The respect to be paid to the sabbath is supposed to rest on the following considerations:

First. It is clear, to every well informed person, that the material system of being (which is apparent to every human eye that is not wilfully closed,) did proceed from supreme Intelligence; that it is ordered by incomprehensible power, and adorable goodness; that man in his marvellous physical organization, and in his intellectual powers, and in his adaptation to partake in the bounties of this system, proceeds from the same Divine Author; that he begins, continues, and ends his connexion with that Author, on earth, in subjection to his will; that this complicated, and astonishing system, could not endure, and go on through its destiny, (whatever that may be,) without the unceasing presence, government, and providence of the Almighty. That, as man is so constituted, as to be enabled to discern, and be assured, that all these things are so, the natural and inevitable sentiment, that arises in his mind is, that he owes the reverence, submission, and gratitude due from the created, to the Creator.

Second. That this natural sentiment is confirmed by Divine revelation, whereby man is enabled to know what his true relation is to the Deity; that his duration does not terminate with the frail tenement of earth in which he abides, while human life is in process; but that he is surely intended to renew his existence, according to the manner in which he shall have obeyed, served, and rendered his homage, to the Author of his being.

345. *Third.* From these undeniable truths it follows, that as all men proceeded from one, and the same Creator, and as they are bound together by common interests, duties, sympathies, affections, and must act together, in the most important concerns of life, that concern, which is the most important of all, *the reverence of* God, should be manifested at convenient times, and in convenient *assemblies*, and with one heart and with one voice; that such social worship is encouraging, monitory, consoling and honorable, and is

worthy of the Deity, and of the objects of his common bounty.

346. If these opinions are received and admitted, as founded in the obvious relation of man to God, then it would follow, that some time should be set apart, in which all may join in the duties, which arise from it. There was a time assigned by Divine command among the Jews, which was a seventh in the succession of days. This appropriation is convenient to man's own nature, and to that of the creatures who are held in servitude to him, since it is the day of cessation from that labor which is necessary to man's well being; hallowed as the day of rest in the earth, and the day of homage to Heaven. It is one more among the innumerable proofs of divine goodness, that the mind of man is so ordered, that there may be a day of periodical return, when, by universal consent, and approbation, the busy and anxious scenes of life may be shut out, and an opportunity given to turn the course of thought to the design of life, its progress, its termination, and its consequences.

347. Viewed in its earthly relations, merely, and, if it were possible to disregard the Sabbath in its acknowledged relation to the Deity; still it is a precious day, to rational, social, sympathetic man. It is that day on which he knows that all men who acknowledge the existence, the presence, and the attributes of the Universal God, are engaged in rendering to him the duties of that acknowledgment. From the city, from the village, from lonely abodes, from the bosom of the deep, every where, rational, thankful, penitent, supplicatory man, offers at the same time, his humble tribute to the Most High. It is grateful to know that throughout the earth, millions of voices are raised at the same moment, in praise, and adoration.

348. There are still nearer views of the Sabbath, as connected with social and temporal happiness. They are peculiarly striking in this favored country. The Sabbath may be a *better day* in the United States of America, than it is almost any where else in the

world. It is surprising to an American to know, how small a portion of worshipping Christians, in Europe, hear clergymen of their own choosing; and how large a proportion of the places of public worship, are destitute of the accommodations, which are common in all our churches and meeting houses. It is unknown to any one, in this land, to conform to rules, and to use expressions, of which he does not approve in his acts of worship. It would be entirely inadmissible here, that any man should partake of the sacrament, and make a profession of religious creed, to qualify him for trust, and office. Here, there are no dignitaries in ecclesiastical power, who claim to be princes, because they are christians; nor any who live in the pomp and splendor of this world, to show to an admiring populace, the equality, and the humility, of spiritual perfection. Here, there are no classes shut out from social privileges, and rights, because they cannot conscientiously believe, profess, and worship, according to *statute law*.

349. The profession of christian faith elevates, among us, no one to an unnatural, and merely temporal distinction. All christians stand on the same level, as to rights and duties. Each one may choose for himself, what he will believe, and with whom he will worship, and by whose ministry he will be guided. There are few who can have anything, who may not have a place, appropriately their own, in the house of worship. No one is held to pay the tenth of the product of his labors, whether he wills to do so, or not, for the support of a ministry, whether he likes it, or not. All who appear in the house of worship, are where they would be; and are understood to be performing that duty, and service, which they prefer, and none other. It would be surprising, then, if the places of assembly on the sabbath, were not filled by a grateful, and respectable population; more surprising, still, that there should be any, in such a population, who are not suitably affected by the example of those who know the nature of their privileges, and who are disposed to derive the proper

benefit from them. There are a few, and but a few, comprising the unfortunate ignorant, and the habitually dissolute,) who do not regard the sabbath. There are some young persons who show their want of education, their acquired depravity, and their disregard of public opinion, by using the sabbath, and even the time devoted to religious instruction, *for purposes which they sadly mistake to be pleasure.* They are seen to be riding furiously to places of public resort, and returning from them, heated by intoxicating drinks. Such young persons are *marked* by those who see them. When they come to be men, and claim to be members of society, *they find they have been marked ;* and that they have fastened upon themselves, clogs, which they cannot shake off. They need the recommendation of worthy persons for employments, for introductions to respectable communion. They cannot be justly dissatisfied that their claims are disregarded ; and that they have lost their proper rank ; and must pass anew, through a probationary time, which they have sacrificed. They cannot, otherwise, reclaim the rank which is common to all the orderly, and virtuous.

350. There is a social sentiment in religious worship, in this country, which is likely to be felt, but in few Christian assemblies, in other countries. Those who meet, have a bond of union, in the common proprietorship, in the election of the clergyman, and in being accustomed to see each other, in their respective places. It may be, that some who so meet, rarely meet on any other occasion. But the sentiment of common interest, brotherly regard, and good will, grows up from the very fact of so assembling, though the occasions for personal expression of it may be very few. There is something, from the very constitution of human nature, which creates a common interest among those, who use the same terms of devotion, and to whom the same sentiments of instruction are addressed in common, by a teacher of their own choice. There is no compulsion in all this, but the common sense of

duty, right, and propriety; nor any binding association, but in the zeal, and fidelity of the teacher. It is greatly to the honor of the clergy among us, that they are zealous and faithful, and do merit the respect, confidence, and affection which they so generally obtain in our community. The inducements to engage in the ministry, are not attractive. It is much more a sense of duty, than any other motive; since in a country like this, the same talents, in many other vocations, would commonly secure more of what is called the goods of this world, than are to be obtained in the ministry.

351. We dare hardly express an opinion, which we trust will some day find more favor than it is likely to do at the present time, in relation to that part of the service which is called the *sermon*. We do not understand this to be an address to the Deity; though in His presumed presence, and in honor of *Him;* in social worship. It is the sentiments, and opinions of the pastor, to his flock, on their worldly, social, and pious duties. As we conceive of Religion, the contemplation of the Deity, in all his stupendous works; the scale of being far inferior to man, and down to the lowest; the whole order of vegetable being, and the connexion and mutual dependence of all, are subjects of adoration, as well as the intellectual power of man, and his moral, and religious perceptions. We know not, why subjects of this nature, should not be spoken of in assemblies of Christians, reverentially and piously; nor do we know why the thoughts, and considerations, which lead to the great progress of improvement, among the human family, are not subjects worthy of the place and the occasion. We rather incline to think, that in some modified manner, they are so. There are many persons, (whose opinions constitute an important part of the sum of opinion, on which every thing depends, in a free country,) whose unavoidable occupations preclude them from the satisfying inquiries, which it cannot be unbecoming to find answered, from the sacred desk.

352. It is undoubtedly true, that society is advancing in the knowledge of its rights, and duties, especially in our own country, in an unprecedented manner. It must be obvious to all reflecting minds, that the clergy must keep even, at least, with the very front of advancement. There are, and probably will continue to be, controversial discussions on religious subjects, intermingled necessarily with, and often depending upon, the most diligent and learned researches. It is expected by parishioners, that they are to be occasionally instructed, in the character, and progress of these discussions; and that they shall, on proper calls for it, have the judgment of their own teacher. It is expected too of the clergy, when out of the desk, that they shall, at proper seasons, make known, that the passing world is not unobserved, nor unstudied by them. They are, on many important occasions, (promotive of the general welfare, in morals, and in the improvement in which all are interested,) able counsellors, and effective agents, no less from weight of character, than from sound and judicious talent. We, therefore, with the most respectful consideration for long continued habits, venture to suggest a doubt, whether more be not expected from the clergy, in the disposal of their time, than is useful to those to whom it is devoted. It is dutiful, and pleasant, to every clergyman to visit in his parish. The necessity for this visiting, is not what it once was. There are means of instruction, through the use of the press, and from the diffusion of knowledge, which make the personal instruction of the clergy, less essential; and in truth, parishioners, generally, are so much more enlightened than were their sometime predecessors, that, it would be doing them injustice to insist, that parochial visitings are as necessary as they once were. If any one should, in these days, take into consideration the number of hours, and days, which must be spent in visiting, in an extensive parish, and all other indispensable claims on a clergyman's time, he will be surprised to find how small a portion of time will be left, to present those results of study from the sacred desk,

which the actual condition of society demands. In most populous places, (it is believed) that the practice of mere formal visiting, has yielded to the reason of the thing; and that it is not expected as a duty. This is one of the proofs of increasing good sense. Parishioners are compensated for the loss of a visit, by their share in the honorable fame of their minister, and in the general improvement of the character of society.

We have ventured these remarks from the exalted respect which we entertain for the clerical duties in a country, where they must be performed, if performed at all, because the refinement and good sense, of the community, call for them ;—and, because, we entertain the like respect for the clergy, as a body of men, to whom this country ever has been, and as we hope, and believe, ever will be, gratefully indebted.

353. With respect to the manner in which that part of the sabbath shall be passed, which is not given to public worship, there is a well-known difference of opinion. No public law can regulate this matter. It can go no further than to provide, that those who engage in worship, shall not be disturbed; and that it shall be a day of rest, and cessation from the common business of life; except, that we believe, that it is constitutionally right in most of the states, to prohibit resort to public places, for purposes inconsistent with moral duty. We entertain no doubt that it must be competent to any, and every truly christian, and moral people, to interdict all acts which tend to immoralities, and especially on the sabbath. It cannot be doubted that the good sense of the public, would sustain the law-making, and executive power, in going much farther than they do now go. Surely some of the modes of passing the sabbath, in this country, are not such as are useful, or justifiable, on the part of those who might be restrained, if there were no other motive than their own good. All this depends on the will of the community, who have the power, if they choose to exert it, of making changes for the benefit of all, and without the least violation of any right, or proper privilege.

354. There is an appropriation of part of the sabbath day, which has lately attracted the public attention, and patronage, and which, it is believed, cannot be too much respected, and commended. We allude to SUNDAY SCHOOLS. Many very young persons, and many who are between tender age, and adult life, have not the means, during the week, from various causes, to obtain the instruction, which is essential to their welfare. There are many persons, who have attained full age, who would be benefitted by instruction no less than their juniors. Persons who are busily engaged in factories, and in other occupations, which take up all the days of the week but the sabbath, would, it is hoped, if they had the opportunity, gladly employ a part of the latter day, in receiving instruction. It is due to some of the proprietors of manufacturing establishments to state, on all proper occasions, the sense of obligation, which this community feel, for their liberal provision to maintain sunday schools. It is to be hoped that such praiseworthy examples will have their just influence, and be every where followed. It is well known that many persons *of both sexes* who have been blessed with the advantages of education, have *volu-n tarily* given their services, and their pecuniary contributions, to promote and effect this truly charitable, and moral purpose. Next after the services, due individually and socially, to the *Almighty Benefactor* of the human family, surely, there can be no sabbath duty more worthy of the created and the Creator, than those which open the mind to a knowledge of HIS *works*, and of the duties which he has prescribed. Such employment of the sabbath is philosophically consistent with the nature of man, and of society. It is action; it is action to the most useful purposes. It is the sowing of seed which falls, not on a rock, nor by the way side; but in good ground; it will spring up, and bear precious fruits, the fragrance of which will ascend to heaven.

355. With some persons, the stillness and tranquillity of the sabbath is favorable to *self-examination*. By

this, we do not mean the contemplations of diseased fancy; nor attempts to feel and express thoughts, which the human mind cannot rationally entertain. These are unprofitable delusions; they are unknown to well informed and intelligent persons. True, practical self examination arises from considering man as he is, and not in relation to an imaginary state of being, alike unfit for him, and irreconcileable to the true conceptions of the Deity. Man is a material, intellectual, moral, social, and religious creature. His self examination can only relate to himself, *as such.* Its purpose is understood to be, a conscientious inquiry, whether one has lived up to the laws of nature, and of the Creator; and to discover wherein these laws have been departed from; and to strive to live in future, according to what one knows to be best, just, and right. A self examiner may be supposed to ask himself such questions as these: Have I duly considered my bodily frame, and its wonderful constitution, and uses;—have I endeavored to preserve it in a fit condition to render to myself, to my connexions, to society, and to its Creator, the duties for which he ordained, and gave it; have I misused, or abused, this frame, in any of its parts; have I failed to obey the universal command to preserve by care and industry, all things for use, which were meant for use? If I am in pain, sickness, weakness, or inability, what acts of mine have brought this trouble upon me; and in what course can I better perform my duties, and prevent such consequence, in the week to come?

Such examiner, might be supposed to question himself, also, after this manner: I find that another of the few weeks of this transitory life, is gone; how many more are allotted to me; *is there certainly even one more:* if time, if life itself, be a trust, what account have I to give, of the week that is gone; have I learned any thing; am I wiser or better, or more worthy of my own respect, and that of others, then I was on the last sabbath; have I let the hours run by *unmarked*, by any useful act of mine; have they gone by, stamp-

ed and forever, with marks which I shall, and must, behold again; shall I then find that this week went by, as it could, and would, if I had known its value, and as I may hereafter vainly wish it had? Have I begun any thing of which I have not well considered the end; have I considered before I acted; have I taken care of irrevocable deeds?

In what manner have I disposed of this week in the performance of my *social* trusts; have I done to others, as I would that they should do to me; have I escaped vain and criminal anger; have I said of any one, unlawfully, that which I should not dare to say to him; have I been gentle, charitable, civil, cheerful, kind hearted; have I rendered that which is due; have I made promises, which I cannot perform, or any which I should not make; whom have I offended; to whom have I given just cause of complaint that I knew not the laws of individual, or social life; if my peace of mind is disturbed, if a blush tinges my cheek, if a sigh bursts from my heart, if a tear dims my vision; *must* this have come over me, or could I have prevented it; might not this tranquil, blessed morn, have been to me, to my inmost heart, that which it is to those who know what is right, and who practise as they know?

Can I go, as I shall hereafter wish I had done, with a pure, healthy, earthly frame, becomingly covered with the products of ingenious and commendable industry, and with a peaceful, grateful, and devout mind, into a social assembly of christians; can I enter the temple of the Almighty, to thank him, that I live; that I am a rational being; that I live in a land of civil and religious freedom; that I can, and may, cultivate all the powers which he has given me, to my own benefit, and to his glory; that I am permitted to come into his presence, with intelligent, rational, virtuous, and devout citizens, who know, feel, and are grateful for, the blessings of the gospel, and the unrestrained right of profiting of the exalted hopes, and rewards, which it promises?

356. There is a portion of the sabbath day, after the

public services are concluded, and also the evening of that day, which are passed in different modes by persons, who agree in most respects (it is believed,) as to the manner, in which the preceding parts of the day should be passed. By some persons this portion of time is, in whole or in part, devoted to reading, either the scriptures, or some other book, connected with religious instruction. By some persons, it is regarded as a proper time for self-examination and reflection. By many others it is devoted, in whole or in part, to domestic instruction on christian duties. Others, again, consider that the evening especially, is a proper time for family friends, who are prevented from seeing each other at other times, to meet in a quiet and unoffending manner, for social intercourse. There seems to be no reasonable objection to either of these modes. It is to be remembered that the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath. * It is, therefore, to be passed in whole, in that way, which seems to be reasonably adapted to man's religious, moral and social character. There is one consideration of serious importance in relation to children. Certainly care should be taken, that they do not associate with the sabbath, privations, restrictions and exactions, which make the approach of that day, unwelcome. On the contrary, it materially concerns their welfare, and that of society, that their feelings, as to the day, should be such, that they can anticipate it with pleasure, and look back on it with continually increasing satisfaction.

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* It will be remembered by those who are accustomed to read the scriptures, that in the 2d chapter of Mark's gospel, these are the words of the Saviour: 'And the pharisees said unto him, "Behold, why do they on the sabbath day, that which is not lawful?" And he said unto them, "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath; therefore, the son of man is Lord also of the sabbath."'

CONCLUSION.

We have gone through the labor, which we proposed, in the introductory chapter. Whether we have answered all, or any of the questions therein stated, we must leave to the judgment of others. We discern nothing in the created universe that is not conformable to the most exalted power, wisdom, and benevolence, which the human mind is capable of conceiving. We see that the operation of general laws, in which man is no more to be regarded, than any other portion of animated being, visits one, or a small part, of the whole number, with affliction. That this, when properly separated from afflictions, which man is the author of, is of rare occurence. We hope that we have shown, why man should exist, and whence he comes, and whither he goes; and that if he be not a satisfied and grateful being, while he is a mortal he must accuse himself, and not complain that the system of being to which he belongs, is wrong and malevolent. We have attempted to prove that man individually, and socially, is capable of improvement; that he has removed himself from his original condition, and has advanced far, in disclosing his own powers, and in applying them in the promotion of his own happiness. But the main object, which we have had in view is to show, that he has much further to go in the same course; that the way is known to him; that there are no obstacles in it, which he may not remove. And, especially, has it been our object to show, that the means of improvement, in this country, are such as no other nation has ever been blessed with. The separation of a part of society from the great mass, and the concentration of all power in the separated part, but that of mere physical force, are deformities in society, and wholly unknown to American citizens. There are no rights political, ecclesiastical, or hereditary, to impede their advancement; nor any privileged number, who live in luxury, on the labors of others.

Here the physical, the intellectual, and moral power of society, may do whatsoever seems good. If our community does not go on in improvement, it must be because it *will not*, and not because it *cannot*. If these pages aid, however little, in the advancement, the labor of preparing them, will be looked back upon with pleasure.

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